PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

PART 21

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 180 THROUGH 183 AND EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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4	1585–2063	4195– 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065–2492	5461– 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493–2920	6647– 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921–3378	7889– 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379–3927	9108–10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929–4599	10518–12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601–5151	12278–13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153–5560	13709–14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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3	87 11–16–45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
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8	233 11–19–45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8–A	1792 12–18–45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8–B	1792 12–18–45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8–D	2480 1–5–46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11–19–45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11–20–45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11–21–45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11–21–45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11–21–45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11–21–45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11–23–45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed "*Modus Vivendi*," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(*a*) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (*b*) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 16Ø115; (*c*) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((*c*) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22–B	1783 12–18–45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22–C	1783 12–18–45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22–D	1783 12–18–45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11–26–45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11–27–45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11–27–45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11–27–45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11–28–45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11–29–45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11–29–45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G–2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33–A	2092 12–31–45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11–30–45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11–30–45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11–30–45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11–30–45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11–30–45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12–4–45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12–4–45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (Ø7Ø645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12–5–45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12–5–45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10–15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12–5–45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12–5–45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12–5–45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12–5–45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12–5–45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 3ØØ85Ø"; dispatch 3ØØ85Ø from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12–5–45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48–A	2093 12–31–45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12–6–45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC–1).
50	1053 12–6–45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

51	1053 12–6–45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC–22).
52	1053 12–6–45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12–6–45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12–6–45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12–6–45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12–6–45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12–6–45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B–17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12–6–45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12–6–45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12–6–45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12–7–45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12–10–45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed
63	1345 12–11–45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12–13–45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12–13–45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12–15–45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (Ø61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12–15–45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12–15–45	1689	Log of U. S. S. *Boise* for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12–15–45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12–15–45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12–15–45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12–15–45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12–15–45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74	1703 12–15–45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74–A	2768 1–19–46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12–15–45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11–15–45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12–15–45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12–17–45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12–17–45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12–17–45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12–17–45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12–17–45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP–16).
83	1754 12–17–45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (Ø31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12–17–45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12–18–45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12–18–45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12–19–45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12–19–45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP–12)".
89	1938 12–20–45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12–31–45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12–31–45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12–31–45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12–31–45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G–2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12–31–45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12–31–45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12–31–45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12–31–45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12–31–45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12–31–45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12–31–45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12–31–45	2023	Log of U. S. S. *Enterprise* from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12–31–45	2107	Log of U. S. S. *Lexington* from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12–31–45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, *Enterprise* Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12–31–45	2122	"U. S. S. *Lexington* War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12–31–45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12–31–45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1–4–46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107–A	2479 1–5–46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1–4–46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1–5–46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1–5–46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1–15–46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1–15–46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1–16–46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113–A	2807 1–19–46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113–B	2807 1–19–46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113–C	3449 1–31–46	2538	(*a*) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, together with documents which approve same; (*b*) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1–16–46	2568	WPPac–46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac–46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1–16–46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (*a*) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (*b*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115–A	3449 1–31–46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115–B	3450 1–31–46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45–41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1–16–46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1–16–46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117–A	5015 2–20–46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1–16–46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1–16–46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1–16–46	2721	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (*b*) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (*c*) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1–16–46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1–16–46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the *U. S. S. Wright* from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126	2767 1-19-46	2832	(*a*) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (*b*) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1–21–46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874–7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132–A	5137 2–20–46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662–13665 Joint Committee Trarscript): (*a*) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (*b*) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (*c*) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (*d*) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1–23–46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1–23–46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1–23–46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27–28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1–23–46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1–23–46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1–23–46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (*b*) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2–7–46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2–7–47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2–7–46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2–7–46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2–8–46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2–13–46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2–18–46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2–19–46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2–20–46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2–20–46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2–20–46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4–11–46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4–11–46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4–11–46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4–11–46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4–11–46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161–A	5464 5–23–46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4–11–46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162–A	5464 5–23–46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4–11–46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. *Helena* from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4–11–46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4–11–46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5–23–46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5–23–46	3652	(*a*) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (*b*) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (*a*); (*c*) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (*a*); and (*d*) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (*a*) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5–23–46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed *modus vivendi*, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5–23–46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5–23–46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5–23–46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5–23–46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5–23–46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5–23–46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5–23–46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5–23–46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5–23–46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5–23–46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5–23–46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5–23–46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5–23–46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5–23–46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G–2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5–23–46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the *Utah* by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940–45 production of B–17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 180

Table of Contents

1. Abbreviated chart of War Department Organization and Personnel as of December 7, 1941.
2. Abbreviated chart of Hawaiian Department Organization and Personnel as of December 7, 1941.
3. Abbreviated organization chart of the War Department, effective December 7, 1941.
4. Abbreviated chart of the Organization and Personnel of the Navy Department as of December 7, 1941.
5. Abbreviated Tactical Organization Chart, U. S. Pacific Fleet, December 7, 1941.

ABBREVIATED CHART OF WAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL ON 7 DECEMBER 1941



ABBREVIATED CHART OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL ON 7 DECEMBER 1941



ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT



a All air functions with civilian officials.
b Also Chief of Army Air Forces.
c All procurement except aircraft (less armament).
d GHQ now supersedes War Plans Division in the organization and control of task forces and operations. It will continue to direct the training of the Ground Forces and combined air-ground training.

Approved: CHIEF OF STAFF.

NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION, 7 DECEMBER 1941

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
- Naval Aide Comdr. Frank E. Beatty
- Technical Aide
- Petroleum Reserves
- Lend Lease Liaison
- Public Relations, Rear Adm. A. J. Hepburn, ret.
- Interior Control Board, Rear Adm. W. R. Sexton, ret.
- Joint Boards
- Board of Inspection and Survey (for new construction)
- Research and Development Board
- Defense Savings Bonds

Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal
- Naval Aide
- Compensation Board
- Naval Examining Board
- Naval Retiring Board
- Board of Medical Examiners
- Army and Navy Munitions Board
- Procurement and Legal Division
- Naval Contract Distribution Division
- Certification Supervisory Unit
- Office of Judge Advocate General, Rear Adm. W. B. Woodson

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard
- Naval Aide
- Shore Establishments Division, Rear Adm. C. W. Fisher
- Shore Station Development Board
- Training, Liaison and Coordination Division
- Administrative Office

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus Gates
- Naval Aide
- Army and Navy Aeronautical Board

Office of Budget and Reports, Capt. E. G. Allen

Bureau of Navigation—Rear Adm. C. W. Nimitz
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery—Rear Adm. R. T. McIntire
Bureau of Ships—Rear Adm. S. M. Robinson
Bureau of Ordnance—Rear Adm. W. H. P. Blandy
Bureau of Supply and Accounts—Rear Adm. R. Spear
Bureau of Yards and Docks—Rear Adm. B. Moreell
Bureau of Aeronautics—Rear Adm. J. H. Towers

Office of Chief of Naval Operations—Adm. H. R. Stark
- Assistant CNO—Rear Adm. R. E. Ingersoll
- Interdepartmental Committee Division—Rear Adm. S. C. Hooper
- Central Division—Capt. R. E. Schuirmann
- Inspection Division—Rear Adm. J. W. Wilcox, Jr.
- Fleet Training Division—Capt. W. A. Lee, Jr.
- Fleet Maintenance Division—Capt. R. H. English
- Ships Movements Division—Rear Adm. R. M. Brainard
- Naval Districts—Rear Adm. A. Sharp
- Communications Division—Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes
  - Assistant—Capt. J. R. Redman
- Communications Security Section—Comdr. L. F. Safford
- Intelligence Liaison Section—Lt. W. W. Bayley
- War Plans Division—Rear Adm. R. K. Turner
  - Assistant—Capt. H. W. Hill
- Plans Section—Capt. O. M. Read
  - Assistant—Comdr. R. O. Glover

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox—Continued.
Office of Chief of Naval Operations—Continued.
Office of Naval Intelligence—Capt. T. S. Wilkinson
Assistant—Capt. H. F. Kingman
Domestic and Special Intelligence—Capt. J. B. W. Waller
Security—Lt. Comdr. E. S. Earnhardt
Counter-Subversion—Comdr. Hartwell C. Davis
Foreign Intelligence—Capt. W. A. Heard
Far East—Comdr. A. H. McCollum
Lt. Comdr. A. D. Kramer
Central Europe—Comdr. E. H. Von Heimburg

U. S. Pacific Fleet—Adm. H. E. Kimmel
U. S. Atlantic Fleet—Adm. E. J. King
U. S. Asiatic Fleet—Adm. T. C. Hart
Marine Corps Hq. and Activities—Maj. Gen. T. Holcomb, Commandant
Coast Guard Hq. and Activities
Naval Coastal Sea Frontiers

1st Naval District, Boston, Mass.—Rear Adm. W. T. Tarrant.
3rd Naval District, New York, N. Y.—Rear Adm. E. J. Marquart
4th Naval District, Philadelphia, Pa.—Rear Adm. A. E. Watson
5th Naval District, Norfolk, Va.—Rear Adm. M. H. Simons
6th Naval District, Charleston, S. C.—Rear Adm. W. H. Allen
7th Naval District, Key West, Fla.—Capt. R. S. Crenshaw
8th Naval District, New Orleans, La.—Capt. J. A. Thompson, Jr.
9th Naval District, Great Lakes, Ill.—Rear Adm. J. Downes
10th Naval District, San Juan, P. R.—Rear Adm. J. H. Hoover
11th Naval District, San Diego, Calif.—Rear Adm. C. H. Blakley
12th Naval District, San Francisco, Calif.—Rear Adm. J. W. Greenslade
13th Naval District, Seattle, Wash.—Rear Adm. C. S. Freeman
14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.—Rear Adm. C. C. Bloch
15th Naval District, Balboa, C. Z.—Rear Adm. F. H. Sadler
16th Naval District, Cavite, P. I.—Rear Adm. F. W. Rockwell
Potomac River Naval Command—Rear Adm. G. T. Pettingill
Severn River Naval Command—Rear Adm. G. T. Pettingill

NOTE.—The U. S. Atlantic Fleet, the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the U. S. Asiatic Fleet together comprise the U. S. Fleet, whose commander-in-chief is appointed from among the (and is the senior of) the commanders-in-chief of the component fleets. The U. S. Fleet is an administrative organization for training purposes only and is a task organization only when two or more fleets are concentrated or are operating in conjunction with each other.
All offices, divisions and bureaus, etc., are not subdivided; the subdivisions of those broken down are not exhaustive, and include only those sub-offices of more or less frequent mention during the Congressional Investigation of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
Ranks of officers are as of 7 December 1941.

TACTICAL ORGANIZATION—U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 7 DECEMBER 1941

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet—Admiral Husband E. Kimmell
Task Force One—Vice Adm. W. S. Pye, Commander
Task Force Two—Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey, Commander
Task Force Three—Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, Commander
Task Force Four—Vice Adm. C. C. Bloch, Commander
Task Force Seven—Rear Adm. Thomas Withers, Commander
Task Force Eight—Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey, Commander
Task Force Nine—Rear Adm. P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander
Task Force Twelve—Rear Adm. J. H. Newton, Commander
Task Force Fifteen—Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun, Commander

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE ONE

Vice Admiral W. S. Pye (ComBatFor)
BatDiv Two, 3 BB, VO-2 (9 VOS)
Rear Admiral D. W. Bagley, ComBatDiv 2
Tennessee, Capt. C. E. Reordan
California, Capt. J. W. Bunkley
Pennsylvania, Capt. C. M. Cooke, Jr.
BatDiv Four, 3 BB, VO-4 (9VOS)

Vice Admiral W. S. Pye—Continued.
Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson, ComBatDiv 4
West Virginia, Capt. M. S. Bennion
Colorado, Capt. L. E. Lindsey
Maryland, Capt. E. W. McKee
CarDiv One less *Lexington*—1 CV
Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch, ComCarDivOne
Saratoga, Capt. A. H. Douglas
Saratoga Air Group
VB–3 VO–3
VS–3 VT–3
CruDivNine, 5 CL, VCS9 (20 VSO)
Rear Admiral H. F. Leary, ComCruDivNine
Honolulu, Capt. H. Dodd
Phoenix, Capt. H. E. Fischer
Boise, Capt. S. B. Robinson
Helena, Capt. R. H. English
St. Louis, Capt. G. H. Rood
DesFlotOne less DesRonFive
Rear Adm. R. A. Theobald, ComDesFlotOne (10 CL, 2 DL, 16 DD)
Raleigh, Capt. R. B. Simons
DesRonOne, Capt. A. R. Early
Phelps, Comdr. W. Nyquist
DesDivOne, Comdr. W. S. Popham
Dewey, Comdr. A. J. Detzer, Jr.
MacDonough, Lt. Cdr. J. M. McIsaac
Worden, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Pogue
Hull, Lt. Cdr. R. F. Stout
DesDivTwo, Comdr. C. W. Flynn
Alwyn, Lt. Cdr. R. H. Rodgers
Farragut, Lt. Cdr. G. P. Hunter
Monaghan, Lt. Cdr. W. P. Burford
Dale, Lt. Cdr. H. E. Parker
DesRonThree, Comdr. T. J. Keliher, Jr.
Clark, Comdr. M. T. Richardson
DesDivFive, Comdr. L. P. Lovette
Cassin, Lt. Cdr. D. F. J. Shea
Reid, Lt. Cdr. H. F. Pullen
Downes, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Fair
Conyngham, Lt. Cdr. B. S. Anderson
DesDivSix, Comdr. A. M. Bledsoe
Case, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Bedilion
Shaw, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Jones
Tucker, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Terrell
Cummings, Lt. Cdr. G. D. Cooper
Oglala plus MinDivOne, 1 CM, 4 DM
Rear Adm. W. R. Furlong, ComMinBatFor
Oglala, Cdr. E. P. Speight
MinDivOne, Comdr. J. F. Crowe, Jr.
Pruitt, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr.
Preble, Lt. Cdr. C. F. Chillingworth, Jr.
Sicard, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Schultz
Tracy, Lt. Cdr. G. R. Phelan

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWO

Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComAirBatFor*
BatDivOne, 3 BB, Vo–1 (9 VOS)
Rear Admiral I. C. Kidd, ComBatDivOne
Arizona, Capt. F. Valkenburgh
Nevada, Capt. F. W. Scanland
Oklahoma, Capt. E. J. Foy
CarDivTwo, 1 CV
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComCarDivTwo

*After formation of Task Force Eight, Command of Task Force Two passed to Rear Admiral M. F. Draemel.

Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey—Continued.
Enterprise,** Capt. G. D. Murray
Enterprise Air Group
VB–6
VS–6
VO–6
VT–6
CruDivFive, 4 CA, VCS 5 (16 VSO)
Rear Admiral R. A. Spruance, ComCruDivFive
Northampton,** Capt. W. D. Chandler, Jr.
Salt Lake City,** Capt E. M. Zacharias
Pensacola, Capt. N. Scott
Chester,** Capt. T. M. Shock
DesFlotTwo (10 CL, 2 DL, 16 DD)
Rear Admiral M. F. Draemel, ComDesFlotTwo
Detroit, Capt. L. T. Willtsie
DesRonFour, Capt. J. H. S. Desser
Selfridge, Comdr. W. Craig
DesDivSeven, Comdr. L. B. Austin
Henley, Lt. Cdr. R. H. Smith
Blue, Lt. Cdr. H. N. Williams
Bagley, Lt. Cdr. G. A. Sinclair
Helm, Lt. Cdr. C. E. Carroll
DesDivEight, Comdr. S. B. Brewer
Mugford, Lt. Cdr. E. W. Young
Jarvis, Lt. Cdr. J. R. Topper
Patterson, Lt. Cdr. F. R. Walker
Ralph Talbot, Lt. Cdr. R. Earle, Jr.
DesRonSix, Capt. R. L. Conolly
Balch,** Comdr. C. J. Rend
DesDivEleven, Comdr. C. P. Cecil
Gridley,** Lt. Cdr. E. A. Solomons
Maury,** Lt. Cdr. E. D. Snare
Craven,** Lt. Cdr. C. F. M. Quinby
McCall,** Lt. Cdr. F. Moosbrugger
DesDidTwelve, Comdr, E. P. Sauer
Dunlap,** Lt. Cdr. V. R. Roane
Fanning,** Lt. Cdr. W. R. Cooke, Jr.
Ellet,** Lt. Cdr. F. H. Gardner
Benham,** Lt. Cdr. F. M. Worthington
MinDivTwo, 4 DM
Comdr. R. P. Whitemarsh, ComMinDivTwo
Gamble, Lt. Cdr. D. A. Crandell
Montgomery
Ramsey, Lt. Cdr. G. L. Sims
Breese, Lt. Cdr. H. F. Stout

**These ships formed Task Force Eight in accordance with CincPac Dispatch 280447 November 1941.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE

Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, ComScoFor
CruDivFour, 4 CA, VCS 4 (16 VSO)
Rear Admiral J. H. Newton, ComCruDivFour
Chicago,* Capt. B. N. Bieri
Louisville, Capt. E. B. Nixon
Portland,* Capt. C. E. VanHook
Indianapolis, Capt. E. W. Hanson
CruDivSix, 4 CA, VCS 6 (16 VSO)
Rear Admiral F. J. Fletcher, ComCruDivSix
Minneapolis, Capt. F. J. Lowry
New Orleans, Capt. H. H. Good
Astoria,* Capt. P. B. Haines
San Francisco, Capt. D. J. Callaghan

*These ships formed into Task Force Twelve in accordance with CincPac Mailgram 040237 December 1941.

Vice Admiral Wilson Brown—Continued.
Lexington plus MAG 21, 1 CV
Capt. F. C. Sherman, CoLexington
*Lexington,** Capt. F. C. Sherman
Lexington Air Group
VB–2
VS–2
VO–2
VT–2
Marine Air Group 21
Hq and Service Squadron 21
VMF–211**
VMSB–231***
VMSB–232
VMJ–252
DesRonFive, 1 DL, 8 DD
Capt. H. E. Overeach, ComDesRonFive
Porter, Lt. Cdr. F. I. Entwistle
DesDivNine, Comdr. G. C. Kriner
*Drayton,** Lt. Cdr. L. A. Abercrombie
*Lamson,** Lt. Cdr. P. V. Mercer
*Flusser,** Lt. Cdr. G. H. Lyttle
*Mahan,** Lt. Cdr. R. W. Simpson
DesDivTen, Comdr. J. V. Murphy
Cushing, Lt. Cdr. C. Noble
Preston, Comdr. T. J. O'Brien
Perkins, Lt. Cdr. T. F. Wellings
Smith, Comdr. F. I. McInerney
MinRonTwo, 13 DMS
Comdr. G. F. Hussey, Jr., ComMinRonTwo
Hopkins, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Clark
MinDivFour, Comdr. W. D. Hart, Jr.
Perry, Lt. Cdr. R. E. Elliot
Zane, Lt. Cdr. L. M. Lehardy
Wasmuth, Lt. Cdr. J. L. Willfong
Trever, Lt. Cdr. J. S. Smith, Jr.
MinDivFive, Comdr. S. H. Hurt
Southard, Lt. Cdr. J. B. Cochran
Hovey, Lt. Cdr. J. E. Florance
Long, Lt. Cdr. W. S. Veeder
Chandler, Lt. Cdr. H. H. Tramroth
MinDivSix, Comdr. E. D. Gibb
Dorsey, Lt. Cdr. R. M. McKinnan
Lamberton, Lt. Cdr. W. J. O'Brien
Boggs, Ct. Cdr. D. G. Roberts
Elliott, Lt. Cdr. C. Reynolds
TrainRonFour, 6 AP
Harris, Capt. O. M. Forster
Zeilin, Capt. P. Buchanan
Pres. Jackson, (not commissioned until 1942)
Pres. Adams, Cdr. C. W. Brewington
Pres. Hayes (not commissioned until 1942)
Crescent City, Cdr. W. C. Calhoun
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment
Major General C. B. Vogel

NOTE.—Task Force Three, less those ships assigned to Task Force Twelve, those on the West and East Coasts, those in Pearl Harbor, those operating independently in the Fleet Operating Area 25 miles south of Oahu, and the USS *Louisville* (on Escort Duty in the Solomons Islands Area), was operating as Task Force Three off Johnston Island on 7 December 1941, under command of Admiral Brown.

*These ships formed into Task Force Twelve in accordance with CincPac Mailgram 040237 December 1941.
**12 planes of VMF–211 transported to Wake by Task Force Eight.
***CincPac Mailgram 040237 which formed Task Force Twelve, directed the transport of VMSB–231 to Midway.

Vice Admiral Wilson Brown—Continued.
Major General C. B. Vogel—Continued.
Indianapolis, Captain E. W. Hanson
Southard, Lt. Cdr. J. B. Cochran
Hopkins, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Clark
Long, Lt. Cdr. W. S. Veeder
Dorsey, Lt. Cdr. R. M. McKinnon
Elliot, Lt. Cdr. C. D. Reynolds

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE FOUR

Vice Admiral C. C. Bloch, Com14NavalDistrict: (That Part of the 14th Naval District activities which involve the Island Bases.)
Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District
Vice Admiral C. C. Bloch, ComFourteen
In Shore Patrol, Comdr. G. B. Wooley
Outer Harbor Patrol
Channel Entrance Patrol
USS *Ward*, Lt. Cdr. Wm. W. Outerbridge
Ready Duty Destroyer
USS *Monaghan*
Harbor Channel Patrol
Entrance Channel Patrol
One Power Boat
Boom Patrol
One Power Boat
Inner Harbor Patrol
Four Power Boats
A/B Boom
Minecraft
Condor, Lt. Cdr. M. H. Hubbell
Reedbird
Cocicatoo
Crossbill
Keosanqua
Base Defense Air Force
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger
Search and Attack Group
Air Combat Group
(Planes not permanently assigned. Forces supplied from available Army, Navy and Marine units in event of an air alarm.)
Anti-Aircraft Defenses
Colonel H. K. Pickett, USMC
Harbor Control Post
Comdr. H. B. Knowles

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE SEVEN

Rear Admiral Thomas Withers, ComSubScoFor
SubRonFour less SubDiv 41, (1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD)
Capt. F. A. Naubin, ComSubRonFour
Argonaut, Lt. Cdr. S. G. Barchet
Litchfield, Lt. Cdr. F. H. Ball
Widgeon, Lt. Cdr. J. A. Flennikan
Seagull, Lt. Cdr. D. B. Candler
SubDiv 42, Cdr. C. H. Roper
Narwhal, Lt. Cdr. C. D. Wilkins
Dolphin, Lt. Cdr. G. B. Rainer
Nautilus, Lt. Cdr. J. P. Thew
Argonaut, Lt. Cdr. S. G. Barchet
SubDiv 43, Cdr. N. S. Ives
Plunger, Lt. D. C. White
Pollack, Lt. Cdr. S. P. Mosely
Cachalot, Lt. Cdr. W. N. Christensen
Pompano, Lt. Cdr. L. S. Pairks
Cuttlefish, Lt. Cdr. W. P. Huttle

Rear Admiral Thomas Withers—Continued.
SubRonSix, 12 SS, 1 AS
Comdr. A. R. McCann, ComSubRonSix
Pelias, Cdr. W. Wakefield
SubDiv 61, Cdr. C. D. Edmunds
Tambor, Lt. Cdr. J. W. Murphy, Jr.
Tautog, Lt. Cdr. J. H. Willingham, Jr.
Thresher, Lt. Cdr. W. L. Anderson
Gar, Lt. Cdr. D. McGregor
Grampus, Lt. Cdr. E. S. Hutchinson
Grayback, Lt. W. A. Saunders
SubDiv 62
Triton, Lt. Cdr. W. A. Lent
Trout, Lt. Cdr. F. W. Fenno, Jr.
Tuna, Lt. Cdr. J. J. Crane
Grayling, Lt. Cdr. E. Olson
Grenadier, Lt. Cdr. A. R. Joyce
Gudgeon, Lt. Cdr. E. W. Grenfell
SubRonEight, 6 SS, 1 AS
ComSubRonEight
Fulton, Comdr. A. D. Douglas
SubDiv 81
Gato, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Myers
Greenling, Lt. Cdr. H. C. Burton
*Grouper**
*Growler**
*Grunion**
*Guardfish**
SubRonTen, 4 SS, 1 AS
ComSubRonTen
*Sperry**
SubDiv 101
Drum, Lt. Cdr. R. H. Rice
*Flying Fish**
*Finback**
SubDiv 102
*Silversides**

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE EIGHT

Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComAirBatFor
(NOTE.—Task Force Eight was formed, in accordance with CincPac dispatch 280447 November 1941, from units of Task Force Two.)
CarDivTwo, 1 CV
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComCarDivTwo
Enterprise, Capt. G. D. Murray
Enterprise Air Group
BV-6
VF-6
VS-6
VT-6
CruDivFive less *Pensacola*, 3 CA
Rear Admiral R. A. Spruance, ComCruDivFive
Northampton, Capt. W. D. Chandler, Jr.
Salt Lake City, Capt. E. M. Zacharias
Chester, Capt. T. M. Shock
DesRonSix, 1 DL, 8 DD
Capt. R. L. Conolly, ComDesRonSix
Balch, Comdr. C. J. Rend
DesDivEleven, Cdr. C. P. Cecil
Gridley, Lt. Cdr. E. H. Solomons
Maury, Lt. Cdr. E. W. Snoire
Craven, Lt. Cdr. C. F. M. S. Quinby
McCall, Lt. Cdr. F. Moosbrugger

*Not commissioned until 1942.

Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey—Continued.
Capt. R. L. Conolly—Continued.
Balch, Comdr. C. J. Rend—Continued.
DesDivTwelve, Cdr. E. P. Sauer
Dunlap, Lt. Cdr. V. R. Roane
Fanning, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Cooke, Jr.
Ellet, Lt. Cdr. F. H. Gardner
Benham, Lt. Cdr. F. M. Worthington

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE NINE

Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, ComBatWingTwo
PatWingOne, 36 VPB (A), 1 AV, 2 AUD, 1 AUP
Comdr. K. McGinnis, ComPatWingOne
Wright, Cdr. C. W. Weiber
Hulbert, Lt. Cdr. J. M. Lane
Ballard, Cdr. J. R. Dudley
Avocet, Lt. J. A. Jonson, Jr.
Patrol Squadron Eleven, Lt. J. A. Johnson
Patrol Squadron Twelve, Lt. Cdr. J. P. Fitzsimmons
Patrol Squadron Fourteen, Lt. Cdr. W. T. Rassieur
PatWingTwo, 42 VPB (A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, ComPatWingTwo
Curtiss, Cdr. S. P. Ginder
Tangier, Cdr. C. A. F. Sprague
Thornton, Lt. Cdr. J. L. Kane
McFarland, Lt. Cdr. W. F. Kline
Swan, Lt. F. E. Hall
Patrol Squadron Twenty-one, Lt. Cdr. G. T. Mundorff, Jr.
Patrol Squadron Twenty-two, Lt. Cdr. F. O'Bierne
Patrol Squadron Twenty-three, Lt. Cdr. F. M. Hughes
Patrol Squadron Twenty-four, Lt. Cdr. T. U. Sisson

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWELVE

Rear Admiral J. H. Newton, ComCruScoFor
(NOTE.—Task Force Twelve was formed, in accordance with CincPac Mailgram 040237 December 1941, from units of Task Force Three.)
Lexington, Capt. F. C. Sherman
Lexington Air Group
VB–2
VF–2
VS–2
VT–2
Chicago, Capt. B. H. Bieri
Portland, Capt. C. E. VanHook
Astoria, Capt. P. B. Haines
DesRonFive less DesDivTen
Capt. H. E. Overeach, ComDesRonFive
Porter, Lt. Cdr. F. I. Entwistle
DesDivNine, Cdr. G. C. Kriner
Drayton, Lt. Cdr. L. A. Abercrombie
Lamson, Lt. Cdr. P. V. Mercer
Flusser, Lt. Cdr. G. H. Lyttle
Mahan, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Simpson

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE FIFTEEN*

(Pacific Escort Force)

Rear Admiral W. L. Calhoun, ComBaseFor (Units assigned, 4 CA or CL)
Chester, Capt. T. M. Shock
Portland, Capt. C. E. VanHook
Louisville, Capt. E. B. Nixon
Boise, Capt. S. B. Robinson

*Task Force Fifteen was formed in accordance with CincPac Confidential letter A3/A16–3/CV/C12, Serial 01777 of 1 November 1941, from units of CruDivs 4, 5 and 9 (Task Forces 1, 2, 3, 8 and 12).

LOCATION OF SHIPS ON 7 DEC 1941

TASK FORCE ONE

Ship	*Type*	*Location*
Alwyn	DD	Pearl Harbor
Boise	CL	TF in Philippines near Panay
California	BB	Pearl Harbor
Case	DD	Do.
Cassin	DD	Do.
Clark	DD	Navy Yard, Mare Island
Colorado	BB	Puget Sound Navy Yard
Conyngham	DD	Pearl Harbor
Cummings	DD	Do.
Dale	DD	Do.
Dewey	DD	Do.
Downes	DD	Do.
Farragut	DD	Do.
Helena	CL	Do.
Honolulu	CL	Do.
Hull	DD	Do.
MacDonough	DD	Do.
Maryland	BB	Do.
Monaghan	DD	Do.
Oglala	CM	Do.
Pennsylvania	BB	Do.
Pheonix	CL	Do.
Phelps	DD	Do.
Preble	DM	Do.
Pruitt	DM	Do.
Raleigh	CL	Do.
Reid	DD	Do.
Saratoga	CV	San Diego
Shaw	DD	Pearl Harbor
Sicard	DM	Do.
St. Louis	CL	Do.
Tennessee	BB	Do.
Tracy	DM	Do.
Tucker	DD	Do.
West Virginia	BB	Do.
Worden	DD	Do.

TASK FORCE TWO

Ship	*Type*	*Location*
Arizona	BB	Pearl Harbor
Bagley	DD	Do.
++Balch	DD	Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w of P. H.
++Benham	DD	Do.
Blue	DD	Pearl Harbor
Breese	DM	Do.
++Chester	CA	Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w of P. H.
++Craven	DD	Do.
Detroit	CL	Pearl Harbor
++Dunlap	DD	Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w of P. H.
++Ellet	DD	Do.
++Enterprise	CV	Do.
++Fanning	DD	Do.
Gamble	DM	Pearl Harbor
++Gridley	DD	Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w of P. H.
Helm	DD	Pearl Harbor
Henley	DD	Do.
Jarvis	DD	Do.

Ship	Type	Location
++Maury	DD	Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w of P. H.
++McCall	DD	Do.
Montgomery	DM	Pearl Harbor
Mugford	DD	Do.
Nevada	BB	Do.
++Northampton	CA	Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w of P. H.
Oklahoma	BB	Pearl Harbor
Patterson	DD	Do.
Pensacola	CA	Escort Duty, Samoa Area
Ralph Talbot	DD	Pearl Harbor
Ramsay	DM	Do.
++Salt Lake City	CA	Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w of P. H.
Selfridge	DD	Pearl Harbor

TASK FORCE THREE

Ship	Type	Location
+Astoria	CA	TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Boggs	DMS	Fleet Operating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
Chandler	DMS	Do.
+Chicago	CA	TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Crescent City	AP	Charleston, S. C.
Cushing	DD	Navy Yard, Mare Island
Dorsey	DMS	Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
+Drayton	DD	TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Elliot	DMS	Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
+Flusser	DD	TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Harris	AP	San Diego
Hopkins	DMS	Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
Hovey	DMS	Fleet Operating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
Indianapolis	CA	Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
Lamberton	DMS	Fleet Operating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
+Lamson	DD	TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
+Lexington	CV	Do.
Long	DMS	Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
Louisville	CA	TF Escort Duty Solomons Island Area
+Mahan	DD	TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Minneapolis	CA	Fleet Operating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
New Orleans	CA	Pearl Harbor
Perkins	DD	Navy Yard, Mare Island
Perry	DMS	Pearl Harbor
+Porter	DD	TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
+Portland	CA	Do.
Pres. Adams	AP	Norfolk, Va.
Preston	DD	Navy Yard, Mare Island
San Francisco	CA	Pearl Harbor
Smith	DD	Navy Yard, Mare Island
Southard	DMS	Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
Trever	DMS	Pearl Harbor
Wasmuth	DMS	Do.
Zane	DMS	Do.
Zeilin	AP	Seattle, Wash.

TASK FORCE SEVEN

Ship	Type	Location
Argonaut	SM	Near Midway
Cachalot	SS	Pearl Harbor
Cuttlefish	SS	Navy Yard, Mare Island
Dolphin	SS	Pearl Harbor
Drum	SS	Portsmouth, N. H.
Fulton	AS	Off Guatemala
Gar	SS	Off Mexico
Gato	SS	New London, Conn.

Ship	*Type*	*Location*
Grampus	SS	Portsmouth, N. H.
Grayback	SS	Do.
Grayling	SS	San Diego, Calif.
Greenling	SS	New London, Conn.
Grenadier	SS	Portsmouth, N. H.
Gudgeon	SS	Pearl Harbor
Litchfield	DD	About 60 Mi. S. W. of Oahu
Narwhal	SS	Pearl Harbor
Nautilus	SS	Navy Yard, Mare Island
Pelias	AS	Pearl Harbor
Plunger	SS	About 200 Mi. E. of Oahu
Pollack	SS	Do.
Pompano	SS	Do.
Seagull	AM	Lahaina
Tambor	SS	Near Wake
Tautog	SS	Pearl Harbor
Thresher	SS	About 60 Mi. S. W. of Oahu
Triton	SS	Off Wake
Trout	SS	Off Midway
Tuna	SS	Navy Yard, Mare Island
Widgeon	ASR	Pearl Harbor

TASK FORCE NINE

Ship	*Type*	*Location*
Avocet	AVD	Pearl Harbor
Ballard	AVD	En route San Diego to Mare Island
Curtiss	AV	Pearl Harbor
Hulbert	AVD	Do.
McFarland	AVD	Do.
Swan	AVP	Do.
Tangier	AV	Do.
Thornton	AVD	Do.
Wright	AV	About 300 Mi. W. of Oahu

EXHIBIT NO. 181

[The United States News, September 1, 1945 (Extra Number)]

FULL TEXT OF THE OFFICIAL REPORTS CONCERNING THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN RELEASING THE ARMY AND NAVY REPORTS, AUGUST 29, 1945

I have here reports on the Pearl Harbor disaster. One is from the Army and one is from the Navy. The Navy report gives a "Finding of Facts" by a Navy Court of Inquiry. Attached to this Finding of Facts are endorsements by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Rear Admiral T. I. Gatch; Admiral E. J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of the Navy. You will find a summation of the findings in the final endorsement by the Secretary of the Navy at the end of the document.

From the Army we have the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and, bound separately, a statement by the Secretary of War. Certain criticisms of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, appear in the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. You will notice in the Secretary's statement that he takes sharp issue with this criticism of General Marshall, stating that the criticism "is entirely unjustified." The conclusion of the Secretary of War is that General Marshall acted throughout this matter with his usual "great skill, energy and efficiency." I associate myself wholeheartedly with this expression by the Secretary of War.

Indeed I have the fullest confidence in the skill, energy and efficiency of all our war leaders, both Army and Navy.

[1] [a] REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the Provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces Upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to Make Such Recommendations as It May Deem Proper. Also, To Consider the Phases Which Related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as Directed by the Acting Secretary of War, in His Memorandum for The Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944

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Legends: RR—Roberts Record; R—APHB Record; D—Document; Ex—Exhibit. Italics ours unless otherwise stated

Chapter 1. Preamble: Authority for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and Its Action Taken

This Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, by Letter Order A. G. O. 8 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)) as amended by Letter Order A. G. O. 11 July 1944 AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jun 44)) and Letter Order A. G. O. 22 August 1944 (AGPO-A-A 248.7 (2 Aug 44)), and as supplemented by Supplemental Letter Order A. G. O. 22 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 July 44)) which order made reference to a memorandum for The Judge Advocate General of 12 July 1944—Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944 alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects, and which was signed by Robert P. Patterson, Acting Secretary of War. This supplemental order directed the Board to consider the phase of the report which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster.[1]

Composition of the Board:

Lieut. Gen. George Grunert, 01534, USA
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02871, USA
Col. Charles W. West, 012774, JAGD, Recorder (without vote)
Col. Harry A. Toulmin, 0205520, AC, Executive Officer (without vote)
Maj. Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, Assistant Recorder (without vote)

The Board interpreted these orders and the memorandum referred to as confining its investigation to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The Board convened 20 July 1944 and was in continuous session from 24 July 1944 to 20 October 1944. It held hearings twice in Washington, D. C.; twice in San Francisco, Calif.; and in Hawaii. It has heard a total of 151 witnesses and has interviewed many additional potential witnesses whom it found did not have any pertinent information. There has been no available document, witness, suggestion or lead which promised any materiality that has not been carefully investigated by this Board. Every witness has been invited to give, in addition to his testimony, any suggestions, opinions, leads to evidence, or any other information that might possibly be pertinent. It has been our purpose, and we believe we have effected it, to explore every available piece of information on this subject. We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been secured. although we have found a few files from which important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we found these documents elsewhere or were able to prove them through copies in other hands.

This Board has been without power of subpoena, but in no instance has its invitation to appear and testify been ignored.

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[a] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1] See copies of orders and memorandum, Exhibits 65 to 69, inclusive.

[2] In view of the fact that the War Department appointed this Board, under a joint resolution of Congress,[2] to examine the Army's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster because Congress desired, as appears from the legislative history of the Joint Resolution, a more thorough study, it has been necessary to examine the record of the Roberts Commission and the Roberts Report in the light of the new testimony adduced by this Board, new witnesses, and new documents; and to set forth wherein the Board's findings are in harmony with the Roberts Report; or, if in conflict, are correct and supported by fuller evidence.

The Board has made, therefore, a careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts Commission. This Board has been materially helped and enlightened by the Report and Record of the Roberts Commission. We append to this report a section indicating the additional information and documents which have been made available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not come to the attention of the Roberts Commission; or, at least, were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents or reports of the Roberts Commission.

We have been greatly aided by the Interim Report, Committe on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, 2nd Session, pursuant to H. Rs. 30, A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs to Study the Progress of the National War Effort, and the Committee's records, counsel, and investigators, with particular reference to the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., Hans Wilhelm Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, and others, as such activities had a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor disaster and what led up to it. We have been aided by the testimony of counsel from that Committee and the complete record of the investigation of that Committee on this subject and its exhibits. We have also heard testimony and investigated reports and reviewed affidavits of additional affiants, whose testimony came to light, or documents were discovered, after the conclusion of the investigation of the Committee on Military Affairs, as indicated in its Interim Report. We have also been aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Report of the Tenney Committee in California.

We transmit with this report the record of testimony of the witnesses consisting of 41 volumes and 70 exhibits. In the appendix to this report is a tabulation in detail of the witnesses who testified and a list of the exhibits.

In order to facilitate the examination of the Board's record by the War Department and by any others who may have occasion to review the record and exhibits, we append to this report and make a part of it extensive analysis of the testimony of every witness, indexing each statement by reference to the record, and with cross references of those statements to different parts of the record where similar or different statements on the same subject were made by other witnesses. We have also added cross references to the same subject matter in the record of the Roberts Commission or the exhibits presented before that Commission. It is, therefore, possible for anyone reviewing this report to have a complete and, we believe, exhaustive analysis of every phase of the Pearl Harbor matters, so that any part of the situation can be easily and promptly reviewed.

In formulating this report the Board has been conscious of the deep spiritual and moral obligation, as well as its professional and patriotic duty, to present an impartial and judicial investigation and report. This we have earnestly endeavored to do, and have spared no pains or effort to that end. With that spirit

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[2] Public Law 339—78th Congress, Chapter 247—2nd Session, S. J. Res. 133, Joint Resolution : to extend the statute of limitation to certain cases.

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

"Approved June 13, 1944."

animating our actions, we have deemed it helpful and wise to present the state of mind and the background against which the events of the drama of Pearl Harbor could be adequately judged; and to sketch in retrospection the events and the knowledge of such events of each of the principal actors on the scene, so that their actions might be more fully understood and justly evaluated and judged. At no time, however, has the Board acted as a court.[3]

This is necessary because we are now passing upon the matter several years after the event. We have endeavored to effect this reconstruction to some degree in the second chapter entitled "Background." The same considerations have been evaluated in the succeeding chapters, as this background affected the events and actions of those involved in the matters under consideration. In so doing, we hope we have avoided the human failing so aptly pointed out by St. Paul of "forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before."

In Chapter III we have presented the story of Pearl Harbor. This is a running chronological story of the events that took place leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and through that fateful day and for a short period thereafer, so far as subsequent events reflected upon the conditions previously existing. We have discussed in this Chapter III the arguments for and against each principal proposition, have examined all of the representations and defenses of General Short and others involved in this matter. We have endeavored to state the surrounding facts and circumstances, the background, the considerations and factors which influenced each principal officer or official in the execution of his duties.

Therefore, whoever reads this report will have before him all of the considerations for and against any proposition, all facts, any defense or any claim put forward by those interested, and answers to such questions of import to the services and to the public, in order to have the foundation for an impartial judgment.

In Chapter IV we continue the story in so far as it pertains to Washington. In Chapter V we relate the story concerning the Pre-Pearl Harbor construction activities and in Chapter VI come to Conclusions.

The Board was after facts; and the surrounding conditions, background, and atmosphere which influenced the actors in this drama and brought them to their fateful decisions. This we believe we secured successfully from military and naval personnel of widely varying ranks; from civilians of varied stations in life; and from official and other contemporaneous publications. The range of witnesses ran from men in the ranks to generals and admirals, and from the humblest in civil life to United States Senators and the President's Cabinet.[4]

[3] Each witness was invited, additionally, to express freely his views and opinions on the record, and to submit any facts or leads to the discoveries of facts which might be helpful to this Board.

We set out with no thesis to prove, nor person to convict. Our approach has been, we hope, diligently and completely factual; and also equally impartial. Our conclusions are those compelled by the clear weight of the evidence from the facts set forth in the record.

CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND

1. *Introduction.*—The purpose of this explanation of the background of public and private events as they existed in 1940 and 1941 is this. There existed during this critical period much confusion of thinking and of organization, of conflict of opinion and diversity of views. The nation was not geared to war, either mentally or as an organization. It was a period of conflicting plans and purposes. The winds of public opinion were blowing in all directions; isolationists and nationalists were struggling for predominance; public opinion was both against war and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we are negotiating for peace with Japan, and simultaneously applying economic sanctions that led only to war; we were arming our forces for war and at the same time giving away much of such armament. The Administration, State, War and Navy departments in their policies, plans and operations were likewise being pushed here and there by the ebb and flow of war events, public reactions, diplomatic negotiations and newspaper attacks.

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[3] Whenever any interested witness raised a question of proof that had not beeen previously discussed, or fully examined, or any newspaper report raising any question came to our attention, we endeavored to get an answer so that the whole truth would be known once and for all.

[4] Whenever there was a shadow or a shade of a doubt, we resolved it in favor of running down the suggestion and introducing proof, if it had any suspicion of materiality.

The War Department by its actions and its organization was still on a peacetime basis; neither its management nor its general staff had perfected its organization for war or for the conduct of a large enterprise. The whole machinery of Government was geared to a different purpose and tempo than war. Valiant and brilliant men were struggling to bring order out of chaos, rather as individuals or as small groups, attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and to accomplish practical things. As a result a few men, without organization in the true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions that should have been the result of carefully directed commands, instead of action taken by conference. We were preparing for a war by the conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference method: we were even writing vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their contents by compromise instead of by command; that was the product of the time and conditions due to the transition from peace to war in a democracy.

Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for appropriate action and helpless before a strong course of events, that ran away with the situation and prematurely plunged us into war.

2. *Public Opinion.*—The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the responsibilities and courses of action taken by those connected therewith can better be understood when the background of public opinion and the state of the public mind are likewise understood. Psychological conditions had a material effect upon the events that took place. A brief review of the then state of mind of officials and the public: and the facts known to the public and to the Government; and our national policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper perspective.

Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its actions to a degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public opinion and the state of the public mind. Successful war is waged through a state of mind and a state of public readiness for war. A recognition of this fact is necessary to the understanding of the background of public opinion and the state of our desire to make war, which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and the responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation will lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain actions, or the failure to take action, on the part of the Washington departments concerned and the higher commanders in the field.

For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant even to consider a war.[5] There was a distinct lack of a war mind in the United States. Insolationist organizations and propaganda groups against war were powerful and vital factors affecting any war action capable of being tken by our responsible leadership. So influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts in minds of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by the people in the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves against Japan. Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war. There was little war spirit either amongst the general public or in the armed forces, due to this conflicting public opinion having its influence.[6] The events hereinafter recited must be measured against this important psychological factor.

At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of preparation. It had been at war for several years in China; both its people and Government were psychologically and physically geared to war and were implemented with a polished plan of action and equipment to do the job. It was animated by cunning, hatred and patriotism in a land where life is cheap; and nurtured in an atmosphere of insane nationalism and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation united for the single purpose of world conquest bsed on more than a thousand years of conflict.

As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan in 1932, he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for adequate prepara-

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[5] The close vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from active service and on a proposal to abandon Lend-Lease clearly reflect public opinion of that day and time in 1941.

[6] Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet with respect to the strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and what would have happened if our fleet had gone out into deep blue water to fight: "A fight would have occurred in which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred . . . our own losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our carriers." (R. 2878)

tion militantly to implement our diplomatic policy, because of Japan's readiness for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State, in the latter part of 1932:

"The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it wants war."

And he continued:

"At that time I said it would be criminally 'short-sighted,' I think, not to recognize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop in the Far East. Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches throughout the ten years of my service there, right up to the end" (R. 4201).

3. *U. S. Policy (1922–1939).*—The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor disaster can only be understood when we examine our national policy as administered by the State Department. That policy must be examined back a number of years to see the long-term treatment of Japan which had its bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster.

[4] An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of the United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on its fortifications of the Mandated Islands.

The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator under date of Dec. 17, 1920, the Convention for the Control of Trade and Arms and Ammunition between the Allied Powers under date of Sept. 10, 1919, and the Mandates between the United States and Japan regarding the former German islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator and particularly the island of Yap under date of Feb. 11, 1922, have the following in common:

a. "Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated territory, including control of public works and services, the importation of arms, etc. In short, it was a 'government in trust.'"

b. "No military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory."

c. "The Mandatory . . . allow missionaries, nationals of any state member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling."

d. "Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the Mandates, whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned or the one direct with the United States, are to be settled by a negotiation of 'The Permanent Court of International Justice.'"

e. "Vested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected and in no way impaired."

f. "The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the Mandated Islands."

g. "The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations and their respective nationals and all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable which may be hereafter laid or operated by the United States or its nationals connecting with the island of Yap."

h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom of action with respect to Yap.[7]

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[7] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board: "Japan was given under a League of Nations mandate full power to administer the Mandated Islands as an integral part of Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed in a treaty with Japan of Feb. 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands pursuant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically opened to foreign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit.

"Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of Feb. 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands provided that: 'Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the Mandated Islands.' Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and Japan on Feb. 21, 1911, contained the following provisions: 'The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties, equally with the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the country to which they thus come.'

"By exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing of the treaty with Japan of Feb. 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, Japan assured the United States that 'the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands.' The term 'usual comity' in its application to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries means the courtesy which is normally accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of other countries."

Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up to those treaty stipulations, the entire naval and military structure in the key Pacific islands erected by the Japanese might have been made possible. Japan, without authority of international law and in violation of the treaties and mandates above referred to, for nearly twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals from the mandated territory, and during this time built up army, navy and air installations of tremendous strategical value.

As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enormous advantage of a string of naval and air and army bases across our lifeline to the Philippines and rendered futile and impotent any fortification of our own islands, such as Guam, Midway, Christmas, Palmyra, etc. It also placed the dagger's point at the heart of the Hawaiian Islands because such a base as Jaluit in the Mandated Islands was a thousand miles closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan.

Our policy through the successive years appears have been based upon a combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to give offense to the Japanese; a policy which, because of their temperamental characteristics, proved to be one of weakness rather than of strength; it was also a policy of endeavoring to treat the Japanese on the basis that they were civilized and that their word could be trusted and at the same time one which treated them as if they were uncivilized and could not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the United States.

We entered the year of 1941 with two purposes in mind: first to avoid war and settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and contracts; and, while negotiating, we applied exactly the opposite remedy of economic sanctions.

Efforts to visit the Mandated Islands, presumably to glean information, were said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles, 101–107; Pye, 1064–1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527–1529; DeLaney, 1702–1703; Kimmel, 1807–1808; Layton, 3054–3055). The State Department explanation concerning these efforts is set forth below. The net result was, however, that we did not get into these islands; the Japanese fortified the islands and in consequence the United States suffered. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, presented his Department's views as follows:

"The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or private American vessels, just as visits in general by American nationals and American private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not call for a procedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to the Japanese Government and would not therefore have come within the cognizance of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of the Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplomatic action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record has been found in the Department's files of any application having been made by the Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the year 1940–1941, the years concerning which you made inquiry. According to the information made available to the Department in 1940, an officer attached to the Office of the Naval Attache in Tokyo inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company with regard to possibilities of making reservations for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subsequent efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the part of the Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that instance. . . .

"The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or ports in Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this Government in requesting per [5] mission for visits by its public vessels to the ports of other countries.

"No record has been found of any requests in 1940 and 1941 by the War or Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to visits to the Mandated Islands. In previous years the Navy Department at various times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States naval vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Mandated Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the Japanese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its readiness to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but not the unopened ports

named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. The Navy Department, however, cancelled the proposed visits to the opened ports for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this Government in 1936 and in 1937, the Japanese Government, on grounds of inconvenience, withheld its permission for United States public vessels to visit the opened ports as well as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands.

"In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in actual practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports in the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination in 1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922, this Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government decided to adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribilof Islands which the Japanese were permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Convention of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936 permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial waters of the Western Aleutian Islands."

The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed diplomatic immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying activities and unrestricted communication by radio and cable with the mainland of Japan in reporting upon the movements of our fleet and the status of our armed defenses in Hawaii.[8] Neither the Army, the Navy, nor the F. B. I. had authority to tap these lines and find out what was going on because of our own legal restriction, the Communications Act of 1934.[9]

No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the results thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in Honolulu. This man had about 200 consular agents in the Islands. He used the commercial telephone and telegraph for reporting on our defenses and fleet movements with impunity. When he was arrested with his agents on December 7, a large number of his messages were found in the wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a result of eight months' work in piecing a portion of these together, Colonel Fielder, G–2 under General Short and since that time G–2 in Hawaii, produced a number of these reconstructed messages which clearly revealed that military information was being gathered and transmitted to Japan. The day before this event took place a radiophone message, that was monitored, between a Japanese doctor's house in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and reported, late on December 6, and was given extensive consideration by General Short and Colonel Fielder, G–2; but its exact meaning could not be made out. This message is referred to as the Mori message (R. 2961). The next morning the Japanese struck. The evident trend of this message was to report upon the state of the naval defenses and the presence of the fleet as well as the Army defenses.

This Board believes that Japan's spying activities could have been determined, the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much important information gathered, which would probably have prevented in large measure the Pearl Harbor disaster, had the Army and Navy been permitted, with the FBI, to tap these lines and find out what was going on. If the consular agents were conducting commercial business no harm would have been done; if they were not limiting their activities to consular business, we then had a right to know it and to take action accordingly, either by an open breach or by preparing ourselves to meet what they were doing.

Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of defense for a nation such as ours: the diplomatic line of defense, the Navy, and the Army. However, the diplomatic line—held by the State Department—ofttimes handi-

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[8] Admiral McMorris, head of the War Plans Division of Staff of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, 1941, said: "I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area." (R. 2882)

[9] Memorandum of Sept. 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission: "The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (Section 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radiotelegraph, cable telegraph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to Dec. 7, 1941."

caps and influences the preparation for the Army and Navy defense lines. As an illustration, the policy of compromise between economic sanctions and negotiations[10] in turn influenced War Department action, in that Short was told by the War Department, which in turn reflected the State Department's warnings, to take defensive measures but in doing so he was told not to alarm the population nor to disclose intent.[11] There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of standing up for American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japanese behave themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well known that people of the character of the Japanese and their national attitude of mind respect only force and strength and do not respect a policy of good intentions nor demands of conduct without means to enforce same.

The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more aggressive relationship between the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the War and Navy departments, in using all of their facilities as a coordinated team for the defense of the United States.[12]

[6] The Japanese policy was typical of the Oriental mind, which is predominantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as they expect to get and then settling on a compromise. Any show of weakness merely strengthens the hand of the bargainer, and any crack in the bargainer's front causes him to lose face and bargaining power. Therefore the action of the United States in demilitarizing Guam by removing its guns and other equipment and thus attempting to show Japan the peaceful intentions of the United States, was undoubtedly considered by Oriental Japan as an evidence of weakness and merely served to put our interests backward instead of forward. (R. 3062)

4. U. S. Policy (1939–1941).—We had been following the policy immediately before the war which broke out between Germany, England, and France, of veering away from anything that would precipitate a conflict with the Japanese. In view of the tense international situation, particularly after the outbreak of the European War in August, 1939, it became apparent that it would be necessary for us to redouble our efforts to avoid any open friction with the Japanese, both because we wished to devote what resources were available to the assistance of England and France, with whom we were in deep sympathy; and also, for the further purpose, that we were inadequately prepared to meet any attack from Japan in the Pacific.[13]

As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the necessity of following a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of Japan increased to one of great national urgency. We were faced with a dual load of unpreparedness for any war and the necessity of sending England and France what equipment and supplies that were available.

It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the necessity of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it expedient to lean over backwards to avoid any appearance in Hawaii of a warlike or belligerent atti-

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[10] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to the lines along which this Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was directed in 1941, a detailed record is given in Chapter XIV of *Peace and War* (a publication issued by the Department in 1943), and on pages 325–386 of Volume II of *Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931–1941.*"

[11] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to your request for an expression of the Department's views touching upon the influence of foreign policy upon military directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against "any country or to cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States."

[12] The State Department counterproposals of the 26th of November, which Japan considered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army and Navy Marshall-Stark memorandum could be delivered asking no ultimatum, is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering his ultimatum that he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy. (R. Stimson, 4051–4053, 4078–4079).

[13] Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very significant testimony, when asked if the American Navy, with two of its carriers, had discovered the task force that attacked Hawaii and had attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome:

"Captain LAYTON. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war.

"General RUSSELL. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval engagement off of Oahu?

"Captain LAYTON. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at any Japanese plane." (R. 3047)

tude, particularly, in view of and towards the large Japanese population of the islands.[14]

Our general national policy and particularly the War Department policy, very naturally conveyed itself to the Commanders in residence in Hawaii. Their acts were colored and their dispositions tempered by the repeated cautions in this direction as we sought for time to prevent an untoward incident from precipitating war with Japan before we were ready to meet it. The fact that they were no more fully advised of the progress toward a critical international situation in the Pacific must be taken into account.

This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to some degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of commercial restrictions which tended to strangle her economic life and her preparation for war. For instance, the refusal to sell scrap to Japan, the abrogation of Japanese commercial rights under treaty and the failure to renew that treaty with Japan, the oil embargo and similar incidents were at variance with this general policy.

The net result was a national policy towards Japan which reflected itself in the "Do-Don't" type of instructions that characterized the messages from the War Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until Dec. 7, 1941.

The policy of our Government as practiced by our public officials in their attitude towards Japan was not one of appeasement openly, but it was that in effect. Every effort was being exerted to prevent a rupture of relations with Japan, while presenting a show of face by economic sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression. Every effort was made to maintain the status quo until we were ready. Time was our most precious commodity in 1941.

5. *Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion.*—No competent understanding can be gained of the relationship with Japan unless we break down the problem into its essential aspects. Japanese industry had received a succession of serious blows by reason of our successive steps of not renewing the commercial treaty with Japan, the cutting off of scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade in silk with Japan, the oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and numerous other incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being made to maintain the status quo leading up to the final visit of Japanese special ambassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl Harbor. This situation generally trended, however, towards placating and appeasing Japan with such firmness as was necessary to keep the negotiations going.

During all of this period the Government was not supported by a public that was war-minded; just the contrary. Public irritation was increasing, but it was still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary, Japan's attitude toward the United States was one of increasing hostility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions, starting in 1935 against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of considering the views of the United States. Being unable to agree with them, it had no intention of doing so whatsoever.

During this period Japan made no concessions. It was quite apparent that she would continue her course until the patience of the United States was exhausted; and the United States was forced into a position of an open breach—the time of that breach was stipulated clearly to the President November 27 by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the counterproposals to Japan on November 26 anticipated that time—war came before we were fully prepared.

It was well known that Japan's entry into all wars of the past had been characterized by the first overt act of war coming simultaneously with the declaration. The services, both Army and Navy, were well aware of this Japanese characteristic. It was, therefore, to be expected that an unexpected attack would be made by Japan as the first indication of a breach of relations. This is well expressed by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified:

"General RUSSELL. Then you were not surprised at the air attack on the 7th of December?

"Mr. STIMSON. Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack that would be made; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew more about it, the attack that was framing up in the Southwestern Pacific. And I knew also that there was a concentration in the Mandated Islands—I know now, because I was shown by General Arnold the letter about the telegram, and an

[14] 160,000 Japanese were in the Islands, composing about one third of the population. (R. 2947)

order; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either Hawaii or Panama" (R. 4072).

[7] Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941, sent the State Department the following message:

TOKYO, *January 27, 1941—6 p. m.*
(Received January 27—6:38 a. m.)

"A member of the Embassy was told by my . . . colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of 'trouble' between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of *all* the Japanese military faciilties. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic."

GREW.

Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had been to avoid war to the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our situation. It was, therefore, obvious that the United States would have to avoid friction with Japanese nationals as that would be a ready excuse for Japan to precipitate the issue prematurely. On the other hand, sabotage was to be expected from these Japanese nationals. A large body of them, as in Hawaii, was a potential source of great danger, not only as to what they might do, but as the basis of precipitation of an international incident with Japan.

The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii. It had no appreciation of the danger except as the press became increasingly insistent in pointing out the progress of the advance towards war and the likelihood that this outpost would be involved in the conflict as one of the first line elements of our western defense.[15]

The War Department was urging officially and privately that every effort be made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of our serious state of unpreparedness and because much of our available military resources were being utilized to assist the United Nations. The battle of the Atlantic was the predominant factor in the public mind and dominated the policy of the War Department, as evidenced by the transfer of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic. Therefore, the entire consciousness of the War Department was directed towards avoiding any incident that might precipitate war with Japan while, at the same time, exerting its efforts to prepare for such a war. The War Department was confronted with a grave lack of planes, antiaircraft guns, and other implements of war with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate defense mechanism. The previous delay in implementing our defense had left us, two years after war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our preparations. The strong antiwar group in the United States made it unwise for the United States to take stronger action against Japan.

These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of the War Council.[16] Its policies were reflected in the actions of the Chief of Staff, U. S.

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[15] *Fortune* Magazine polled the public in late 1939 and made a report in January which showed that 55 per cent of those questioned were in favor of defending Hawaii; 25 per cent not to defend; and the balance did not know what they wanted.

[16] There is some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of this term, and the two bodies to which it refers. The situation was clarified by the testimony of Mr. Stimson, who said:

"The first subject that was listed here is that of the 'War Councils.' By the 'War Councils' we meant the meetings that were held by the Secretary of State, possibly the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, from time to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government. . . .

"The name 'War Council' is the name of a statutory body which was created in, I think, the National Defense Law of about 1920; but it was purely a War Department board. It did not have any members from the Navy or from any other department in it. . . .

"The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays, in the times that we are talking over, but it consisted solely of myself, my assistants, civil assistants, and the Chief of Staff and such other officers as I invited in; and it had nothing to do with the Navy or matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of meetings—they can hardly be dignified by the 'organization'—but early, very soon after Mr. Knox and I came into the Government in 1940, we decided that we ought to meet regularly, and we ought to meet with the Secretary of State; we were approaching important matters; and so we went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any objection to meeting with us once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we began meeting on Tuesday mornings at 9:30 every week, whenever we were present in Washington, or able to come, and those series of meetings went on until Mr. Knox died; they lasted right through.

"They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and during the time at which you are about to inquire, just

Army, as to measures taken for defense in the Pacific. It is necessary to keep these factors in mind in reading the messages from the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan had been a mixture of diverse policies; and this reflected itself in War Department messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and at the same time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate trouble with the local Japanese population or excite the local public. As evidence of this was the fact that Short responded to the situation by selecting an antisabotage alert and the War Department took no exception to it. These two conflicting courses of action were reflected in the messages and in the policies of the War Department; they account in part for the attitude in mind of Short and others in the Hawaiian Department. Whether justified or not, we consider later.

Then, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific defense was almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen to the Philippines, the intermediate islands, and Panama. It was there that the main attack, in the first phase, was expected from Japan. No early attack was expected on Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testified, it was a surprise to him (R. 9).

All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts. Such modern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being flown to the Philippine theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to strengthen the defenses of Midway, Guam, Wake, and other localities judged to become the first involved. The Hawaiian defense was clearly secondary at that time, although prior thereto it was considered as our strongest outpost and had first priority on equipment and maintenance (R. 14, 184).

[8] Planes flown from the mainland as late as Dec. 7, 1941, to Hawaii en route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammunition until they were ready to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold explains this was because of the necessity of carrying sufficient gas to insure a safe arrival. (R. 168) This too led to a state of mind, both officially and personally, in the responsible officers of the Hawaiian Department, that, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan would not initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite well down on the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of American territory closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and that the implementing of other defenses must give way in priority to those thought to become the first involved (R. 2872).

Japan shrewdly calculated and estimated correctly this state of mind. It arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, temporarily by-passing the Philippines and the intermediate American islands, for a direct attack on Hawaii Dec. 7, 1941, just as Ambassador Grew had clearly warned in his message of Jan. 27, 1941. So clearly did Japan understand our national phychology that it selected Sunday morning, early, as the time for attack, well knowing this to be the best time to achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later, it will appear how well that venture was prepared and executed, and how well timed as an answer to our counterproposals of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum; because it was on and after the delivery of that document against which General Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task force of Japan that attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at Tankan Bay on the 27th or 28th of November to launch the attack against Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.[17]

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before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and myself were in constant contact.

"The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which he usually called with great regularity—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff—that was, of course, General Marshall—the Chief of Naval Operations, who was at that time Admiral Stark; and sometimes, General Arnold. Well, that was also improvised, so to speak; it had no custom before it. It was created in the light of the approaching emergency, and among ourselves, as a nickname, we called it the 'War Cabinet,' or the 'War Council,' or something like that; and evidently Mr. Hull, from what you say, used that expression in his White Paper.

"There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met on the call of the President, at his office, and during this time about which you particularly ask, the autumn of 1941, they were meeting very frequently, also: and, fortunately, I have records. I have kept records during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly, and without much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking place, including everything that was important, that I deemed to be important, in regard to the crisis that was coming along: and including these meetings: so that I am in a position where I can give you dates of these meetings pretty fully" (R. 4041–4043) (General Marshall, R. 5–6).

[17] The best attainable evidence supports this statement (R. 3033).

6. *Public Demands Action Against Japanese.*—Our national policy has been to avoid war. The difficulty with our policy appears to have been its conflicting nature that in the case of Japan we desired to avoid war, to continue in business with Japan, and at the same time to prevent Japanese aggression by both negotiation and simultaneously to apply economic sanctions against Japan. As our nation was not prepared for war, it left the Administration, particularly the State Department, without the full support of the public so it could proceed with a firm policy toward Japan; and it left the War and Navy departments without sufficient means to implement a more agressive policy towards Japan.

The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult for the State Department to handle negotiations with Japan, which well knew our national policy. It was difficult both to negotiate for a peaceful solution of differences with a nation such as Japan, and at the same time impede negotiations by applying economic sanctions such as the freezing of assets and credits, the cutting off of the supply of oil and scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty with Japan.

This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions directed by the War Department to its field commanders, who were required to both take all the necessary precautions to meet war and at the same time to take no steps either to excite the civil population or to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy was particularly difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large proportion, some 30 per cent, of the population of the nationality of Japan. The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out the War Department policy, that in our preparations for war we would precipitate an issue with Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian Islands which would be an excuse by Japan to open hostilities.

This state of public mind was further inflamed to demand action by the Government against Japan, because of the latter's open aggressions in 1941; but effective action was impossible of fulfillment because of the long public policy of only maintaining a very modest Army and Navy. Public opinion can change far faster than a nation can make ready for war. The time element of making preparations for war is so long that it always lags behind a sudden change of public views, as in our case with Japan. Our public opinion had changed against Japan faster than preparations for war could be made.

This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. It likewise left the War and Navy departments unable to fully support the State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compromise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in the form of a resort to economic sanctions.

But the difficulty with economic sanctions was that, while it indicated a firm policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggravated the situation in that it made negotiations difficult of either progress or consummation. At most, our national policy was one of defensive character while waiting for the preparations for war to catch up with the new state of the public mind that Japan should be made to behave herself and that our Government should do something about it.

7. *Economic Sanctions Against Japan.*—In 1938 and 1939 a series of "moral embargoes" or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan by the United States. During those two years there had been brought about a cessation of the United States' export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There also resulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials, and as of July 1940, under the Export Control Act, the President had curtailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials. Licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools as of September, 1940.

The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and result of embargoes. He said:

"During the period up to, I think it was the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan—and embargoes are in the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults—I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes. I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations with that country were bound to go steadily down hill and it might, and probably would, end in war; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I felt it would be very shortsighted to get into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so conducive to

a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abysinnian campaign.

"But in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect; and, shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.

"Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been two years earlier."

[9] It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General Herron as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department upon Washington orders went into an all-out alert into battle positions with live ammunition for six weeks (R. 212).

In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. The effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities, including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to a war effort.

Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was the decision in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression, that the United States would continue its conversation with the Japanese Government and offer her a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.[18]

As was stated in the White Papers[19] as to economic sanctions, he (Grew) said that "considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measures would probably avert war; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course. . . . Finally he warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dangerous suddeness which might make inevitable a war with the United States."

As Ambassador Grew testified in summary:

"However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during the period you mention—that is, the years 1940 and 1941—was almost steadily downhill; we, of course, in our Embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to arrest that trend; and I think everything was done that could possibly have arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But we were up against what I would call a 'tidal wave' of military extremism in Japan and I think the results as culminating in Pearl Harbor proved that fact."

The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in the State Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary indicate that he too was acting under what apparently was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the inevitable date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of Grew's communications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an excellent perspective of the course of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor.

On January 27, 1941, he communicated by wire with the State Department indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means available to the military and naval forces of Japan was being discussed, and he felt that it was so serious that it should be reported, even though it was fantastic to consider it; on February 1 he said the outlook was never darker for peace; on July 25 the United States froze Japanese assets, causing bitter Japanese resentment; on August 18 he reported the Japanese protest on U. S. economic pressure; on August 29 the United States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil tankers to Russia and a military mission to China; on September 6 Grew reported the statement of the Japanese Premier that if the United States continued its economic sanctions it would pre-

[18] "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931–1941," Department of State, Washington, p. 129.

[19] "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. I and Vol. II; and Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, Department of State, Washington, D. C."

vent any settlement for six months to a year after they terminated, and on September 29 Grew sent an important message to Washington that the Japanese could only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He pointed out that any agreement would be a mere breathing spell for Japan, that war was likely in any event, and unless results were shown in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to date, the Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing for time and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at the secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United States without advising the public, whereas it was common knowledge in Japan.

On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy of the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and she would be forced to act. His prediction was correct, because Tojo, the only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that position, was made Premier on October 16. There was an indication of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure on the active Army list, and on October 25 he reported that the Emperor ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When they refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with the United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war. The next step would probably be war itself.

Grew warned on October 30 that the situation was fraught with the greatest danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only possible but probable and that Japan was preparing for hostilities "with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." It was on that date that Kurusu left for Washington, refusing to take a *later* clipper for "technical reasons," the significance of which was apparent.

On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet "that relations between Japan and the United States were 'extremely critical' and that there was 'imminent possibility' that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force" (White Papers, p. 136).

This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the situation in speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under Secretary of State Welles Nov. 11, 1941.

The White Papers continue:

"On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a 'sudden Japanese naval or military attack on regions not then involved."

Seecretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of high officials of this Government "stated that there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the purpose thereof" (White Papers, p. 144). It does not appear that such a statement was sent by the Army and Navy to their field forces.

On November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President's Ten Points of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. These proposals were verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors at once, but they inquired as to any other basis of negotiations or a *modus vivendi*. The following day, at the request of the Japanese Ambassadors, the President received them and Secretary of State Hull, at which time the President reaffirmed with finality the "Ten Points," stating the
[*10*] three primary considerations upon which the "Ten Points" were based. On the same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark wrote a joint memorandum to the President requesting that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese as the Army and Navy were not ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified him of the agreement reached with the British and the Dutch for reciprocal action in the case either one of them was attacked.

The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the 27th to the President did not reach him until after the meeting with the Japanese Ambassador on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of November. Whether or not the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, now disclaims that this document of the 26th was an ultimatum, Ambassador Grew testifies that the Japanese so regarded it. (R. 4208, 4215, 4221, 4222). They so acted upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted because he so informed the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of November 27. The latter testified, based on his diary of contemporaneous events, thus:

"The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'

"General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I don't like to disturb you, but I have become a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th of——

"Mr. STIMSON. This was the 27th.

"General RUSSELL. 27th.

"Mr. STIMSON. The day after the 26th.

"General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. STIMSON. The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it.

"General RUSSELL. Yes.

"Mr. STIMSON. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 27th, by telephone he told me that he decided to break it off.

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it" (R. 4052–4053).

On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador, "The matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy." He warned that the Japanese action would probably be "a desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness and risk." His predictions were uncanny (White Papers, pp. 144–145). On November 29, Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached Japan news that the President had made a proposition to settle Japanese grievances by giving her substantially most of what she wanted,[20] and on December 1 Grew reported Japan cold to the proposals, a fact Secretary Hull had found on the 26th when he handed the President's Ten Points to the Japanese Ambassador. On the same day, December 1, his diary shows that he had a conversation with a Japanese friend apparently high in that Government, Grew saying "everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan."

On December 6 an address of Tojo was read for the Diet different from all others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly indicated Japanese intentions. The following day, on Sunday morning, the Pearl Harbor attack occurred.

8. *The Hawaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Complex.*—The conditions in Hawaii and the state of the public mind in Hawaii were considered apparently by the War Department to be primary factors to be taken into consideration in the carrying out of the military mission of the defense of the islands and defense of the fleet. As elsewhere indicated in the War Department communications, this was a fact: and the responsible commanders in Hawaii in the Army also gave weight to the state of the Hawaiian situation on the civil side.

It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United States to exclude Japanese nationals from the United States and its territories, both for self-protection and to protect American labor against cheap foreign labor of the yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our fleet base and one of our most important defense outposts, we permitted the introduction into the population of the islands of Japanese, to the extent of 30 per cent of the total population or 160,000.[21]

Many were Japanese of dual citizenship who, although born in the United States, had not yet taken the steps made available by Japan to become released from their Japanese citizenship. These Japanese laborers and artisans were comparatively economical in terms of performance, useful both in agricultural pursuits and as artisans, were highly prized by the great commercial interests in

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[20] "Ten Years in Japan" by Ambassador Grew.

[21] There are three classes of Japanese population: (a) old aliens known as Issei, about 37,500; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent back to the mainland of Japan for education known as Kibei, about 2,599; and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian-educated known as Nisei, composing the balance of 160,000. 95 per cent of the Japanese children attend the Japanese language schools. Under Japanese law no Japanese is released from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal procedure securing his release from that citizenship. Most Japanese in the Islands have not secured such a release and they therefore have dual citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approximately 50,000 Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around these temples were centered the teachings of Japanese culture, patriotism, and family fealty (R. 3919–3920). See also Chapter I, "Gentlemen of Japan" by B. S. Haven, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.; "Feudal Hawaii; Paradise, Ltd." by Stanley High, Readers Digest, June 1943, pp. 19–23; and "Are the Japs Hopeless?" by George Horne, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 9, 1944.

sugar cane, pineapples, shipping, and other interests of the Islands; and it was the urgent desire of these commercial interests apparently both to enjoy the protection and profits from the basing of the fleet in Hawaii and also to have no disturbance of such labor or to be led into any situation that would disturb these profitable labor relations.

This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to become dominant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as to permit the Japanese to become important political factors with membership in both the Senate and the House of Hawaii, and to dominate, by way of majority, the Island governing councils in some of the islands of the Hawaiian Group (R. 2941).

Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities. But up to December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage. On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the radio operations of the Army. No other specific instance of sabotage or alien enemy action had been reported either by the War Department of Hawaii or by G–2 or the FBI in Hawaii.

Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Department order to General Herron, by which his troops moved into the field in battle positions with live ammunition in June 1940, had no effect upon the civilian population or their anxieties. Subsequent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly going on, including Short's Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect upon the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing the local populace paled by comparison with the contents of the local newspapers and their reports of the war news and the progressively increasing threats of Japanese action. Indeed, approximately a week before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local newspaper in Hawaii carried a complete prediction of this attack on the following Sunday (Exhibits 19–19a).

[*11*] The foregoing statement of fact as to background should be considered in connection with the communication of the War Department warnings as to sabotage, the action of General Short in placing the Department under the Number 1 Alert against sabotage on November 27, and the claimed reasons for not taking other defensive measures, because of the reluctance to disturb both the civilian population and the alien population of Hawaii.

The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of the responsible commanders and their resulting state of mind is an important factor for consideration. As part of this state of mind, it was generally considered that Japan would never dare attack; and certainly, in the early stages of a war, she would not dare risk the major portion of her carriers for the launching of such an attack. The probabilities were strongly against such a bold and possibly suicidal move by Japan.

The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and the presence of the large Japanese population built up a sabotage consciousness in the responsible authorities as a more likely course of Japanese action than what was regarded as the more remote military operation of a direct air attack. This background is important to consider in evaluating the decisions arrived at by the Army commander and the actions taken by his associates.

The existence of this state of public opinion had its effect upon the evaluation by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it was supplemented by the American attitude that Japan would not dare attack the United States in what was regarded as its home territory in the Islands, in the presence of the fleet, which was considered an asset and not, in reality, a liability.

Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (R. 2939–2940) as to the protests of local commercial interests to General Emmons when he proposed to take action in removing the dangerous Japanese from the sugar plantations after the Pearl Harbor attack. He said the political pressure brought to bear by these interests was sufficient to bring about a cancellation of this effort of General Emmons. It was significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing nothing to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so they could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which must have been imposed heavily upon General Short. The constant application of such pressure for a period of nearly a year upon General Short doubtless had a material effect upon his mind and upon his anxiety about the Japanese population, about which he could no nothing. This was particularly reflected in his refusal to have legal action taken against those who failed to register as aliens (R. 3255–3256).

It was well known in Honolulu to both the FBI and G–2 of the Army that there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to the best interests of

the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A Japanese combines in his Shinto religion, centering about the Shinto temples, three things: patriotism, religion, and family fealty. Those three things compose his entire emotional, political, and family life.

The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the Islands were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and disloyalty to the United States. This was all well known and could have been cured promptly by closing the temples and arresting the priests, as was done after December 7. Then there were the Shinto societies, and particularly the Black Dragon Society. The Japanese are well known as great organizers and they had countless organizations, many of which were of potential subversive character. The Japanese ran their own Japanese-language newspapers which promoted the same national spirit. They had Japanese-language schools in which they taught Japanese customs, family fealty, religion, and patriotism to Japanese children one hour each day after their regular education in the American schools. Here again our national policy, due to freedom of the press and freedom of religion and of education, permitted these people to jeopardize the defense of Hawaii. After December 7 the Japanese newspapers were put under strict control and used by the United States for propaganda agencies to control the Japanese population. and the Shinto temples were closed.

9. *Hawaiian Press.*—The state of mind and the state of information in the Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly before it, is not better illustrated than the articles appearing in the *Honolulu Advertiser* and the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin.* A mere recitation of these headlines would seem to have been sufficient to have warned General Short and his subordinate officers of the critical international situation.

The newspaper headlines in question read as follows:

"U. S. Waits Japan Reply" (29 Nov. 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend"; Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle" (20 Nov. 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Hull, Kurusu In Critical Meeting Today" (1 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows"; "Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension"; "War Fears Grow in Philippines" (1 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S."; "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations" (2 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Huge Pincher Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted" (3 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Japan Spurns U. S. Program" (4 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today" (4 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Singapore on War Footing"; "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo"; "Civilians Urged to Leave Manila" (6 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China"; "Japanese Navy Moving South"; "Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup" (6 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis" (7 Dec. 41—*Honolulu Advertiser.*[22] [23]

10. *Summary.*—We have learned a great deal about psychological warfare since this nation went to war. Looking backward, it is possible to see that the psycholgical phases of the preparatory period for war leading up to the conflict with Japan had an immense effect upon the state of mind of our own public, officials and commanders; and upon what they did or did not do, prior to December 7. The deception of Japan and its actions based upon that deception in combination with our own failures to take precautions against the attack played no small part in the disaster of December 7.

Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth and industrial strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one would presume to attack it.

This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prevalent on the mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii.

With the foregoing background it is possible to understand more accurately and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early January 1941 until the attack and shortly thereafter.

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[22] Complete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be found in Exhibits 19 and 19A.

[23] The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses. They testified that these headlines resulted from deductions based on current trends in international relations gleaned from news dispatches. No other factual data was available to them (R. 3107-3109, 3169-3170).

[12] CHAPTER III. THE STORY OF PEARL HARBOR

A. GENERAL

1. *Introduction: Scope of the Chapter and Its Purpose.*—This is a running story of the principal events, documents, and actions taken leading up to Pearl Harbor. We accompany this story with a discussion of the pros and cons of each situation in order that all arguments for and against every explanation and the circumstances surrounding every set of facts may be clearly understood and evaluated. Against such a background, all claims, arguments, facts and explanations can be considered. We believe this chronological history of the entire transaction will make our succeeding conclusions clearly stand forth.

After setting forth some general considerations in this chapter, we direct attention to the two primary periods, from January through September and from October through December. As will be noted elsewhere this is a logical chronological division. In the latter part of the year 1941 there seemed to be a change of understanding, appreciation, and apprehension of forthcoming events on the part of those in Hawaii. In reading this chronological history this should be observed because it is an important factor in what was done or not done in Hawaii.

2. *Geographical.*—The territory of Hawaii comprises an island group of which the Island of Oahu is the primary element. Oahu contains Pearl Harbor, located on its southern rim. Pearl Harbor is the base for the Pacific Fleet, and was also the headquarters during 1941 of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Headquarters of the 14th Naval District, which had naval jurisdiction over the Hawaiian Islands and our other island possessions in the Pacific including Midway and Wake but not the Philippines. Oahu was also the location of one of the largest troop concentrations in the national defense system of the United States while other national defense elements are located on the adjacent islands.

It is important to emphasize that Hawaii was an outpost in the American defense system. In view of that fact, certain fundamental requirements of action resulted which were incumbent upon the commander of the Hawaiian Department to follow. Hawaii is both an outpost for defense and offense, and is one of the primary bastions of our national defense system. In priority of importance it is rated on a par with the Panama Canal.

The primary mission of the Army was the defense of Hawaii and particularly of Pearl Harbor and the fleet there, when in residence; and the fleet sea and air base at all times. Aside from the necessity of preventing these islands from falling into the hands of other nations as the springboard for an attack upon the United States, the foregoing primary mission was that incumbent upon General Short at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The whole reason for having this outpost was that it should be on the alert to repel attack and to furnish the springboard from which attacks could be launched upon our enemies. For this reason this outpost was implemented with the major portion of the fleet and very substantial Army installations in order that the mainland might rest securely and be protected. There is no other fundamental reason for the great concentration of naval and military power on the Island of Oahu and associate islands. The very location of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 2,000 miles from our Pacific Coast, makes it an admirable location for naval, air and ground forces, for it gives, by reason of its position, a scope and flexibility of attack and defense, sufficiently remote from the Pacific Coast to insure the maximum latitude of action against our enemies and the maximum protection of the mainland of the United States.

3. *Mission of Army in Hawaii.*—The Army in Hawaii had a mission and a duty to perform. As stated in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this was:

"a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, to support the naval forces.

"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein, to support the Army forces."

The Army's mission was primarily that of protecting Hawaii, because it was the sea and air base for the fleet; and, when the fleet was in the harbor, it was there to render such protection as it could to the fleet. The protection of the Islands, other than for those purposes, was secondary and only necessary to the extent of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission. It should be observed that the very fact of the fleet being in the harbor increased the responsi-

bilities of the Army, because of the dual facts that the fleet when in the harbor was not in a position to support the Army forces either by reconnaissance or by the protection incident to its being at sea in waters adjacent to the Islands, and when in the harbor itself needed protection for its ships that were temporarily immobilized and particularly vulnerable to air attack.

4. *Condition of the Hawaiian Department at the Time of Short's Assumption of Command and Just Prior Thereto.*—With the above mission in mind, the condition of the Hawaiian Department just prior to the assumption of command by General Short and Admiral Kimmel is a matter of interest. Admiral Richardson was the senior naval officer in command of the fleet, and General Herron the senior Army officer in command of the Hawaiian Department. These officers jointly reviewed the situation as to the Army. As a result Admiral Richardson addressed a letter on the 25th of January, 1941, as to the status of the Army's deficiencies for the defense of Hawaii, which was sent to the Secretary of the Navy. (R. 1802.) The Secretary of the Navy, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of War, and called his attention to the serious conditions existing.[24]

Admiral Kimmel summed up the situation in his testimony:

He was "astounded at the then existing weakness" of the Pearl Harbor defenses,[25] and collaborated with his predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:

[*13*] "(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ship's A A. guns while in port.

"(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

"(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, etc.

"(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore" (Roberts Rec. 544).

He communicated this information to General Short. (R. 1768)

It is therefore apparent from the considered investigations by Richardson and Herron, which conditions were concurred in by Short, that the lack of adequate defense equipment and what was needed to bring it up to a satisfactory status were clearly known to both the Army and the Navy in Hawaii and to the War and Navy departments. Short, therefore, came to the command on the 5th day of February, 1941, with a clear and unmistakable recognition by all concerned of the condition by all concerned of the condition of the Department of which he had assumed command.

General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17, *1940*, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R 213) This alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214–215) After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to positions and with full equipment and ammunition.

General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert.

When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with the following language:

"General HERRON. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men like refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is Number One, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change. I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement" (R. 226–227).

In this connection, General Herron made a significant observation on the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

"General GRUNERT. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future

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[24] See below in this chapter for a discussion of this correspondence.
[25] Italics by the Board.

the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment?

"General HERRON. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I had better protect the island" (R. 228).

5. *Organization of the Navy at Pearl Harbor.*—Before proceeding to a consideration of the Army problems and the action taken by the Army in preparing the defenses of Hawaii, it is necessary to understand the organization of the Navy with whom General Short was to deal extensively and with which he was to enter into various agreements and understandings, which have a material bearing upon what was done or was not done.

To an Army man the organization of the Navy at Hawaii appeared to be quite complex. Admiral Kimmel was Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Admiral Bloch's duties consisted of the following:

a. Commandant of the 14th Naval District, reporting directly to the Navy Department; the 14th Naval District was a decentralized Navy Department for local affairs, dealing with administrative matters such as plans, buildings, work of the Navy Yard, repairing ships and the like, and providing for the Fleet oil, docks, water protection and such services as minesweeping, antisubmarine patrol, and the like.

b. An officer of the Fleet, reporting to Admiral Kimmel, and acting as a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel; his duties related to the preparations for the offensive and defensive actions in time of war and to purely military matters.

c. Administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, Commander of the Base Defense Air Force.

d. Commander of Task Force No. 4 in control of the naval installations at the outlying island bases, such as Midway, Wake, Guam, etc.

It will be noted from the foregoing that Admiral Bloch dealt directly with the Navy Department on certain phases of his work. He was primarily charged as the Naval Defense Commander of the naval installations on shore-based naval air forces, which were charged with Kimmel. He was the responsible commander over the shore-based naval air forces, which were charged with the mission of naval long-distance reconnaissance.

Additionally, Block, in his capacity as a Defense Commander, had administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, the Naval Air Officer, who was responsible for cooperation in the air with the Army, but he had no power of disciplinary control over Admiral Bellinger, who was under Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Bellinger's duties, in turn, were as follows:

a. Commander, Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings, and Commander Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.

b. Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, plus other units as assigned by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for conduct of Pacific operations.

c. Commander, Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all Fleet aircraft actually based ashore.

d. Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

e. Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. In connection with the above five major duties, Admiral Bellinger operated under the following senior officers:

(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as Fleet Commander for patrol wings was based at San Diego.

(2) Commander, Scouting Force, the 4th Command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.

(3) Directly under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in his capacity as Commander Task Force 9.

(4) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(5) Commanders of Fleet Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 or patrol planes assigned to those forces for specific operations.

[14] To summarize, Admiral Bellinger indicated that he held six positions in Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941, namely,

(1) Commander, Base Patrol Wing
(2) Commander, Patrol Wing 2
(3) Commander, Task Force 9
(4) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor
(5) Liaison Commander with the 14th Naval District
(6) Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In these various capacities he was responsible to the

(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force
(2) Commander, Scouting Force 1 and 2
(3) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for his duties in connection with Task Force 9
(4) Commander of the 14th Naval District, for his duties in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force
(5) Commander in Chief, the Pacific Fleet, for his duties with respect to Patrol Wings 1, 2, and 3.

In Admiral Bloch's testimony he testified that he (Bloch) wore three hats. He was in command of the 14th Naval District, in which capacity he reported direct to the Navy Department. In another capacity, as an officer of the Fleet, he was directly under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. And again under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in another capacity, with respect to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, as Naval Defense Commander.

As may be realized, in this organization in which there were two governing heads, Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General Short had to do business, and their respective staffs with whom Short's staff had to deal, as well as the many-titled Admiral Bellinger with whom General Martin dealt, the problem of co-operation was made somewhat difficult.

By way of contrast, the Navy only had to deal with General Short as the sole responsible commander over all activities, both ground and air. General Martin was in command of the Army Air Forces and presented a single air commander with whom the Navy had to deal; and Martin was under the direct command of Short. When the agreements and methods of operation arrived at between the Army and Navy are examined hereinafter, these relationships will become important in understanding what was done and what was not done and some of the reasons for the failure of the competent defense of Hawaii.

B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941

1. *Selection of General Short.*—General Short was selected for his high post of command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of this selection, he was called to Washington to confer with General Marshall, to receive special written instructions from him and to confer with the sections of the General Staff and particularly the War Plans Division. The purpose of this visit and these conferences was to equip him with the latest and most up-to-date information and instructions as to the responsibilities of his new command.

Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on the fifth day of February, 1941. He assumed command on Feb. 7, 1941. Both Short and Herron concur that the latter fully advised Short of the problems and conditions with which he was confronted.

At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed certain basic documents constituting fundamental instructions for his guidance in the conduct of the command, such as the Joint Army and Navy Plan of 1935. This was modified by the subsequent agreements between Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short, and Bellinger and Martin.

Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on Feb. 7, 1941, a letter was written on that date by General Marshall to General Short comprising a full presentation of the problems confronting General Short in his new command. The letter was based upon a conversation with Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations, and said in part:

"Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army material for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns . . .

"What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this material throughout the Army and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii . . .

"You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army's defenses of the naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle . . .

". . . However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

"*My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of unknown hostilities, thereafter, the existing defenses will discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation.* Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

"Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the naval concentration and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy fueds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. . . ." (R. 14–17).

Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound advice and an admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such being the measure of his instructions, it is interesting to observe in what particulars he complied with them or varied from them and the reasons for his reactions. In conformity with the instructions as to the Navy, General Short proceeded to establish cordial and cooperative relationships, the exact nature of which is discussed elsewhere. By the 19th of February he "had made a pretty thorough inspection or survey" (R. 321), and on that date wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff as to things that required immediate attention, which were:

"As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes.

"(1) Co-operation with the Navy.

"(2) *Dispersion and protection of aircraft* and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.

"(3) *Improvement of the antiaircraft defense.*

"(4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery.

"(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.

[*15*] "(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies in roads and trails.

"(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such a command posts and communication centers.

"(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops."

The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the efforts of Short to secure approvals and money for improving the defenses of Hawaii. It is also replete with various instances of his being turned down by the War Department, particularly because of lack of money in connection with permanent installations.

Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the equipment, as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7, "Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army," and the fundamental queston to be considered is: What did Short do with what he had to meet the attack?

As elsewere stated, he was granted his request for the construction of many types of installations, including the important Aircraft Warning System. (See the discussion below of supply of equipment and construction, and also the delays in construction.)

Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as to the air situation in clear, unmistakable language:

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The estab'ishment of a satisfactory system of co-ordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." (R. 19)

On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular reference to Aircraft Warning System and the delays in its construction, and delays in sites due to the Department of Interior delays:

"One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At te present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.

"The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. * * * I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.

"Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a board of officers in this department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion."

On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short:

"The progress that you are making in reaching close co-ordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying. * * *

"The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, material and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared."

On March 15, General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the Aircraft Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of getting approvals from the Department of Interior regarding matters pertaining to its National Park Service:

"The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

"I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time."

On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a letter showing full appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and the protection of aircraft. Among other things he said:

"On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19 some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case have arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius." (R. 21-22)

In this letter he also discussed at length the question of antiaircraft defense.

On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as follows:

"Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for those purposes will be included in estimates."

On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and amongst other things reported progress, as follows:

"Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in co-operating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

"1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.

"2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.

[*16*] "3. Field Orders No. NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

"I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very co-operative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to co-ordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command." (R. 26–27)

On May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of money needed for the construction of airports and other defense projects totaling over $27,000,000. General Short followed this up with a letter on May 2 to General Marshall in further explanation of his radiogram forwarding supporting data.

On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowledging the receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying:

"The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time . . .

"It is most gratifying to have you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time." (R. 28)

On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a complete report on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of the ground and the construction of field fortifications, and the plans for repelling a serious attack, and reporting his theory of the defense of Hawaii, saying:

"My theory of the defense of Hawaiii is based upon the following:

"1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.

"2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly.

"3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.

"4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.

"5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counterattack."

On July 7 The Adjutant General sent General Short the following wire:

"For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop the Neutrality Pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic

ports to be west of Panama Canal by First of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned end."

This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7, 1941.

On July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new airfield on the island of Oahu.

On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General Marshall the Joint Air Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and exchange of facilities such as airfields. On July 25, 1941, a very significant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning him of the application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, particularly saying:

"Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities."

On Aug. 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to the establishment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and his reasons for so doing. This brings to conclusion the communications between the Chief of Staff and General Short to Oct. 1, 1941.

2. *Short's Staff.*—Short brought one Colonel Phillips to Hawaii with the view to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for that assignment he placed him successively in various sections of his General Staff. On November 1 Colonel Phillips was made Chief of Staff. Evidence indicates that Phillips failed to measure up to that most responsible and important assignment—the "alter ego" of the Commanding General; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander and failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and candid advice of high professional character and with a competent vision and knowledge of what was taking place or might take place.

His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak and reflected itself in the work of the several General Staff sections and in the output thereof as a whole. While the various Assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short.

Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance.[26] Short's selection of Phillips appears to have been a mistake. An examination of Phillips' testimony as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter (R. 1134–1144). In justice to Phillips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he never was present at important Navy conferences (R. 393–394, 534), and that information of important and vital events came to him secondhanded.

Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had Phillips conduct most of the staff conferences and apparently rarely dealt directly with his principal staff officers. He delegated to his staff little more than mere routine duties. His direct relationship with his G–2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of the then existing tense situation (R. 393, 519, 520, 521). Although he frequently visited and consulted with his principal subordinate commanders he held no periodic conferences, and his second in command, General Burgin, was not taken into his confidence as to existing conditions nor was his advice sought (R. 2625).

3. *Short's Actions in Building Defense Installations And Adding Equipment.*—There is no question that Short [171] made many demands for equipment, defense, construction, and personnel. He was active and diligent in this matter. Except as to aircraft and antiaircraft, his command appears to have been well supplied. In many instances, long delays were incurred in the approval of defense construction and making funds available therefor, and some of the recommended defense construction was disapproved by the War Department.

4. *Short's Reorganization of Divisions.*—Short converted the square division, known as the Hawaiian Division, into two triangular divisions and equipped them with unusually heavy fire power in both artillery and machine guns as a basis for future expansion in time of war.

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[26] R. 265, 1408–1409, 1946, 1977–1978, 2625–2626.

General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified:

"General GRUNERT. And in your division you had what artillery?

"General MURRAY. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery, but it is not generally known that we had practically doubled the gun strength of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too." (R. 3076–77)

5. *Short's Relationship With the Navy.*—Turning from Short's efforts to build up the physical installations and equipment of Hawaii and his staff, and the successful conversion of his single square division into two triangular divisions on which his staff seemed primarily engaged, we come to his actions with the Navy. Acting upon General Marshall's instructions and admonitions of Feb. 7, 1941, which seemed to greatly impress him, Short succeeded in establishing an amiable relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger. As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with the Navy. Suffice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in concept and in many particulars equally admirable in the proposed plan of administration, under the handicap of joint action by co-operation instead of unity of command, were of quite limited effectiveness because neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient means to properly implement them.

The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them effective would have taken skilled professional officers of both services guided by a well-organized composite staff and practiced in operational tests.

The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either a period of strained relations occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in the actual event of war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appreciate this defect.

Short apparently mistook the conduct of "war by contract" for a conduct of "war by command."

Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically into effect, had the equipment and matériel available been utilized, had there been in existence a detailed plan of operation of the staff and lower echelons, and had sound judgment been exercised in the selection of the alert, the disaster of Pearl Harbor undoubtedly would have been materially mitigated, if not wholly avoided.

(For a full discussion of the agreements see below in this chapter.)

6. *Abandonment of Herron's Field Order No. 1: Adoption of Triple-Alert System: Sabotage Issues.*—A further step, and one of great import, taken by Short was the study that he initiated through his staff with a view to abandoning the Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the regime of General Herron, and substituting his temporary Standard Operating Procedure, which was published tentatively on July 14, 1941. The final draft of this vital document came out on Nov. 5, 1941 (R 283), and provided for three types of alerts, which are defined by Short as follows:

"Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities without any threats from the outside.

"Alert No 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, and, in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks.

"Alert No. 3 was defense against an all-out attack where everybody moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible attempt at landing in sight" (R. 283).

Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395, 400.) He says he sent a copy to Washington. (R. 431.) Alert No. 1 was purely antisabotage. Its effect when executed was to concentrate the planes in groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where they were vulnerable from the air but less vulnerable from sabotage on the ground. He said he did this because of his deficiency of personnel in protecting his planes against sabotage. If they had been put in dispersed positions about the fields within bunkers, they would have been less vulnerable to wholesale destruction from the air. This alert concentrated equipment and personnel and in effect set up almost perfect conditions for a successful enemy air attack.

Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide dispersion of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition at the guns and troops and planes in positions of readiness for action and maximum protection. Under Alert Number 1, the earliest time in which planes were planned to get off the ground was four hours, while under Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available aircraft is ready and can take to the air in from seven to eight minutes. Like-

wise, in connection with putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other similar establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alerts Numbers 2 and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours.

As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete dispersal of planes, and troops, and guns was effected, with ammunition at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses—R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772–2773, 3096–3097) that there was no disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron. This is significant, in view of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection of Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427–428, 532–533).

It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different from that of people on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers ofttimes contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credibility.

At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7. It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37 per cent of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but in no case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a [18] very exhaustive investigation being made constantly by the FBI and by G–2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.

We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General Short adopted his antisabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.

We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the FBI, General Wells, executive vice president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and Walter Francois Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, Government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress.

7. *Navy Long-Distance Reconnaissance.*—He assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance deconnaissance, and in this he was joined by a large group of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by him, if it had been made, would have soon revealed the fact that his assumption that the task forces went out for conducting reconnaissance at long distance was not true. Such reconnaissance as they were conducting was only incident to the maneuvers of the task forces of the Fleet, who were operating for training purposes and were looking for Japanese submarines so as not to interfere with their training operations. The Navy was submarine- and training-minded. (R. 1527, 1600, 1725, 1773, 1802.)

It should have been apparent upon examination of the facts by him that any such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent and limited in scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360 degrees around the Island.

A further understanding by him of the actual facts would have disclosed very promptly, as it did to his Air Force subordinates, that the Navy did not have any means for such long-distance reconnaissance, nor did the Navy get from the Army any such assistance, even though under the agreements the Army on call was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for this purpose. In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor available for this purpose only six planes capable of this work.

The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance reconnaissanse is set forth in paragraph 18 (i) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which provides:

"18. *Navy.*—The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for: . . .

"i. Distant reconnaissance." (R. 1745)

The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy assumed in its agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval forces and particularly carriers before they could launch an attack. The area of search extended two to six hundred miles from the shore. It was assumed by Short that the presence of task forces of the Navy at sea insured such reconnaissance being conducted. Long-distance reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but also put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of the attack if it got through. But, as elsewhere stated, this long-distance reconnaissance was not being conducted by the Navy and such air reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose of clearing the area of submarines where the fleet was in training. The inshore reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from shore, was substantially for the same purpose.

The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army and Navy commanders and their staffs that carriers and their supporting craft would attempt to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving in position at dark preceding the dawn of the day on which the attack was to be made. (R. 106) Under the protection of darkness 300 additional miles could be covered so that at dawn the attack could be launched within approximately 300 miles from shore. This is apparently substantially what actually did happen (Roberts Record 556–B).

The conception and estimate of the situation was correct; steps taken to meet it were either absent completely or so defective as to amount to little. The Navy had available for long-distance reconnaissance, from November 27 to December 7, 1941, 50 PBY's and the Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes would have been required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance if a 360-degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766). It is significant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant reconnaissance was made a mission of the Army but Short and Bloch agreed early in 1941, in the joint plan for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier and for the employment of the Army-Navy air forces, to place the responsibility for distance reconnaissance on the Navy, leaving to the Army reconnaissance only to about 20 miles from shore. This is due to the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for distance reconnaissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was O. K.'d by Kimmel and approved by the War Department.

The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the 600- to 900-mile area) was not patrolled. Observations therein were infrequent and incidental. Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that the few planes available would be wholly ineffective for this purpose and employed them otherwise (R. 1763).

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were conversant with these conditions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438–4439). It was obvious, therefore, that a Japanese task force with carriers could launch an attack upon Oahu with a reasonable certainty of success since its discovery prior to such launching would have been purely accidental and its chances of discovery remote.

An early alert by the Navy to the Army would have permitted of a dispersion of its planes with the result that they could have been aloft, ready to intercept the attack, and the damage done would have been greatly lessened.

The remaining factor for reconnaissance and detection was in the Aircraft Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army.[27] The Army had put into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training basis, which was operating for

[27] See below for complete story of construction difficulties of an aircraft warning system signal difficulties, and how the enemy fleet was discovered.

all practical purposes, a number of mobile radar sets and an aircraft information center. That it was in operating condition, even with the state of training of the personnel that then existed in late November and early December, 1941, was amply proven by the successful operation of the system during previous tests and exercises and of the station that discovered the attacking Japanese force 132 miles from the Island and the correct interpretation by the two enlisted men op [19] erating the station, who duly reported the presence of a strange force but were told by an inexperienced and only partially trained Air Force lieutenant to "forget it." This was at 0702 on Dec. 7, 1941.

If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to the Navy the latter would have had the antiaircraft weapons on its ships in action, since only three to five minutes were required for that purpose, the Army antiaircraft system could have been alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and some could have gotten off the ground.

The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that being operated by the Navy.

It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was constantly supplying information of the greatest value to important naval commanders, a part of which information was communicated to General Short by Admiral Kimmel (R. 1771–1772).

The one notable and tragic exception was the failure to advise General Short that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force was discovered in the Marshall Islands, in which force there were reported as present two or three carriers, 15 to 20 submarines, and possibly other vessels (R. 361). About the first of December radio contact was lost with this force as it apparently went into radio silence, which was known to be by the Navy the third and last and most dangerous phase of the movement of the enemy fleet (R. 1654–1655, 1662). The loss of such contact of a threatening fleet in the year preceding was the occasion for a directive from Washington for an all-out alert by which all troops went into the field with live ammunition and remained there for six weeks.

So here again, as in the case of the Army radar system, there was a failure of transmission of the information by the Navy to the Army as the Army had failed to transmit its radar information on the morning of December 7 to the Navy. Such a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands was 72 hours away from Pearl Harbor and nearly a thousand miles closer to Pearl Harbor than the Japanese fleet resident in Japan, from whence the main attack was expected if it ever did arrive (R. 106–107).

After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the Jaluit task force and the fact that there was long belief that it was from Jaluit that the attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor, there was produced in Hawaii the more certain proof that this force had assembled at Tankan Bay in Northern Japan and had moved from that point eastward and then southward for the attack, leaving Tankan Bay on the 27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be accepted of the later naval witnesses as against the testimony of the earlier naval witnesses, who seemed equally well informed, it does not change the situation. The Navy failed to give to the Army a very vital and important piece of information.

In conclusion, the last element in the tragic situation was the failure of the subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army of the presence in the outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7, at about 0630, of a Japanese submarine which was sunk by naval action (the destroyer U. S. S. *Ward* and a naval patrol plane) about 0633 to 0645 hours, which would have indicated that something was on the move and the whole naval and military establishments should have been correspondingly alerted. The *Ward* reported this action to the naval base watch officer at 0712 hours, who notified the Naval Chief of Staff. The Army was not notified. (R. 536–537; Roberts Record 1725)

The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in excerpts in testimony from senior commanders. The long-distance patrol of the Navy consisted of only two or three PBY's and it was "nothing to amount to much" (R. 1820). General Martin said: "I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being done. 'Well,' he said, 'this is all that I have. This is all I can put up'" (R. 1822).

"General FRANK. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?

"Admiral BLOCH. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief. I think that might as well be cleared. He would be the man to order that, in my opinion" (R. 1527).

As to Army reconnnaissance, General Mollison testified that such reconnaissance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not operate on Sundays, saying, "I'm sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much if it did" (R. 812). So far as inshore patrol is concerned, he said that the Army Air Forces did so little that it would amount to "a token payment only" (R. 824).

"General RUDOLPH. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they didn't have a boat out—an airplane, seaplane" (R. 1232).

"General FRANK. But you understand that they were not out on that morning?

"General RUDOLPH. So I was informed" (R. 1233).

"General GRUNERT. Then, according to the instructions under which you were functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance?

"Admiral BLOCH. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in that order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.

"General GRUNERT. But actually was there some distant air reconnaissance being made from time to time or continuously?

"Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not. That would not be under me" (R. 1884).

With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it under the joint air agreement, Admiral Bloch testified:

"So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the 14th Naval District force" (R. 1884).

"General GRUNERT. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission?

"Admiral BLOCH. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly what missions they were on, but there were planes in the air" (R. 1494).

So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed such reliance for protection by Naval long-distance reconnaissance and joint air action with the Navy.

8. *Agreements Between Army and Navy.*—The basic document governing the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands is contained in the document entitled "War Plans, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935." This was prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Rainbow War Plan. It covers the over-all policies of the functions and agreements between the Army and Navy as to their relative responsibilities in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii was Category D. This category was defined as "Coastal Frontiers that May Be Subject to Major Attack." Under this category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application. . . . In addition, antiaircraft defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; . . . Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided. . . . (Page 39).

And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be "Protecting our Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; . . . Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial and commercial operations."

It was also provided that there be furnished "a communication and intelligence system to include an air [*20*] craft warning service among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy." This was a responsibility of the Army.

Pursuant to the foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into entitled "Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan." (Prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District.) This agreement was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and provided the fundamental plan for the defense of Hawaii.

The third agreement was that entitled "Joint Air Agreement," signed March 28, 1941. This document was prepared by Major General Martin, U. S. Army Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Force Commander, and signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short. It provided for the combined air action as follows:

"Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission, etc."

"Defense air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense

Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practical. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control." (Roberts Record 555)

This Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and Short, was implemented by certain additional documents signed by Bellinger and Martin as operating plans. The date of these operating plans was April 9, 1941 (Roberts Record 556a-O Vol. 5).

Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting on behalf of the Commander in Chief in signing the document, and there operated under him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command of the planes, so far as the Navy could implement the Agreement, as Commander of the Air Base Force. Bellinger, however, was under the command of Admiral Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged with the responsibility for the operation orders and plans of operation for the base defense air force, had no air force with which to implement the Agreement. Bellinger had the job to do and such means as existed to do it with was Fleet aviation. Bloch had supervisory control over Bellinger, but the Commander in Chief, Admiral Kimmel, had to approve the Agreement (R. 1522).

Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readiness of the aircraft, but did not have control of the aircraft, the readiness of which he was to determine. The confusion inherent from the Navy's organization is best expressed in the following question:

"General GRUNERT. Who would the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger?

"Admiral BLOCH. I do not know." (R. 1522)

This agreement was the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Islands. This report was signed by Major General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. (R. 1581)

Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.

Plans which must wait to be put into practice and only become operative when war strikes under all the unexpected and changing conditions of an attack inevitably prove unsound in practice. The basic difficulty of the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements was inherent in all such agreements, as they constituted a vain paper attempt to predict war procedure without having properly tested out the proposed arrangements in training and by joint staff action to see if they were practical measures.

The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work, and the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far enough to find out if their plans were sound in practice. There was inadequate practice of them to enable the respective organizations to acquire that automatic facility in their execution so that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all the stresses, strains and unexpected developments to personnel and equipment that were incidents of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this synthetic structure of agreements and plans based upon them. The following analysis of these agreements shows that:

> There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan and the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" of 1935. The second agreement was the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and based upon it as Appendix No. 7 was an operating plan worked out by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger.

As Admiral Bloch said:

"Ordinarily it would not be operative" (R. 1478).

He also testified:

"The plan was never operative as a plan because the War and Navy departments never ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The local commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part" (R. 1474).

And again he testified:

"General RUSSELL. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, according to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not effective until Dec. 7, 1941?

"Admiral BLOCH. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my responsibility by demanding patrol planes for that purpose, but I never had any; I never had one." (R. 1487)

The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army had two basic defects. First, they did not become operative until an emergency arose. The agreement said (paragraph 15 (c), 2):

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders" (R. 1584).

The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were understood to be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These commanders apparently took no action to "mutually agree" to implement parts of the plan and, evidently were going to let the agreements go until an emergency arose, when they became operative automatically. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

"That could have been done at any time by the commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, if it was approved by and agreed upon by General Short" (R. 1591).

But it was not done. The selection of M Day to initiate the putting of the joint plan and agreements thereunder [*21*] into effect according to the terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of the War and Navy Departments. They took no action to put it into effect although a copy of this agreement was forwarded to the War Department and presumably to the Navy Department (R. 1474).

The consequence was that not unitl the morning of December 7 did the agreement become operative, when it was too late to have gotten the benefit of the co-operative action that it implied, and the training which would result from this close teamwork by the Army and Navy. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

"The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority to place that organization in the functioning status, except in the case of an actual emergency" (R. 1582).

This brings us to the second defect: unity of command. If that had been put into effect as provided in paragraph 9 (b) of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this air agreement would have become effective by reason of such unity of command. As Admiral Bellinger again testified:

"I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a success.

"General FRANK. You mean a unity of command before something happened?

"Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

"General FRANK. Rather than when it happened?

"Admiral BELLINGER. Yes" (R. 1589).

Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the unity of command could be put into effect either by the President of the United States or by joint agreements of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy or when the commanders of Army and Navy forces agreed that the situation required unity of command and who was to exercise it. No one of these agencies took steps to effectuate what all of the witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal cause of difficulties on Dec. 7, 1941, and the events leading up to and causing those difficulties, that is, unity of command (R. 1587–1588).

It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was not put into effect, in addition to lack of equipment to make it effective. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

"The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense" (R. 1582).

Likewise General Short testified:

"General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or ferrying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the

ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.

"That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3" (R. 286).

"As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours (4 to 7 a. m.). In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4" (R. 298).

"By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into the air) it gave the possibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried about getting that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them an hour to get back in" (R. 460).

"Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions" (R. 528).

The reason for not so doing is shown by Kimmel's words:

"We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize" (R. 1811).

Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on the Commandant, 14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the Navy, for putting this plan into effect, yet it would have been necessary to refer to Washington for a decision. When asked why this would be so, he said:

"It would have alarmed the population. It might have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action which should have been taken without reference to the Department" (R. 1756).

Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for Washington and Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so; and that in turn meant that the Martin-Bellinger Air Plan of Co-operation, which depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, did not go into operation.

The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, "had no planes assigned to him at this time" (R. 1751), so that he could do nothing to carry it out. As to the Army, Admiral Kimmel pointed out:

"There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any" (R. 1753).

When asked why the Navy accepted the responsibility for distant reconnaissance without any effective means of carrying it out, Admiral Kimmel testified he "accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible" (R. 1753).

Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel's statement on long-distance reconnaissance means not being available (R. 1595, 1606). Therefore, paragraph 18 in the air agreement providing the Navy will furnish distant reconnaissance was without effect (R. 1605–1606). Bloch had no planes and such planes as Bellinger had were under command of Kimmel and were being used for other purposes in connection with reconnaissance with the Fleet for protecting maneuver areas against submarines.

For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available and to the extent that any planes were available the use of them would have interfered with training, and for the further reason that the agreements were not to go into effect until an emergency, the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Martin-Bellinger Air Agreement signed by Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The Army and Navy agreed that when and if the time came that they had to put the plan into effect, the documents could only show what the working scheme would be. The inherent weakness in making such plans was the fact of their not being operative in time to meet the attack. Neither the local commanders nor Washington took steps to make them operative as they could have done (R. 1606–1607, 1609). However, unity of command in Washington would have been a condition precedent to unity of command in Hawaii.

[22] 9. *Estimate of the situation.*—The best indication of what the Army and Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense of Hawaii is found in

the estimate of the situation in the implementing, operation plans signed by Bellinger and Martin on April 9, 1941, in execution of the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941. This estimate was prophetic in its accuracy and called for vigorous implementation to meet the worst the enemy could do, as estimated in this document. The document says:

"b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war.

"c. A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective defensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

"d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan) submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service. . . . II (a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines, and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. . . . III (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 30 miles. . . . (c) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start . . ." (Roberts Record 556–D–F).

It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it was stated:

"Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier." (Roberts Record 556–F).

It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to Pearl Harbor and was sunk at about 6:45 a. m. on December 7, but was not reported by the Navy to the Army. Such a report would have been a sure warning of an hour before the attack of what was coming as recognized by paragraph 3 (d) of the estimate of the Situation, forming a part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan.

In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of the information that he had upon which to premise a successful course of action, it is necessary both to take into consideration the background in the first chapter and of the official communications and official actions of those estimates of the situation at the time.

It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned the State Department on January 27 by wire of the possibility of an air attack upon Pearl Harbor. This possibility had already been apparently thoroughly considered by the War and Navy Departments, and it had been concluded that that was the strongest danger to Hawaii. In early January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence of Admiral Kimmel and General Herron, had written at length to the Navy Department on this subject, with particular reference to the weaknesses of the Army defenses against air attack. This letter and the resulting correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War must be read in the light of the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of 1935, which places upon the Army the following mission:

"b. Army—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers."

General Marshall testified, however, as follows:

"We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movements in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack" (R. 9).

As a result, Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War Stimson on Jan. 24, 1941, in part as follows:

"My dear Mr. Secretary:

"The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This re-examination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily pos-

sible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.

"In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

"The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

(1) Air bombing attack
(2) Air torpedo-plane attack
(3) Sabotage
(4) Submarine attack
(5) Mining
(6) Bombardment by gunfire

"Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily."

It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air attack and that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were sufficient by the Army. It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson's letter stimulating this letter of Secretary Knox was based on Richardson's personal inspection and knowledge of the Army situation.

Secretary Knox concludes his letter with the following recommendations to the Army:

"Assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii . . . that the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor."

"(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty exists."

So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment then existing that the most serious threat was an air attack and that all means should be taken to implement against it.

On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter of the Secretary of the Navy under the subject "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and said:

"In reply to your letter of Jan. 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and of the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort . . ."

"(6) With respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective."

On the same day another communication was addressed to General Short, and this time by General Marshall:

[*23*] "Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Navy matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns.

"The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid and by submarine, constitute the real peril of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have air superiority."

And not satisfied with this first letter, General Marshall on March 5, 1941, again addressed General Short, saying:

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of co-ordinating all means available to this end is a *matter of first priority.*"

And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length with reference to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the measures being taken to meet this situation. He points out that antisabotage measures and suppression of local disorders could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come from the islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against air attacks. His estimate of the situation was:

"The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack."

Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use of emergency fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of bunkers to protect the dispersed planes, as he discusses such a problem at length and its solution (R. 21–25).

On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure; Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement, and Field Orders No. 1–NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement (R. 26–27).

He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and himself felt all steps had been taken "which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together with the unity of command as the situation requires" (R. 27).[28]

This statement was in error at the time it was made, as the agreement could not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any material way and there was no unity of command. none proposed and none was ever put into effect under these agreements. Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative.

This communication was acknowledged by General Marshall on May 5.

This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus transmitted to the Chief of Staff on April 14 as indicating the best judgment in estimating the situation by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch.

It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situation *to select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks* (R. 1121, 2662). In the present instance, it was clearly recognized, not only in the foregoing correspondence, but in this formal joint estimate by the Army and Navy of the situation, *that the most serious attack to be met by the Army and Navy was an air attack by Japan.* Herewith is the following statement from that estimate signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This estimate is prophetic in its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of the enemy's intention.

"2. Assumptions. . . .

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu.

e. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu. . . .

c. . . . The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.

"2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the *action upon which we should base our plans of operation* is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before attack.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack. . . . .

"4. . . . The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. . . .

"It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action."

C. CRITICAL PERIOD: OCT. 1 TO DEC. 7, 1941

1. *Vital Messages.*—In view of the foregoing, the estimate of the situation showed that an all-out attack by air was the judgment of the best military and naval minds in Hawaii. Under established military doctrine, that called for preparation for this worst eventuality. (R. 436–437) Short so admitted that this was the correct procedure (R. 436–437).

[28] Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 27).

The contrast between the written statements of many of the responsible actors in this matter prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, as to their estimate of an air attack by Japan on Oahu, is startling.

The Secretary of the Navy wrote on Jan. 24, 1941, to the Secretary of War:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

"(1) air bombing attack.
"(2) air torpedo attack.
"(3) sabotage" (Roberts Record, 1824–1825).

However, when Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few days after December 7, following the Japanese attack, Admiral Pye testified his (Secretary Knox) first remarks was: "No one in Washington expected an attack—even Kelly Turner." Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division of the Navy and was the most aggressive-minded of all (R. 1070).

General Marshall, in a letter to General Short on Feb. 7, 1941, said:

"The risk of sabotage and *the risk involved in a surprise raid by air* and submarine constitute the real perils of the situation" (R. 17)

On Oct. 7, 1944, General Marshall testified before this Board:

"We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack upon Hawaii (R. 9).

[*24*] It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin were responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference to air, and this was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. In that estimate they put attack by air as the primary threat against Hawaii.

Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record:

"If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been in a functioning status" (R. 1626).

Contrast what General Martin said:

"I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is from a surprise attack with the information we had" (R. 1827).

Admiral Kimmel said:

"We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor" (R. 1771).

The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board, whereas the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and the instructions from the Secretary of the Navy as well as his own recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy show that an air attack was the principal concern.

Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement based on the air estimate of Bellinger and Martin, testified as follows:

"General FRANK. Was the attack a complete surprise to you?

"Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir" (R. 1518).

General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying the air attack as a primary threat and he had received the Marshall letter of February 7, 1941, and similar letters of General Marshall, and had replied setting forth in letters that the air attack was his primary concern.

Witness what General Short says on this record to the contrary:

"General GRUNERT. Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?

"General SHORT. It was" (R. 536).

We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, *all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor.* As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it.

Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified:

"Well, I was not surprised" (R. 4072).

Short's Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated with his staff in July and finally put into complete form on Nov. 5, 1941 (R. 333) had been sent to the Chief of Staff (R. 431). General Marshall wrote General Short on October 10 that it had just come to his attention and that upon an examination of the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, containing those three alerts, "I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units" (R. 29).

He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all airfields on Oahu against sabotage and

ground attacks, and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. He thereby clearly warned General Short that the Air Force should not be used for antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter:

"This (the action of using the Air Force for anti-sabotage duty) seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided" (R. 29).

General Short replied on October 14, as follows:

"The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essential utilities. . . . However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon."

General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October, and in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert plan (of which there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. General Marshall further indicated that no potential ground duty should be used as an excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force training, saying:

"I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

"It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned" (R. 30).

Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his Air Force for its normal purposes and not upon antisabotage guard duty, and emphasizes that the use of the Air Force must be free and unfettered.

On October 16 Short received the following Navy message:

"The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C. N. O. which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote: 'Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include reapproachment with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan" (R. 279).

On Oct. 18, 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reading as follows:

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent" (R. 4258).

This message was dated Oct. 18, 1941, according to the Gerow statement, Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by General Marshall, the same message was dated Oct. 20, 1941, as #266.

On October 28, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details of the training of the air corps personnel.

On November 24 the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message that Short thinks he saw, reading as follows:

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military force is, in our opinion, that a *surprise aggresive movement in any direction*, including an attack on the Philippines
[25] or Guam, *is a possibility*. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action . . . inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japan action" (R. 4258).

On Nov. 26, 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24s on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simul-

taneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines . . . before they depart Honolulu insure that both B–24s are fully supplied with ammunition for guns" (R. 4259).

On November 27 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, to G–3 of General Short, which reads as follows:

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo" (R. 1775).

And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

No. 472. "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers" (R. 280–281, 4259–4260).[29]

This completes the pattern of the communications and information that was in Short's possession when he made the fatal decision to elect the antisabotage Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. 2 or No. 3, which would have constituted the defense against the most serious attack that could be made upon him in view of the previous estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all quarters of an air raid.[30]

On the same day, Nov. 27, 1941, but *after his decision to select Alert No. 1* and the sending of a reply to the message, Short received from G–2, War Department, through his G–2, Hawaiian Department, the following message:

"Advise only the C. G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possibilities that hostilities may begin*" (R. 4260).

Short was asked what were his reasons for his action. The following colloquy is important:

"General FRANK. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?

"General SHORT. Yes.

"General FRANK. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our War College teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?

"General SHORT. The worst.

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[29] A full discussion of the message follows:

[30] Significant naval messages from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, under dates of Dec. 3, 4, and 6, 1941, relating to the destruction of codes and secret documents by Japanese consulates and instructions regarding destruction of similar means of our own evidently never reached General Short (R. 424–425).

"General FRANK. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in this instance?

"General SHORT. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had" * * * (R. 436–437).

"General FRANK. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in general, may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and to a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages between the 16th of November and the 27th?

"General SHORT. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes without any ammunition.

"General FRANK. All right. Did you feel that the wording of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?

"General SHORT. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: That they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures.

"General FRANK. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the answer——

"General SHORT. You mean the estimate of the year—you mean the year before?

"General FRANK. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate.

"General SHORT. Oh.

"General FRANK. Of 1941.

"General SHORT. Yes.

"General FRANK. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the question asked two or three questions back.

[*26*] "General SHORT. Yes" (R. 471–472).

General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the Chief of Staff of November 27 ordered the No. 1 Alert, which continued up to the attack on December 7 (R. 282). His message in reply to General Marshall was:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. REUARD four seventy two Nov. 27th" (R. 38, 286).

The indorsements so appearing on this reply are as follows: In the handwriting of the Secretary of War there appear the words "Noted HLS," written in pen: "Noted—Chief of Staff," stamped by a rubber stamp on the message without initials; and a rubber stamp "Noted, WPD" (in red ink) followed by pen initials "L.T.G." (R. 38, 4287).

An examination of the wire received from General MacArthur, in response to a similar message sent to General Short,[31] shows the same indorsements, including "Noted—Chief of Staff," with a rubber stamp but not initials. However, this message has written in General Marshall's handwriting the words "To Secretary of War, GCM." This indorsement does not appear on the following message that came from Short. (See General Marshall's explanation below.)

The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was the "Action Copy" as noted in pencil at its foot "OCS/18136–120."

When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said:

"General RUSSELL. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by

[31] On November 27th the War Department sent messages similar to one sent to General Short, to MacArthur in the Philippines, Andrews in Panama, and DeWitt on the West Coast, each of which called for a report of measures taken. All replies except that from Short indicated the taking of measures of greater security than those envisaged in the Hawaiian Alert No. 1.

message from you over your signature by number. That message of General Short reporting action merely states:

> "'Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh.'

"The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp 'Noted—Chief of Staff,' and was initialed by General Gerow.

"The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signaure. Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages?

"General MARSHALL. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, 'Noted—Chief of Staff.'

"General RUSSELL. That is true.

"General MARSHALL. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will find my initials.

"General RUSSELL. Yes; I do see them.

"General MARSHALL. But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all; that is my practice. One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection at all.

"General RUSSELL. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's office and was by him initialed—would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?

"General MARSHALL. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not initial it. They evidently came in together.

"General RUSSELL. If they were together you might or might not have seen them?

"General MARSHAL. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it" (R. 38–40).

No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any record, either internally in the War Department or externally, of any message to Short showing the slightest exception taken to his course of action. It will be noted as to the Chief of Staff, that while he did not initial the Short reply, he did initial the top message from General MacArthur on the same subject, and apparently they both went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substantially the same time in answer to the same message from the Chief of Staff. The inference from General Marshall's testimony is that possibly he only initialed the top one, but that is speculation, as he said, "I do not know what the explanation is." (R. 39)

2. *Analysis of the Situation from November 24 to November 27.*—The vital message of November 27, No. 472, heretofore quoted as having been sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, can be understood and its proper place in this narrative determined only when we know the events which led up to its being sent; when we know by whom drafted and by what procedure the drafting was accomplished; and the circumstances under which it was forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and other documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the message and the meaning of each part of it.[32]

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[32] The Secretary of War has cleared some ambiguity in this record, and an ambiguity in the White Papers by defining with precision the War Council. There were really three bodies that were closely referred to from time to time by this title. The true War Council was that established under the National Defense Act of 1920, solely within the War Department. The second body was that created by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, when they entered into their positions, by which they gathered together at regular intervals with the Secretary of State, and sometimes with General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The third group was that which joined the President at fairly regular intervals, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and from time to time General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and occasionally, General Arnold. (R. 4041–4042–4043–4044, 4047–4048, 5–6)

The War Council met on the 25th of November, 1941. Fortunately, we have the advantage of the contemporaneous diary of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who was pictured in his diary with great clarity and precision the events as they transpired, which were material to this issue. This diary reads:

"At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic. . . . We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and [27] the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem" (R. 4050–4051).

This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941 (R. 4050–4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War returned to his office, he found a G–2 message that a Japanese expedition had started southward, south of Formosa; and he at once called Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the report and a copy to the President.

On the following day, Nov. 26, 1941, the diary continues: "Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all" (R. 4051–4052).

There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington for North Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of the 26th, he had drafted in the rough a proposed message to General Short apprising him of the situation as it was developed. General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he believes he discussed such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244–4246.)

General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th, at which time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th together with the report from General Gerow of the events during the 27th which we are now about to relate. (R. 36–37.)

Before the closing of the story of the 26th, Mr. Stimson defines it as:

"The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it" (R. 4051–4052–4053).

What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the "Ten Points." As Ambassador Grew testifies, the Japanese considered these "Ten Points" to be an ultimatum. (R. 4221.) Whether or not the Secretary of State considers now that this is not an ultimatum (see his letter of Sept. 28, 1943), nevertheless, the Japanese did so consider it and acted upon it as such by notifying the task force, which as the evidence shows was waiting at Tankan Bay, to start the movement against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27th–28th of November. As well put by Ambassador Grew:

"Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for years beforehand, in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects, and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail; but as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don't myself know exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the point at which they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26 that the button was touched" (R. 4215).

On the morning of the 27th of November 1941, Mr. Stimson's diary reads:

"The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'"

Then the Secretary of War states:

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by General Arnold to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take pictures. (R. 4033.)

The Secretary related that General Marshall "is down at the maneuvers today," and "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow." At this point he says:

"A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed" (R. 4054).

This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to prepare; but it was too late, as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State in handing the "Ten Points" counterproposals to the Japanese on the previous day, which was, as the Secretary of State remarked, "washing his hands of the matter."

When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did not know of the very complete evidence in this record of the movement of the Japanese task force starting on the 27th–28th from Tanken Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull's statement on this subject is of interest:

"I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesman—who were urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20—what became the last of this Government's counterproposals. . . . It will thus be seen that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultimatum." (Letter from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Sept. 28, 1944.)

3. *The Drafting of the Message #472 of the 27th.*—We now turn to the drafting of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and other witnesses. The first meeting was between Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and General Gerow. (R. 4239–4240). A second meeting between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day. (R. 4240) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says:

"But the main question at this meeting was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he should be on the *qui vive* for any attack, and telling him how the situation was." (R. 4055) To continue with the diary:

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr. Stimson here verabally testified—'We were sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska'). So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was." (R. 4056)

The Secretary of War then stated:

"The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right." (R. 4056)

The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in the message of the 27th were these:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." [33]

The Secretary continues his testimony:

"That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; [28] and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely, that the man should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here" (R. 5046).

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[33] However, General Gerow (R. 4247) testified that he believed that the sentence, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment," was inserted by him or Colonel Bundy.

The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally that of the Chief of Staff. Mr. Stimson said:

"That is why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally do: to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts" (R. 4057).

The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has indorsed upon it, "Shown to the Secretary of War" (R. 4057).

The Secretary testified:

"I went over very carefully the whole message. * * * And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there" (R. 4058).

With reference to the other meeting that took place on the 27th in the drafting of his message, #472, General Gerow's testimony is that at the meeting with the Secretary of War the first two sentences, reported by the Secretary of War as being drafted by him, were sentences which were softened by instructions or information furnished by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the telephone with the Secretary of War the morning of the 27th (R. 4247). General Gerow testifies that the sentence so softened originally read "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated" (R. 4270).

The sentence, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy (R. 4247).

The sentence, "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act," was thus phrased because as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts Commission:

"We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act" (R. 4251–4252).

The next sentence: "This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense" was inserted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The purpose of this language was to insure freedom of action to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department (R. 4252).

General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the ambiguity of the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a "Do-or-Don't" message (R. 4252).

He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the relations between the American Government and the Japanese Empire (R. 4256). The sole information passed on to General Short by the War Department from October 20 to November 27 about what the soldier calls "enemy information" was in this particular message (R. 4263). The only previous message that Short had had of the international situation from the War Department was on October 20, which read:[34] [35]

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent" (R. 4264).

The sentence: "This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense" was put in by the War Plans Division (R. 4271).

With reference to the phrase, "You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." Apparently at that time no investigation was made by the War Department to ascertain just what means General Short had of conducting the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the fact is that General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree of reconnaissance. The record shows he did not fully and gainfully employ these means for this purpose. General Short was recalled at substantially the

[34] However, General Gerow testified (R. 4258) that there was a Navy Department message of November 24 which contained information of the Japanese situation and indicated possible Japanese aggressive action and which directed the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet to inform General Short of its contents.

[35] Information gleaned by the Board indicates that G–2, War Department, on Nov. 3, 1941, sent a letter to G–2, Hawaiian Department, in which was set forth the prophecy of war between Japan and the United States in December, 1941, or February, 1942, as made by a prominent Japanese.

end of all the testimony and questions on this point. Short's position on this message was that the direction to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile directive and that it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was entirely unfamiliar with the fact, "that the Navy was responsible for long-distance reconnaissance."

He said this was "in spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved that plan that provided for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar with it, or it had slipped his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible" (R. 4436–4437).

He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this matter in his reply to the War Department:

"I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement, they would have told me so."

He said he based everything on the responsibility of the Navy for long distance reconnaissance, because it had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations (R. 4438).

He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance aircraft even though the agreement was not actually in effect at that time or the War Department had overlooked the agreement, because he says, as elsewhere admitted, that the Army and Navy agreement was not to go into effect until hostilities, or their equivalent, had occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his control and could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this message.

For instance, the following colloquy occurred:

"62. General GRUNERT. You might clear up two additional points. First, we will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Department had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department's attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about that agreement?

General SHORT. I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing.

"63. General GRUNERT. Then you considered your report the answer to that?

"General SHORT. They called on me for a report. If they had not called on me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but they definitely told me to 'report action taken,' which I did; and I heard nothing further from them.

"64. General GRUNERT. We have had testimony before the Board, from a member of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and apparently the emergency, or the imminency of such an emergency, [29] was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that understanding, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance, prior to such an emergency?

"General SHORT. If the emergency existed it was their business; if it did not exist, there was no necessity.

"65. General GRUNERT. Then, when do you judge the emergency came about?

"General SHORT. It very definitely came about at 7:55 on the morning of the 7th" (R. 4438–4439).

This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was not taking the action which he could and should have taken or either more fully carrying out the order, or of specifically and definitely reporting the complete circumstances of his inability to do so. He did not call the attention of the War Department to what was an apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the Navy reconnaissance without any reasonably energetic inquiry to ascertain the correctness of his assumption that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance. He has no adequate explanation for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which was in full operation Sunday prior to December 7) after getting the message of the 27th, and which was used continuously after December 7 (R. 4441–4444). For some time after December 7 the situation as to the dearth of spare parts was the same as before December 7.

The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part, "Report measures taken . . . Limit dissemination . . . to minimum essential officers" (R. 4071). He said he knew it was there and he understood it.

There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one at 9:30 the morning of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the first conference, the Secretary of War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, and General Gerow were there. At that time General Gerow received instructions with reference to the prepara-

tion of the message. He then consulted Admiral Stark (R. 4239–4240). The second conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and Mr. Stimson (R. 4240). General Bryden has testified that although he was Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General Marshall's absence, he does not remember the message nor the conference thereon (R. 900). While the Chief of Staff reviewed the message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unfortunate that during this critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and missed the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a number of people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting tenor. Possibly had he been present, the Marshall-Stark memorandum might have reached the President in time to have influenced the momentous decisions of November 26.

It is equally obvious that the November 27 message was the only message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course of events terminating in the counterproposals on the 26th of November to Japan.

No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this message. It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short's mind the background of events that had been taking place. While this does not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment for the responsibility on others.

The three principal major generals who were commanders under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing by way of information as to the international situation except what they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other high officers of the War Department had, was not transmitted to Short. The only summary of this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of November 27, which was but a faint echo of what had actually occurred.

It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotiations by the counterproposals of the 26th, considered by them as an ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information, which our ultrasecrecy policy did not permit of full transmission to field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and Navy departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much of what they knew as they judged necessary.[36]

It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941.

If it had not been for Mr. Stimson's initiative in calling the Secretary of State, it is uncertain as to when he would have been advised of this most important event. As it turned out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the information was not material, since the Japanese delayed striking until December 7.

The effect of the counterproposals of November 26 on the resulting responsibilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stimson's quotation of Mr. Hull's comment to him, as follows:

"Now it is up to the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have washed my hands of the Japanese."

4. *Analysis of the Nov. 27, 1941, Message.*—The message of Nov. 27, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, consists of the following component parts:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

Comment: This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American relations, i. e., that war might not come. The War Department was convinced then that war would come.

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[36] Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed themselves as of the opinion that the warnings transmitted to Short and Kimmel were sufficient to properly alert their respective commands.

The statement that "Japanese future action unpredictable" was in conflict with the Navy message which the War Department had directed be shown to Short, to the effect that the attack would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the Far East. It did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations.

A warning that "hostile action possible at any moment" indicated the necessity of taking adequate measures to meet that situation. This is particularly true in view of the Navy message of 16 October 1941, which said that there was a possibility that Japan might attack. There was also received from the Navy on November 27 a message containing these words:

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days."

[30] The next statement in the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided comma the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense."

Comment: This instruction embodied our well-known national policy against initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the war must be Japan's. It gives Short the right of defense, notwithstanding the restriction, but creates an atmosphere of caution which he must exercise in preparing for such defense.

The third portion of the message is this:

"Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken."

Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.

Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public.

Short did report within an hour the measures taken (R. 286). Short's answer to General Marshall's radio said:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. REUARD four seven two twenty seventh."

This in itself was sufficient to show that such steps were inadequate, but as he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Department erroneously assumed that its responsible commander was alert to sabotage and to liaison with the Navy and was taking the necessary responsible other steps mentioned in the radio because he had been warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall.

Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Department placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it did not direct Short to take such measures as they considered adequate to meet this serious threat. This is particularly true in view of the fact that much material information relating to Japanese-American relations was in the War Department, which had not been made available to Short.

The next and last portion of the message: "should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

Comment: (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that his basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon it was to be used and was a clear indiction to him to adopt adequate preparatory measures to insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5.

(b) As to the directive to "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers":

The War Department was security-conscious. The construction which Short appears to have placed upon this language may have unduly limited the information which reached responsible subordinate commanders. This part of the message left broad discretion in Short as to the dissemination of the information contained in the message, and had the personnel operating the Air Warning Service on the morning of December 7 known of the absolute imminence of war they

doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from the radar station much differently.

It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions—not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission of the first overt act.

Comment on the message as a whole: General Short, as the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and as such had a fundmental duty to properly employ all available means at his disposal for that purpose in the face of any threat with or without notification of impending hostilities.

Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying information, which undoubtedly had its effect on Short's mental conception of the situation, the responsibility rested on him to take measures to meet the worst situation with which he might be confronted, and such action on his part, as Commander on the spot, was mandatory despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by the War Department of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate imminence of war.

The same day G–2 of he War Department wired to G–2 Hawaiian Department, which clearly indicated that *both* sabotage and hostilities might begin and be concurrent. This message said:

"Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Actions of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also* probable that *hostilities* may begin."

This G–2 message nullifies all Short's explanations that his mind was put on sabotage because of the War Department's emphasis on this subject. The message shows that hostilities were just as possible as sabotage. His decision to adopt Alert No. 1 came on the 27th, before receipt of any message having reference to sabotage. He had two threats: he only took measures as to one. The third message, upon which he particularly relies as to sabotage, which came on November 28 from the War Department (G–2), came *after* he had made his decision to go to Alert No. 1. This last message again mentions the critical situation as to sabotage activities. It does not in any way change previous messages. Short should have known, as a trained soldier, that a G–2 message is informative and is of lesser authority than a command message from the Chief of Staff.

When General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations with Japan had practically ended when he received the message of November 27, he said:

"I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically unavoidable. . . . If I knew it was immediately imminent . . . but if I had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert No. 3. . . . It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost upon us" (R. 450).

"General RUSSELL. General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum which G–2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese government?

"General SHORT. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.

"General RUSSELL. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the [*31*] Japanese and that the security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?

"General SHORT. I did not.

"General RUSSELL. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?

"General SHORT. At that time I was not in command; but I have known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about it at that time" (R. 451).

This concludes the status of affairs to the 27th. There still remained the period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during which time messages and even letters could have been sent outlining and completely delineating the entire situation to Short.

Even a courier could have reached Honolulu in 36 hours from Washington. The War Department, although it had additional information of a most positive

character, left Short with this fragment of information regarding the U. S.-Japanese negotiations contained in the two sentences inserted in the message of the 27th by the Secretary of War, and took no action either to investigate Short's reply to the message of November 27 to determine the steps being taken for defense, or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken.

5. *Messages November 28 to December 6, Inclusive.*—On November 28 the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short, reading as follows: [37]

"Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigated responsibility of War Department (See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions."

Short sent a reply to wire 482 of November 28 on the same day which outlined at length the sabotage precautions he was taking. The War Department copy of this wire, which is addressed to the A. G. O., shows that a copy was sent to the Secretary of the General Staff, but no other indorsements are on it showing it was read or considered by anyone else. This wire reads:

"Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Dept paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this Hqrs by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Commanders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on his Hqrs to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual co-operation has been given on all pertinent matters. Short."

It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio No. 482, sent to Short by the War Department on November 28.

On December 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following wire to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet:

"On 3d December we have, 'Op Nav informs'—this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir * * *—'informs C in C Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14–16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents' " (Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, APHB).[38]

The story as to whether Short ever saw or received this message is as follows: Admiral Kimmel visited Short Dec. 2 and Dec. 3, 1941. (R. 1513) Short says: "I never saw that message" (R. 424), referring to the 3 December mes-

[37] A similar message, No. 484, was sent on the same day to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, by General Arnold.

[38] This message also paraphrased by General Grunert, Vol. 4, Page 424. This same message also paraphrased in Roberts Testimony, Vol. 5, Page 583, and Vol. 17, Page S–85.

sage. He also denied seeing the message from the Navy of December 4 and 6 hereinafter quoted (R. 424–425). However, Short was advised by the FBI that it had tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consul's cook and had found the Consul was burning his papers (R. 3204). All other lines were tapped by the Navy (R. 3204). Phillips testified Short was "informed of it," but nothing was done about it (R. 1243). Short denies such G–2 information, saying: "I am sure he didn't inform me" (R. 525). Colonel Fielder says the matter was discussed by Colonel Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it. Colonel Bicknell, G–2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder (R. 1413–1414).

This record does not provide either a true copy or a paraphrase copy of the message of Dec. 4, 1941, or Dec. 6, 1941. The information we have is no better than that contained in the Roberts Report, which reads as follows:

"The second of Dec. 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of Dec. 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment." (Roberts Report, Page 8).

[*32*] These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he remembered them (R. 1513–1514).

Irrespective of any testimony on the subject the record shows that on Dec. 3, 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cablegram relative to the relief of marines on Wake and Midway (R. 302, 394).

There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not give instructions to Short direct which would have put him on his guard as to the tenseness of the situation.

On December 6 there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips, the message about the Japanese burning their papers, and he reported it at a staff meeting on December 6 (R. 1414).

6. *Dec. 7, 1941, Message.*—This brings us to the final message from Washington. It was filed by the Chief of Staff at 12:18 p. m. Washington time, December 7, which was 6:48 a. m. Honolulu time.

"Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have been sent so as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack might at least have greatly lessened the results of the attack, will be set forth at length. It was sent by commercial radio, the RCA. This is a commercial line. Early in the morning in Honolulu the Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in keeping in communication with the War Department radio. It is significant that the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k.g. set. It was not a powerful set, like that of the Navy or the RCA. The Message Center of the War Department, which is charged with the expeditious handling of messages, decided to send this vital message by commercial RCA instead of War Department radio, because it could not get through on its own set. Why this message was not sent by the Navy radio, by FBI radio, or by telephone, and why these means of possibly more rapid communication were not investigated, is not satisfactorily explained. The explanation that "secrecy" was paramount does not appear to apply to those means.

Shivers of the FBI testified:

"We had our own radio . . . I would say within—depending on the length of the message; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington by—could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of twenty minutes . . . our channels were not jammed . . . We used a frequency that was assigned to us by the FCC . . . All of the stuff that went out from here to—that went out over that radio, was coded" (R. 3221).

"General GRUNERT. Then any message that Washington wanted to get to you during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour?

"Mr. SHIVERS. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes, sir" (R. 3221).

It is to be noted in this connection that not only was the FBI radio working between Washington and Honolulu on December 6–7, but that testimony shows numerous telephone conversations were conducted just after the attack, over the telephone between Washington and Honolulu.

The story of the sending of this message in the War Department is as follows:

This message arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., Honolulu time, December 7. The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message was not actually delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian Department until 11:45 a. m., the attack having taken place at 7:55 a. m. The message was decoded and delivered to the Adjutant General at 2:58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack.

The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on the morning of December 7 and for 24 hours previous to that time was as follows: The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel Fielder (G–2) himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a call from Washington on the same phone: it took no more than an hour as a maximum to get the call through despite the heavy traffic to Hawaii by reason of the attack (R. 2999). Furthermore, a war message could have demanded priority.

It is important to observe that only one means of communication was selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the FBI radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Washington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa. Shivers of FBI testified. (R. 3222) Short testified:

"General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was a possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after the attack" (R. 310).

Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage an immediate attack, rather they thought more of a breaking of diplomatic relations, and if the idea of an attack at 1 p.m., E.S.T., did enter their minds they thought of it as probably taking place in the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was still of paramount interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send this massage by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or FBI radio or the scrambler telephone or all three.

The result was the message did not get through in time due to the failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of Staff used it to the Philippines (Short R. 310) or take steps to insure that the message got through by multiple channels (by code over naval or FBI radio to Hawaii), if the War Department radio was not working. He left Short without this additional most important information. Short testified as follows:

"If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea of danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack" (R. 310).

Colonel French, in charge of Traffic Operations Branch, Chief Signal Office, in the War Department, testified that on Dec. 7, 1941, Colonel Bratton brought the message to the code room in the handwriting of the Chief of Staff which "I had typed for clarity" in a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it. The message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities checked. It was decided to send the message by commercial means, choosing Western Union, as the fastest.

He stated that he personally took the message from the code room to the teletype operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45 minutes to transmit message to destination. It left at 12:01 (E.S.T., 6:31 a.m., Honolulu time). The transmission to Western Union [*33*] was finished 12:17 p.m., E.S.T., or 7:33 a.m., Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The message was actually delivered at 11:45 a.m., Honolulu time. The messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing (R. 189–202).

Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the FBI used to Hawaii; he never used the scrambler telephone and sometimes he used the Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on the morning of December 7, although the Navy has a more powerful radio (R. 203–204).

7. *Failure of Navy to Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on Morning Dec. 7, 1941.*—The second failure was by the Navy Department, upon whom Short so trustingly relied. A two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor area at 6:30 a. m. Between 6:33 and 6:45 a. m. it was sunk by the Navy. This was reported at 7:12 a. m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff, but the Navy made no such report to Short. (R. 310–311; See Roberts Report p. 15.) As Short said:

"That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not—at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack" (R. 311).

8. *Failure of Aircraft Warning Service to Advise of Approaching Planes, Dec. 7, 1941.*—The third event that might have saved the day was the following:

The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warning stations on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and had set up an Information Center to utilize the aircraft warning information, plot the course of any incoming planes and to advise the responsible authorities. The organization was set up and operating and was being utilized from 4 a. m. to 7 o'clock on the morning of December 7 as a training method and had been so used for some time past. The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Information Center to be trained as liaison officers, but had not yet gotten around to it. In the Information Center that morning was a Lieut. Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Aair Corps, whose tour of duty thereat was until 8 o'clock. It was Tyler's second tour of duty at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but there were no others on duty after 7 o'clock except the enlisted telephone operator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, the first of personnel that had made the Center operative from 4 to 7 a. m. had departed.

At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two privates who had been on duty from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. One of them was Private Lockard, who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft detector, and a Private George E. Elliott, who was the plotting man to plot the information picked up on the radar.

This plotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private Lockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close at 7 o'clock and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to breakfast. He kept the radar open for further operation to instruct his partner, Private Elliott. While Lockard was adjusting the machine to begin the instruction of Private Elliott, he observed on the radar screen an unusual formation he had never seen in the machine. He thought there was something wrong with it, as the indicator showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine error. He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that the machine was operating correctly and that there was a considerable number of planes 132 miles away from the island approaching from a direction 3 degrees east of north. The time was 7:02 a. m., Dec. 7, 1941.

In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that he plotted these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the Information Center. After some debate between them, Lockard did call the Information Center and reported to the switchboard operator. The switchboard operator, an enlisted man who testified, was unable to do anything about it, so he put Lieutenant Tyler on the phone. Tyler's answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in substance, "Forget it." Tyler's position is indefensible in his action, for he says that he was merely there for training and had no knowledge upon which to base any action; yet he assumed to give directions instead of seeking some one competent to make a decision.

If that be a fact, and it seems to be true, then he should not have assumed to tell these two men, Private Lockard and Private Elliott, to "forget it," because he did not have the knowledge upon which to premise any judgment (R. 1102). He should, in accordance with customary practice, have then used initiative to take this matter up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact that he said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it. By his assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the consequences of his action should be imposed upon him.

If Taylor had communicated this information, the losses might have been very greatly lessened. As General Short testified:

"If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air . . . It would have made a great difference in the loss . . . It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action" (R. 312–313).

The attack actually took place at 7:55 a. m.

When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was communicated, apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight of B-17s was coming from the mainland and he thought that they might represent what was seen on the screen of the radar machine. As a matter of fact, that probably had something to do with it, as they did come in about this period and were attacked by the Japanese, some of them being destroyed.

9. *Navy Failure to Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jaluits*—About Nov. 25, 1941, the Navy through its intelligence sources in the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington had reports showing the presence in Jaluit in the Marshall Islands of the Japanese fleet, composed of aircraft carriers, submarines, and probably other vesels.

Information of this fleet ceased about Dec. 1, 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles closer to Oahu than the mainland of Japan the present of such a strong force capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval information. This information was delivered to G-2 of the War Department as testified to by General Miles. No information of this threat to Hawaii was given to General Short by either the War or Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in Hawaii. Short and his senior commanders testified that such information would have materially altered their point of view and their actions.

Such information should have been delivered by the War Department or the Navy for what it was worth, to permit Short to evaluate it; this was not done.

[*34*] The fact that the actual force which attacked Hawaii has now been identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action.

10. *The Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor; Sources of Information to Japanese.*

The following account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has been Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of December 7 and shortly before Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

He said that the task force which has been identified by the Navy through numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from interiewing prisoners who were in a position to know personally the orders and preparations for the attack, had the following history, according to the Navy view of the correct story:[39]

Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with great care and precision, as disclosed by the maps which were found in the planes which were shot

[39] The Japanese striking force assembled in home waters during November and departed from the Bungou Channel area in Japan about 22 November, proceeding to Tankan Bay (sometimes called Hittokapu Bay). This assembly had started between the 7th and 22nd of November. Tankan Bay is located at Etorofu Island in North Japan. It does not appear on the ordinary maps or charts, but is shown in a map of the Japanese Empire in a Japanese encyclopedia under the title "Hittokapu Bay." The task force arrived in this bay approximately November 25. The entire force departed on the 27th–28th of November (see footnote 40), taking a northerly route south of the Aleutians directly to the east (to avoid being sighted by shipping) and then headed for a position to the north of Oahu, arriving there on the early morning of the 8th of December (Japanese time) for the 7th of December (Hawaiian time). The date of departure of November 27th–28th, according to the numerous documents and prisoners interviewed who had intimate knowledge of this matter and who independently picked the same date, is confirmed beyond doubt according to Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. This force consisted of six aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers as well as submarines.

down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the two-man submarines. These papers and orders show meticulous care in planning and timing, which would take very considerable practice. The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Tankan Bay was about November 22, and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941.[40]

The elements of the fleet for this task force consisted of six carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer division.

This is one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled, and after the date of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it took part in a number of similar successful and very disastrous attacks in the Pacific Southwest. The elements of this task force left individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tankan Bay in an uninhabited spot where they were unobserved. The assembly was completed and the task force departed on November 27-28, Eastern Longitude Time, which was apparently after the date that the counterproposals (considered by the Japanese as an ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to Japan through Secretary Hull on Nov. 26, 1941. It is significant that the attack of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army and Navy planes parked together wing-to-wing as protection against sabotage (Alert No. 1) must have been as a result of knowledge of that fact, in view of their carefully rehearsed and scheduled attack formations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes on fire with incendiary ammunition; it is equally significant that it was well known in the island that Alert No. 1 was put into effect November 27 and therefore can be assumed to have been communicated to Japan, and that advantage of such information was apparently taken by reason of the nature of the attack and the way it was conducted.

It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a shot-down Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been found upon one of the crew in a two-man submarine, that there had been entered on these maps, which were old Geodetic Survey maps of the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the hangers that had been built on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be built. Five of these hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the Hawiian Department or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field, showed five of these hangers in full line and three in dotted lines as being hangers yet to be built. The Japanese are well known as precise copyists. It is apparent that when they made the maps found on the aviator and the submarine-crew members they had knowledge later than 1936 of construction either that had been constructed or was to be constructed, because they entered on such maps the additional three hangars in full lines.

The task force proceeded in radio silence due east to a point substantially due north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under forced draft to a point between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from which the flight took off. The two-man submarines were carried on top of the mother submarines and released adjacent to the harbor.

Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured and those that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured prisoners, show that the attacking forces were to destroy without a trace any third power's vessels including Japanese Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force; to capture and maintain in radio silence any such vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force, but if such vessels had sent any radio communications to destroy them (R. 3043). This is a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their own people and to sink them without mercy because they happened to be operating by accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally operate.

This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of approximately 424 planes; (R. 3048) of this number about 300 actually attacked Pearl Harbor (R. 3053). The pilots were the highest quality and training that have ever been encountered in this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of Midway, where four of these same carriers were engaged and were sunk (R. 3046). The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the United States could muster on December 7, on the carriers Lexington and Enterprise, was approximately 180 planes (R. 3049).

Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have been unable to have brought the Japanese task force under gunfire because our battle-

[40] Japanese time and date must be taken into consideration because our December 7 at Honolulu is Japanese December 8. The time difference between Tokyo and Hawaii is 4½ hours. The time difference between Washington and Tokyo is 10 hours.

ships were too slow and the remainder of our force would probably have suffered severe damage if not defeat on the high seas by reason of the great superiority in the air before superior gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only possible hope of overcoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that prevented fight of their planes so that the United States force would have superiority of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air power.

He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way, from any source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and if it had been expected the probability of the United States winning in any engagement of the task force was not a bright one. He stated that this task force represented a substantial per cent of the entire Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the Jap carriers 424 aircraft against a possible 180 which we might have mustered if we had had our own two carriers available to operate against them (R. 3048–3049).

The information upon which the story of the attack [*35*] is based has been revealed so far as coming from several sources. First, the Otto Kuehn trial revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet disposition and locations in Pearl Harbor in the period December 1 to December 6, and a code delivered with the information, so that communication of the information to Japanese offshore submarines adjacent to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered by the Japanese Consul direct to the homeland.

Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This information the Japanese Consul communicated principally by commercial lines to Japan. Additionally Kuehn provided a code indicating what units were in the harbor and what were out and means of signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat, radio signals over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his yard, all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period during which the signals were to be given was December 1 to 6.

If such information had been available to our armed forces it would have clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese Consulate on the subject show clearly what was done and the intention of the Japanese. If authority had existed to tap these lines, this information would have been available to both the Army and Navy. Kuehn was tried by a military commission after signed confessions of his actions and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to imprisonment for fifty years. It is significant that Kuehn was a German agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until after Pearl Harbor, right under the nose of the Army, the FBI, and Naval Intelligence.

As Shivers, head of the FBI in the islands, said:

"If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japanese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7; because, if you recall, this system of signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul General simply included the period from December 1 to December 6" (R. 3218).

Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over the commercial line to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured was that while he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the telephone wires and to intercept telephone conversations, yet they could not get the information out of the cable offices. He testified:

"Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him one question. What other means of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than a telephone connection?

"Mr. SHIVERS. He had commercial communication system.

"Colonel TOULMIN. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines?

"Mr. SHIVERS. Off of the lines themselves?

"Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

"Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

"Colonel TOULMIN. So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication over those lines?

"Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir" (R. 3223).

It was later discovered, when the torn messages of the Japanese Consul were reconstructed after they had been taken on December 7, that many vital messages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was keeping Japan advised of the entire military and naval situation and every move we made in Hawaii.

Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone message on December 5 from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman newspaper reporter, ostensibly to her newspaper in Japan, an apparently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious message. It was this message that was tapped from the telephone by the FBI, translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it to General Short at 6 o'clock on December 6 (R. 1417–1419, 2993). As Short was unable to decipher the meaning, he did nothing about it and went on to a party (R. 1420). The attack followed in the morning.

In this same connection, the story of the spying activities of the German, von Osten, is in point (R. 2442–2443, 3003). The telephone lines of the Japanese Consulate were tapped by the Navy with the exception of one telephone line to the cook's quarters, which was overlooked, and this was tapped by the FBI (R. 3204).

The last and one of the most significant actions of the Japanese was the apparent actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a few days prior to December 7, their circulation in the harbor, by which they secured and presumably transmitted complete information as to our fleet movements and dispositions.

The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack on December 7 is even more astounding as to the complete freedom with which Japan operated in getting intelligence out of Hawaii. Shivers of the FBI produced maps 1 and 2, which were copies of maps captured from the Japanese two-man submarines that came into Pearl Harbor on December 7.

The FBI in endeavoring to reconstruct the intelligence operations of any agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack, secured these maps from Naval Intelligence (R. 3210). Maps 1 and 2 have a legend translating all of the Japanese characters and writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said:

"An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack." (R. 3210)

"Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations at Hickam Field Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places" (R. 3211).

There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translated by the FBI and shows that it was intended for use by the submarine commanders in communicating with the Japanese task force enroute to Hawaii. It contains such messages as "indication strong that enemy fleet will put out to sea," or "enemy fleet put out to sea from or through"; in other words, describing the presence, size, composition, and movement of the fleet (R. 3212).

As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of the harbor of the submarine and this information had been prepared partly written in Japanese, it is obvious that the Japanese must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will. The data on the chart show the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about 0410 when the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave the harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0600 and then left by the same route. The map shows the location of our battleships and other naval vessels observed by the submarine (R. 3212–3213). As the ships actually in the harbor on December 7 were somewhat different from those shown on the map, it is conclusive proof that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising the fleet of Japan as to our dispositions prior to December 7 (R. 3210–3213).

The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese was not open sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason why the Japanese aliens did not commit sabotage was that they did not want to stimulate American activity to stop their espionage and [36] intern them. That was the last thing they intended to do; and Short appears to have completely misapprehended the situation, the psychology and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his sabotage alert.

Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes wing to wing, etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported by Kuehn through the Japanese Consul, were all known to the Japanese task force proceeding toward Hawaii. That will explain why they were able to conduct such precise bombing and machine-gunning. The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-gunning of that field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concentrated on the hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps where the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack of any consequence upon the landing strips.

From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of events taking place bearing on the attack; and that aclue to such events and the Japanese actions was in part available to Short and in part not available to him. Both the War Department and the Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters,

and our governmental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of the Japanese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information.

If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his aothority, he had ample opportunity from November 27 to December 6 to inquire of higher authority and make his position and his actions certain of support and approval. This he did not do.

11. Information Not Given Short.—In judging the actions of General Short and whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must be taken into account information that he was not told either by the War Department or by the Navy. Briefly summarized, he fundamental pieces of information were the following:

1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at Jaluit from November 27 to November 30 and the disappearance of that force. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department saw fit to advise Short of this important piece of information.

2. The fact that the Chief of Staff with the Chief of Naval Operations had jointly asked (on November 27) the President not to force the issue with the Japuanese at this time (R. 9).

3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Ambassadors by the Secretary of State of the counter proposals; and the immediate reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these counter proposals, which they considered an ultimatum and indicating that it was the end of negotiations.

4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew reporting the progressive deterioration of the relationship with the Japanese.

5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as to whether his report of November 27 as to "measures taken," i. e., a sabotage alert and liaison with the Navy, were satisfactory or inadequate in view of the information possessed by the War Department.

6. The following information not furnished also existed in the War Department: Information from informers, agents and other sources as to the activities of our potential enemy and its intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know their potential moves against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions and proposals.

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable, and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave only a small fraction of this information. It would have been possible to have sent safely, information ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives for an all-out alert.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and cannot be disclosed to them, it would appear incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directives to such commanders.

Short got another form of assistance after November 28 from the War Department, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed that the disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the extent that its defenses were available and used on December 7 if properly alerted in time. The failure to alert these defenses in time by directive from the War Department, based upon all information available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War Department had an abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give him a directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the real seriousness of the situation, although the War Department thought he was. It is believed that knowledge of the information available in the War Department would have made him so.

General discussion of the information herein referred to follows:

The records show almost daily information on the plans of the Japanese Government. In addition to that cited above and in conjunction therewith the War Department was in possession of information late in November and early in December from which it made deduction that Japan would shortly commence an aggressive war in the South Pacific; that every effort would be made to reach

an agreement with the United States Government which would result in eliminating the American people as a contestant in the war to come; and that failing to reach the agreement the Japanese Government would attack both Britain and the United States. This information enabled the War Department to fix the probable time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty.

In the first days of December this information grew more critical and indicative of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor positions who were charged with the responsibility of receiving and evaluating such information were so deeply impressed with its significance and the growing tenseness of our relations with Japan, which pointed only to war and war almost immediately, that such officers approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General Gerow) and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the express purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true picture of the war atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the War Department and which was uppermost in the thinking of these officers in close contact with it. The efforts of these subordinate officers to have such information sent to the field were unsuccessful. They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently informed. The Secretary to the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when told of the decisions of the War Plans Division.

Two officers then on duty in the War Department are mentioned for their interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something done. They are Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler.

The following handling of information reaching the War Department in the evening of December 6 and early Sunday morning, December 7, is cited as illustrative of the apparent lack of appreciation by those in high places in the War Department of the seriousness of this information which was so clearly outlining the trends that were hastening us into war with Japan.

[37] At approximately 10 p.m. on December 6, 1941, and more than 15 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G–2 delivered to the office of the War Plans Division and to the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army information which indicated very emphatically that war with Japan was a certainty and that the beginning of such war was in the immediate future. The officers to whom this information was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with the necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of the War Plans Division.

On the following morning, December 7, at about 8:30 a.m. other information reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan. Colonel Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, attempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the Army in order that he might be informed of the receipt of this message. He discovered that the General was horseback riding. Finally and at approximately 11:25 a.m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received this information. General Miles, then G-2 of the War Department, appeared at about the same time. A conference was held between these two officers and General Gerow of the War Plans Division, who himself had come to the Office of the Chief of Staff. Those hours when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could take action in matters of this importance and the passing without effective action having been taken prevented this critical information from reaching General Short in time to be of value to him.

About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas department commanders, including Short in the Hawaiian Department. This message which has been discussed elsewhere in this report, came into Short's possession after the attack had been completed.

D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 1941 AND THEIR STATE OF READINESS ON DEC. 6, 1941, OR THE REASONS FOR THEIR LACK OF READINESS

1. *Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command.*—The Aircraft Warning Service on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941, was in operative condition for all practical purposes. It had an Information Center and five mobile stations. It was sufficiently operative to successfully pick up the Japanese force 132 miles from Oahu. This was done by Private Lockard and Private Elliott, respectively radar operator and plotter, and reported by these privates on their own initiative to the Information Center where the sergeant in charge of the switchboard received the information and relayed it to Lieutenant Tyler, who was a pursuit officer of the Air Corps on temporary duty for training. The stations had been used from 0400 to 0700 hours each morning for the training of personnel, and the

personnel was reasonably trained by that time, with the exception of certain liaison officers who were still getting their training, like Lieutenant Tyler. If the radar system and Information Center had been fully manned, as it could have been and as it was immediately upon the disaster at Pearl Harbor and thereafter without further physical additions, it could have been successfully operated on December 7.

The Air Warning Service had been operating on tactical exercises and maneuvers prior to December 7 for some weeks.

On Dec. 7, 1941 this service could have been a great asset to the defense of the islands had the Command and Staff understood its value and capabilities and had taken more interest in implementing the temporary setup instead of awaiting completion of the permanent installations.

The only mechanical difficulty that was being experienced was in connection with the stand-by motor generator sets, which were to be used to supplement commercial power in case the latter failed. There had been some minor difficulty with the pumps on the motor generator set for the internal-combustion engines, but that was not of serious character.

The story of the delay in installing both the temporary, mobile sets and the permanent sets is a follows:

Army personnel had been receiving radar instructions on Navy surface ships and had gone to sea with the ships and had had the benefit of such practical training. Unfortunately the Navy had not detailed its liaison officers to the Information Center, and in that it failed. There also had not been brought about, due to the failure on the part of General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, a complete integration into a single system of Army and Navy defense including radar and particularly the Army, Navy and Marine fighters which were to pass to the jurisdiction of the Army to form a compositive interceptor command, so that the three elements of the system would be working—the aircraft warning service, the interceptor command, and the antiaircraft artillery.

The only reason that the Aircraft Warning Service was not on a full operating basis on the morning of December 7 was due to the type of alert put into effect, but otherwise it should have been in full effect. It was a fully operating service and did so operate shortly after the attack.

Major Bergquist and Major Tindal had been sent to the Interceptor School at Mitchell Field in the early summer of 1941. At that time the AWS was new to the U. S. Army and its organization and development had just started in the United States. For the system to be operative required a considerable amount of highly technical electrical and radar equipment, the supply and manufacture of which was critical.

The whole AWS project was new, novel, and somewhat revolutionary in practice. It took time to get the equipment through War Department priorities, and it took time to teach and train operating personnel, and to indoctrinate the whole Army as well as the public to its operation and value. This process had been going on since May and June 1941.

Testimony before the Board has indicated that neither the Army, Navy, nor civilian population of the United States or Hawaii anticipated the necessity for immediate use of this service. There was, however, a small group directly in charge of the AWS development in Hawaii, including Major Bergquist, Major Tindal, Major Tetley, and Major Powell, all of the Army, and Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy, who were pushing the AWS project to the fullest extent that their level of authority would permit. As a result of their efforts it is believed that this service in the normal course of events would have been established and in operation in another two or three weeks, which in view of the lack of warmindedness of the services would have been to the great credit of this group.

Since the No. 1 Alert was the decision due to the logic and judgment of the Department Commander, it is very doubtful had the AWS been 100 per cent completed that it would have been on a full-out operating basis on the 7th of December. General Short has stated in the Roberts report testimony, Volume 14, page 1642, that had he had the material and fully equipped radar stations he probably would have operated them just as he did.

Nevertheless, had General Short's judgment led him to have decided to go to Alert 2 or 3 on November 27, or at any time prior to December 7, the AWS could have functioned and the fighter airplanes could have been ready for active defense within a period of minutes. From the damage that was accomplished by a few fighters that did [38] get into the air from the Haliewa Airdrome it can be assumed that the seventy or eighty fighters that could have been in the air under normally active alert system would have made the Jap attack a much more costly venture. This paragraph, however, is hypothesis.

2. *Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7.*—The Aircraft Warning Services, consisted of the Information Center and five mobile radar stations, was in operation on the morning of December 7 and had been for several weeks prior to that date. The fact that the Information Center was not in its permanent location and the radar stations were not permanently built had no bearing upon the operation and effectiveness of the aircraft warning system.

"It was set up and the men were being trained for, I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on December 7th," as testified by General Martin (R. 1825).

The difficulty of putting the AWS into full operation as a practical matter was the insistence of General Short that he retain control for training purposes whereas the best training would have been to put the system into practical operation.

Of this General Martin said:

"The Department Commander would not turn those (the operating stations) over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he (Short) had completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn them over unless he considered they were properly trained. So they were still training under those conditions and had not been turned over to the Air Force the morning of the attack on December 7th" (R. 1824).

Here again is another example of the whole organization of the Army in Hawaii being held in a training status instead of acquiring its training in or near combat positions, where it would have been ready for any eventuality. As General Martin said:

"They were capable of operating . . . the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area" (R. 1824).

General Martin is confirmed in this by Commander Taylor, loaned by the Navy for the purpose of getting this service into operation. Commander Taylor confirmed the fact that:

"On December 7th the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wheeler Field . . . We had no liaison people to man any of the positions . . . On December 7 all the communication lines were in; the radar stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough advance information could be given to pilots, so that they could come back without being intercepted" (R. 1082).

However, the radio equipment that would have enabled control through interception a reasonable distance off-shore had been given to the Ferry Command. The situation is treated elsewhere, but it should be pointed out, to avoid confusion, that on and before December 7 the aircraft warning center was able to pick up incoming planes and to give notification of that fact.

It was not fully able to perform its other function, which was supplementary to the Information Center, that is, for full co-operation in conjunction with an Interceptor Command to intercept the incoming planes in the full sense of that arrangement.

So far advanced was the organization and apparatus that it would have been fully complete within ten days to two weeks at the time of the attack. As Commander Taylor said:

"The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting (a conference to wind up the details of organization) to bring the thing into operation at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it." (R. 1083).

Taylor, in turn, is confirmed in this by one of the most energetic officers who was working with Taylor in pressing this aircraft warning system to conclusion, Colonel Bergquist, then a Major. He endeavored to have 24-hour service by November 24 and stated that the mobile units could have stood it. There was some minor trouble with the stand-by power gas engines, but this was of little importance and the system could have run 24 hours a day. He had been running a school since October known as the "Air Defense School" in which he was training Army and Marine officers and as many pursuit officers of the Air Corps as he could get. The delay was from the Signal Corps. As Colonel Bergquist said:

"I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating" (R. 1201).

Despite the efforts of General Martin with Department Headquarters, very few results were secured in making the *Signal Corps let go their technical operation and allow the practical people who were going to operate it go to work.* This is described by Colonel Bergquist, who said:

"One of the big arguments was: We wanted to take over the radar stations and get them set up and operating. The Signal Corps said no, that was their job; they wanted to get them up and get them operating and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps" (R. 1196).

This delayed the ultimate completion of the system by a month (R. 1196). He stated that:

"My opinion on that is that they (the enlisted men) were fairly well trained at that stage of the game" (R. 1197).

This state of training is further described by him as follows:

"Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information-center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of the positions on the board—on the control platform, that is—by running a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order to do two things: To both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal—I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major at that time—and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the Bomber Command laison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department headquarters" (R. 1191-1192).

At this time the system had a maximum range of approximately 130 miles (R. 1190).

On November 24 there was a conference of interested Army and Navy officers on this subject, and the con [*39*] sensus of opinion of these experts among the younger officers who were actually getting this Information Center into operation was expressed by Commander Taylor:

"It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks. (The conference was on Nov. 24, 1941.) We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication equipment we had at that time" (R. 1077).

This confirms the testimony of others that the only thing lacking was the IFF equipment on the plants to enable identification of the planes in the air by ground personnel. Considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for this purpose for the use of the Ferry Command (R. 1079).

As to the operability of the Aircraft Warning Service on the morning of December 7, Commander Taylor testifying said:

"If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the Japanese) flight was" (R. 1085).

The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although Commander Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a week before Pearl Harbor (R. 1086).

This brings us to the question of why General Short on his staff did not take more vigorous action in putting this most important part of the defenses into operation, particularly in view of the fact that both the long-distance reconnaissance by the Navy and the inshore reconnaissance by the Army were, for all practical purposes, non-existent. Commander Taylor was asked, when he found these delays, whether he had ever seen General Short, to which Taylor replied in the negative by saying:

"I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff" (R. 1089).

"We saw every Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible" (R. 1088).

Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated efforts to get the Navy to co-operate by supplying naval officers to complete the working of the service were fruitless. They were not interested (R. 3906).

It is significant that when Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, was asked if Short had tried to expedite these matters he professed ignorance (R. 1143), but it was Phillips, as Chief of Staff to Short, who Taylor and others said was principally responsible for acting on Short's behalf in this matter (R. 1088).

Colonel Powell testified that the construction of permanent installations did not hold up the placing of the Information Center and the radar stations into operation because there was adequate equipment for this purpose that was actually installed in temporary buildings for the Information Center and that radar mobile stations were placed around the Island.

As a consequence of the Information Center and the radar stations were in operation some time prior to December 7. The only reason they were not operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire to conserve tubes, as they were short of tubes and other spare parts.

Two permanent radars, No. 271, were received on June 3, and a third radar, No. 271-A, was also received on June 3. On August 1 six mobile radar stations were received and shortly thereafter put into operation. They were complete and self-contained and only needed to be placed at some appropriate elevation.

Colonel Powell testified that the entire service was operative about the 1st of November, 1941. The installations for the permanent radar and Information Center were held up by the Engineer construction and were not held up by any lack of information or drawings or equipment of the Signal Corps.

Colonel Powell testified that the location of the centers was made by a board from Washington. This board ordered the abandonment of Kaala at 4,000 feet on the theory that while the range would be extended to 150 miles from Hawaii yet there would be no detection of planes within the 20-mile radius close to shore. This does not sound logical, because the great necessity was the locating of planes at a maximum distance from Hawaii. The other stations lower down were fully capable of picking up the close, inshore approach of aircraft.

Colonel Powell added the significant statement that the Navy took little interest in the radar system and "We were never able to get any liaison officer over from the Navy to take part in the exercises or carry on the work" (R.3906). This is confirmed by the fact that Navy liaison officers never were supplied for the Information Center although it had been in operation for some weeks prior to December 7 and the Army had supplied a number of officers to be trained (R. 3906).

General Short testified again as to the reason why he was interested in keeping the aircraft warning service in training. He said:

"We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.

"Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a strain on this material, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Interceptor Command was working with them. We were trying to educate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service, and using this training period as an opportunity to give them work at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit" (R. 298).

Two explanations have been advanced as to the reason why the Aircraft Warning Service was not put into operation fully. The first was that the signal equipment was not ready until very late; the testimony of Colonel Powell, in charge of this matter for the Signal Corps, plus what actually occurred as to its actually going into operation for nearly a month before the permanent construction was erected, is ample to overrule this objection (R. 3896-3898).

The second explanation was that there were serious delays in construction. But such delays in permanent construction did not delay the Aircraft Warning Service because it was using temporary housing for its Information Center, and its mobile radar stations were operative without any permanent housing (R. 3885).

As to the Interceptor Command and the Information Center of the Aircraft Warning Service, General Burgin, Commanding General of the antiaircraft artillery, said:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over" (R. 2604).

He explained how the Interceptor Command had been working during previous trials and exercises. While the Interceptor Command was not fully functioning due to the lack of IFF instruments on the planes, yet there was ample [40] AWS means for defense and interception that it could have used to a material degree on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941. The Interceptor Command was just being set up, but the nucleus of its operation was there, and it would have been an effective instrument had it been used when the attack came. This was not done.

3. *Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses.*—General Burgin commanded the Coast Artillery Command, consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade, composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary basis, saying:

"We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to Interceptor Command . . . For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7 . . . On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The Fleet was in the harbor."

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the Interceptor Command, is that the Interceptor Command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire" (R. 2602–2604).

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack.

He said in his opinion it would not have made any difference anyway, "because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were" (R. 2604).

He said of his antiaircraft batteries:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition" (R. 2604).

A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the field.

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not even put his guns into final positions because of the conditions now described.

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the situation as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to Dec. 7, 1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

"General BURGIN. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.

"General FRANK. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned the land?

"General BURGIN. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice" (R. 2628).

He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island

and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five. As to this he said:

"General RUSSELL. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert No. 3?

"General BURGIN. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

"General RUSSELL. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3—And I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?

"General BURGIN. I feel positive it would.

"General GRUNERT. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?

"General BURGIN. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

"General GRUNERT. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?

"General BURGIN. Oh, my!

"General GRUNERT. Is Dillingham one of them?

"General BURGIN. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

"General FRANK. Which Walker?

"General BURGIN. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells" (R. 2629).

He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapple, etc.

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that one of the things that may have influenced Short in selecting Alert No. 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then and later from the large commercial interests on the Island using Japanese labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned (R. 2654).

As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have been locked up before the war started and not afterwards (R. 2649).

4. Ammunition Issue: Short's and the Ordnance Department's Responsibility.—The Ordnance Department in the Hawaiian Department in its misdirected effort to safeguard and maintain ammunition in a serviceable condition objected to a full issue thereof to troops except in an emergency. Such issues in an emergency entailed delays which delayed troops in getting into position and action (R. 2607).

General Burgin, who commanded the antiaircraft artillery, stated that he and General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divisions, personally went to the staff and to General Short, who turned them down and refused to allow the issue of the ammunition for the artillery and the infantry. Later there was some relaxation of the issue of infantry ammunition. Colonel Weddington testified that on the morning of December 7 he had insufficient ammunition, that there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the only extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his aircraft machine guns. (R. 3026–3027).

The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burgin as follows:

[*41*] "They were all ready to go into action immediately with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions" (R. 2604–2605).

He described the efforts of General Murray and himself to get the Ordnance Department to release this ammunition and how he was overruled by General Short's staff and General Short himself, in the following language:

"General BURGIN. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose ammunition from our storehouse and from the ordnance during peacetime. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck.

"General FRANK. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding General or by a staff department?

"General BURGIN. Both; staff departments first, then the Commanding General in person.

"General FRANK. Supported them?

"General BURGIN. In his office, to General Murray and to me.

"General FRANK. Well; what were the staff departments who opposed it?

"General BURGIN. The G's; G–4s, the Ordnance.

"General FRANK. And their reasons were?

"General BURGIN. Same old reason, that they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on and renovate it; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise" (R. 2607–2608).

Apparently one of the reasons in General Short's mind was sabotage, if the ammunition was out with the guns. As General Burgin testified:

"As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent" (R. 2608).

He testified that without ammunition for his guns it would take from a few minutes to six hours before he could get his guns into position and firing. He was never permitted to take live ammunition on any of his practices and as 50 per cent of the mobile guns were on private land he had been unable to even place half of his guns in position, and they were unable to take ammunition with them (R. 2608–09–10).

Therefore on the morning of December 7 he was caught in this position with only ammunition adjacent his fixed gun batteries, but half of his guns were without ammunition.

As General Burgin summed it up:

"It was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the G–4s, or from General Short himself" (R. 2612).

General Maxwell Murray testified as to the difficulties in getting ammunition for both his field artillery and his infantry, as follows:

"General GRUNERT. . . . First, I would like to talk to you about artillery ammunition, and ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand for the artillery, on December 7?

"General MURRAY. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it had not been issued to troops.

"General GRUNERT. I mean 'at hand' not 'on hand.'

"General MURRAY. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from the magazines. I requested authority form General Short to draw artillery ammunition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks on the division review field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the dispersal area for the artillery" (R. 3075–3076).

"General GRUNERT. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say that there was no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action; is that right?

"General MURRAY. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammunition in the gun parks.

"General GRUNERT. And, in case you were turned out, to go on an alert which required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere?

"General MURRAY. We had to draw it.

"General GRUNERT. Where did it come from?

"General MURRAY. We drew it directly; the majority of it was drawn at Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately

adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, which was down here near Pearl Harbor" (R. 3080).

General Murray had made arrangements to have separate entrances to get the ammunition out of the storage houses, but even with that effecive arrangement, plus piling ammunition in the warehouses according to unit, it would take at least an hour to get the ammunition so the guns could go to the beaches to defend the island.

As General Murray said:

"I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either the infantry or the artillery" (R. 3081).

He had a limited amount of machine-gun ammunition and rifle ammunition. He had a large number of machine guns in each rifle company, extra guns, and

"It was obviously impossible—most of our ammunition was not belted—it was obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without serious delay" (R. 3081).

He had only two belt-loading machines for each heavy weapon company, and it had taken three days to load up the belted ammunition on a previous trial (R. 3081). After applying to General Short he had been authorized to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the necessary rifle ammunition, and store it in the parks. He was not allowed to have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside the barracks; that ordnance had to be left in the Ordnance Depot, as was the artillery ammunition. He testified (R. 3081) that it was General Short who was personally supporting his ordnance officer and G-4 in following the peacetime practice of holding [42] ammunition in depots where it would take hours to get it out in the event of a raid.

He testified that his movement of ammunition into the barracks was in violation of the standing orders of the post, but he had made that movement of ammunition on the express authorization of General Short (R. 3091).

It is to be recalled that when the War Department ordered General Herron, in 1940, into an alert in which he stayed for six weeks, he was able to draw his ammunition immediately and take it with him into the field.

The testimony of General Burgin as to his inability to get ammunition for use with his antiaircraft guns is borne out by the testimony of Colonel Weddington of the Air Corps that when he was in command of the Bellows Field base his efforts to get ammunition for his machine guns and rifles were met by a response from the Ordnance Department, on each request he made, that the ammunition was not available and was not authorized and that this was by General Short's order.

Lack of ammunition preparations was shown in the testimony of Colonel Weddington, who was in command of Bellows Field prior to and on December 7 (R. 3026-3027). He testified that it was the custom for the ships (aircraft) that were at gunnery practice to be parked on the ramp on Saturday afternoon, close to one another. The guns were taken off the planes for cleaning, the planes were out of gas and were not be refueled until Sunday, and the gas was brought over by truck from Honolulu and did not arrive until sometime later in the day. He also indicated that many of the pilots were away over the week end.

It was in this condition that the attack was launched upon them and they were unable to defend themselves. He said they had 30,000 rounds of belted ammunition but no rifle ammunition for their guards and no machine-gun ammunition. When the attack came they were also without any 30-caliber machine-gun bullets. His repeated efforts to get ammunition from the Ordnance Department met with the statement that it was not available and not authorized, and its failure to be issued was on General Short's order.

5. *Status of Aircraft Defenses.*—The difficulties with supply of both aircraft and parts to maintain aircraft, due to the conditions depicted in Chapter 2, Background, are no better illustrated than in the case of aircraft. The failure previous to 1941 to provide extended aircraft programs and the necessity for revising designs to meet modern combat conditions, as revealed by the European War, joined together to put the War Department in a difficult situation with respect to a sufficiency of aircraft.

On the deficiency of equipment in Hawaii, General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, testified he had written General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force personal letters as well as sent official communications with reference to his obsolete aircraft, the lack of spare parts for the modern craft that he had, and the necessity for placing his aircraft in combat condition with adequate weapons, et cetera. (R. 1858–A, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1874 to 1889, inclusive)

While correspondence shows a failure on the part of the Army Air Forces to supply the correct equipment, adequate equipment, spare parts, and enough of it to be effective, yet Hawaii was better off than other commands. As General Marshall experssed it:

"As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had the maximum of material that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian garrison.

"As to Panama: If the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and matériel was 100, Panama was about 25 per cent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible."

As elsewhere stated, on Dec. 7, 1941, General Martin had under his command 123 modern pursuit and bombardment planes, 15 observation planes, 2 transports, 5 observation amphibians and 8 basic trainers. He had non-modern medium bombers to the number of 39, 9 light bombers, and 62 non-modern pursuit ships.

"When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P–26s, an old obsolete type of fighter which we then called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B–18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as not being a combat ship. In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P–36s. They were obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later—as I remember it, about May—we received som P–40 fighters. These ships were brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B–17s that were ferried over by air, 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September, were transferred to the Philippines by air. The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and upon our request that they be delayed, that we could continue the training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombardment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with that type of airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. . . . The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is the P–40, B–17, and ten A–20s, were always possibly 50 per cent out of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production program all monies, as possible, were placed into the producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were neglected at the time. Therefore the new airplanes coming out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts. We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts to repair other ships. . . .

"Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advance training at the time; that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P–26, then through the P–36 and on to the P–40, and considerable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P–40 equipment. . . . The bombers, as soon as we got B–17s, in I think it was sometime in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the B–17s. They started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers remained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots, and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any of its equipment. . . . In other words, they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technical school facility. We were getting but a few technically trained men. . . . There were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember" (R. 1858–A to 1861).

It is to be remembered that the record shows that the Japanese carriers had over 400 modern aircraft which they brought against the Island, so that the superiority was overwhelming.

[*43*] Although General Short gave a high priority to airfield construction, there were many delays due in part to slowness in getting funds and to the inefficiency of contractors under the supervision of the District Engineer.

Some elements of the Air Force in Hawaii had been used during 1941 primarily as a training force for officers and men who were being sent into the Philippines

and into the outlying islands. The personnel of these elements, therefore, were largely untrained or partially trained personnel, as the more competent were constantly being forwarded into what was then advance theaters where the danger was deemed to be greater. Therefore, much of the Air Force was in a training status primarily. This has been pictured elsewhere in this report through the testimony of General Short, General Martin, Colonel Mollison, and others.

The great effort in the latter part of 1941 was to get B–17s, of which 180 had been allotted to Hawaii. As there were only 109 B–17s in the entire Army (R. 154) it was obviously impossible to comply with this request. General Marshall testified that he had sent General Arnold to the West Coast to see what he could do to get these B–17s to the Philippines via Hawaii, and that they had been held up by contrary winds and production delays for more than three or four weeks. (R. 167–168) General Arnold testified as follows:

"General FRANK. Had anything held up B–17 production that in any way had an effect on this situation?

"General ARNOLD. No; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get B–17s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was the total number of B–17s produced by the Boeing Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required" (R. 180).

Due to this condition the planes had been flown out with their guns, but without their ammunition, to save weight, a factor that was interpreted by Short as indicating that no attack was expected on Hawaii (R. 305).

However, the impression in Washington, as testified to by General Arnold, was that the Hawaiian Air Force was in good shape despite its heavy training mission. He testified:

"We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat" (R. 179).

In order to develop this further, the following question was put and answer gained:

"General FRANK. What I was about to approach was this point, which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly B–17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of mind.

"General ARNOLD. I wrote to General Martin, as I said from time to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done in the United States. In other words, we had no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could we put that training so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force that we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed" (R. 179–180).

It will, therefore, be seen that the Hawaiian Air Force was handicapped by conducting a training program not only for itself but also for other theaters of action; its ships were mainly obsolete, its modern ships were few, and there was a marked deficiency of spare parts, and its airfield construction was lagging. Such was the status on Dec. 7, 1941, of the Army Air Force installations.

E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DEC. 7, 1941

1. *Army Aircraft.* On Sunday morning, Dec. 7, 1941, the status of the island defenses was at the minimum.

As General Burgin testified:

"A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy.

"Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7.

"General FRANK. On Sunday?

"General BURGIN. On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The Fleet was in the harbor." R. 2603).

On that morning, due to Alert No. 1, all planes, with some minor exceptions, were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pursuit planes in commission and 69 out of commission in various states of repair. There were 39 bombers in commission and 33 out of commission. Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for a real mission were 6 Flying Fortresses and 10 A-20s. The old B-18s were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where a squadron was practicing short landings. It was out of this group that there came the brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) Welch, who courageously got his ship off the ground, together with his wing man. Major Welch and his wing man shot down a number of Japanese aircraft.

The Navy had no PBY's in the air that morning, although they usually had four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this explained by General Burgin's testimony that while every Sunday morning the antiaircraft artillery had an exercise with the Navy when the Navy sent its carrier-based planes from ship to shore, and this continued up to the Sunday before December 7, the Navy planes did not get into the air on this particular December 7 (R. 2603). The Fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vesels of material character that were out being the carriers *Enterprise* and *Lexington*. The *Enterprise*, with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles southwest of Midway, with the carrier *Lexington* (R. 444-445): therefore there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning (R. 540).

2. *Naval Long-Distance Reconnaissance.*—The situation as to the long-distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the Navy is admirably and frankly [44 explained by Admiral DeLany, who was assistant chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, during this period: Admiral DeLany testified that here was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out by the Navy on the morning of December 7, and no attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He further testified, "There was neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and maintain such a continuous reconnaissance" as would be necessary in order to maintain a 360-degree reconnaissance around the Island. They realized the danger but there was nothing that could be done about it (R. 1728).

Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense Air Force, Commander Patrol Wing 2, and Commander Task Force 9, said that on the morning of December 7 he had a total of 81 PBYs in Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which included those at Midway, leaving a total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 out of commission. The reconnaissance work that was being conducted normally each morning at sunrise was merely to search the fleet operating areas for submarines so that the fleet could operate on exercises without molestation. He usually sent out three to six planes "to guard against submarine attack." He testified that the only patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise attack was in the vicinity of Midway (R. 1600). He testified as follows:

"General FRANK. You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?

"Admiral BELLINGER. We had had on specific occasions, when there was some apparent reason for doing so. That instances had occurred for one or two different sectors over the periods during the year" (R. 1601).

Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as follows:

"General RUSSELL. You have testified, and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.

"Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct" (R. 1805).

"General GRUNERT. Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance on that morning?

"Admiral BELLINGER. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true sense of the term 'distant reconnaissance'" (R. 1629–1630).

This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack of planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBY's available. The only excuse for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kimmel:

"We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize" (R-1811).

Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy and the Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of the Army was not in a functioning status. (R. 1622) He had 33 scout bombers, 7 fighters, and 9 scouts available on the morning of December 7, but they were not being used. (R. 1623) As witnesses testified, they were accustomed to seeing PBY's go out each morning, but on Sunday morning, December 7, they did not go out. (See General Rudolph's and Colonel Brook's testimony, R. 993-994, 1232-1234.)

3. *Aircraft Warning System.*—The radar aircraft warning system had the Information Center completed and organized with five mobile radar stations which operating. They had been in operation from 4 to 7 o'clock each morning for training purposes but had not gone into regular operation. It was because of their being in operation that Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese attack force 132 miles from Oahu, and this organization functioned continually after the attack, so it can be assumed that it was in operating condition (R. 439–440–441). (See Lockard in other testimony.)

As General Short said:

"I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well."

as of December 7, 1941 (R. 508). They had three heavy radar sets complete and six mobile sets complete (R. 509). The mobile sets were operating (R. 510).

"General FRANK. . . . The AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct?

"General SHORT. That is correct" (R. 512).

The Interceptor Command "was actually operating," according to General Short. He said, "it was actually operating daily." (R. 525) An order had not gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working.

4. *Antiaircraft Defenses.*—As to the antiaircraft, much of it had never gone into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and none of the mobile guns was in position on the morning of December 7. Ammunition had not been issued because the Ordnance Department objected to having it out convenient to the guns because it might get dirty. As General Burgin said, "they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition . . . and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise" (R. 2608).

As it took about six hours to get the ammunition fully out, distributed, and broken open, the delay was a very difficult one (R. 2608).

As General Burgin again testified:

"It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out, because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck" (R. 2607).

The two divisions were in their quarters so that it took them a number of hours to move out after the attack. One of the principal difficulties was the necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere discussed.

The status of the antiaircraft was this: The mobile guns had to secure their ammunition from Aliamanu Crater, between two and three miles from Fort Shafter. The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes adjacent to the guns. He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed guns and the usual complement of 50-caliber and 30-caliber.

He testified as follows:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition" (R. 2604).

On the morning of December 7 he had not gone into operation with the Navy as on previous Sundays. (R. 2603). This was due to the Fleet being in the harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason the Navy was not conducting its usual Sunday exercises with him (R. 2603).

5. *Summary.*—Therefore, the situation on December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were not out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the Fleet air arm; the naval carriers with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the [45] ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers *Lexington* and *Enterprise*. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the antisabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. In short, everything that was done made the situaion perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.

THE ATTACK ON DEC. 7, 1941

1. *Japanese Intelligence.*—The details of the attack have been already adequately described. To have a competent understanding of the attack and the perfection with which it was executed, we should remember that the Japanese had had exceptional opportunities for securing the very latest information from a wide variety of sources in the islands as to the exact dispositions of the fleet and of our military forces. The maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that were shot down or on Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crew men indicated a vast amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date information. The fact that one or more submarines were in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th and had circulated in the harbor and then gone out again showed a knowledge of what was going on in Pearl Harbor that was substntially complete.

It is interesting to contrast this activity of the Japanese Navy in gaining detailed information of our Fleet with the failure of our Navy to glean any information concerning the task force that attacked Pearl Harbor from the time that it left Japanese home waters, about November 22, 1941, and left Tankan Bay about November 28, 1941, until the attack took place.

For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort Kamehameha on December 7th, Exhibit No. 22; Exhibits 23, 24, 25, and 26; and Exhibit No. 48 illustrate with what meticulous detail the entire operation was worked out based upon adequate and complete intelligence by the Japanese. It is difficult to understand this attack and its perfection without first studying these maps. The Japanese came to the attack with full informaion of our dispositions and defenses: we met the attack with absolutely no information about the Japanese attacking force. The details of the securing of this information are set forth elsewhere in this report. The Japanese realized that this was the foundation of their war and that perfection of execution would have a profound effect politically upon their allies and upon the countries of the Far East in which they intended to operate.

2. *Nature and Composition of the Attacking Force.*—The strength of the attacking force has already been stated in this report, based upon the extended testimony of Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. It was one of the most powerful naval attacking forces ever assembled up to that time, because of the large complement of carriers. Its aviators were of the highest quality of Japanese encountered during the war. After they were finally disposed of during the later days of the present Pacific war, the testimony is to the effect that no equal or superior Japanese aviators have been met.

Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains, the best equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert planning, which it had.

The first indication of the attack on the Island of Oahu was the detection by the U.S.S. *ANTARES* of a suspicious obect in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a. m. This was found to be a small two-man submarine, which was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of the U.S.S. *WARD* and a naval patrol plane between 6:33 and 6:45 a. m. on December 7th. The *WARD* sent a report of this action to the Naval Base watch officer at 7:12 a. m., who immediately notified his chief of staff. A ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warning was issued based upon the report. This was one of the most important of a succession of mistakes made during this fateful morning. The Navy admits that it did not advise General Short as it should have done.

A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 and 8:43 a. m., and a third one was grounded in the Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There was a total altogether of five such submarines equipped with two-man crews, one of which was captured. The remaining nine crew members were killed, as confirmed by a Japanese citation later given to these ten men raising them in rank (R. 3038). These two-man submarines were launched from mother submarines a short distance from the Island of Oahu.

While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to prevent the entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during the hours of darkness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel to pass through the net, it was kept open continuously during daylight hours, upon the assumption that the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the neighborhood, would detect any submarines. On the morning of December 7th the net was opened at 4:58 a. m. for the entrance of two minesweepers and was left open until 8:40 a. m. when it was closed by order as a result of the attack. The net was not damaged and it was fully functioning. Apparently the submarine got into the harbor at 7 a. m. It will be recalled that prior to December 7th one or more Japanese submarines had already been in this harbor, passing through the net when it was opened at 4 a. m. to permit the garbage scow to go through.

The attacking planes from the six carriers of the attacking force numbered approximately 424 (R. 3048).

Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack. They consisted of fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously and successively attacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases and airfields on Oahu, starting at about 7:55 a. m. The attack ws over by 11 a. m. On these fields the aircraft were carefully lined up, wing to wing, tip to tip, in the most perfect target position for both bombing and machine-gun straffing. This is true both of the Army and of the Navy. The PBY's of the Navy were substntially all destroyed, and a large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate. The landing strips were substantially without damage, possibly indicating some subsequent intention on the part of the Japanese to employ those landing strips.

Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he ordered Alert No. 3. This was executed with more than expected promptness.

As already related, this force of attacking Japanese planes was detected about 132 miles north of Oahu. The Japanese force came over the island as follows: One force came from the north directly across the island, over Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field, to Pearl Harbor, attacking Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor. Another force came in from the east attacking Kaneohe Field, Bellows Field, and Pearl Harbor and a third force came in from the south attacking Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor. The torpedo planes devoted their attention to the ships in the harbor. A study of the bomb pattern of such places as Hickam Field shows that the attack was concentrated upon the aprons where the planes were parked and upon the hangars as well as upon machine shops. All objectives were entered and carefully identi [46] fied by legends placed upon the U. S. Geodetic Survey maps used by the Japanese.

It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care of every major contingency before, during and as a result of the attack. Nothing was left to chance. It is particularly noted that the information of construction was shown by the fact that as to Hickam Field the legend indicated, "All concrete structures—or in the process of construction."

G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK; THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST

1. *Attack a Surprise.*—The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses, including Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the attack was a surprise. General Marshall testified that the Hawaiian commanders indicated their views that an air attack was their very serious concern (R. 52). Yet he also testified:

"We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack" (R. 9).

An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point of view shows that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the facts as to their strength as we now know them are reasonably accurate. In race-track parlance, it was

a "long-shot" and an extraordinary risk because the consequences of failure to the Japanese might have been greater than those to the United States in the event of success. It was a bold and considered venture.

Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location of our fleet. It knew week-end conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in the harbor as well as we did. It apparently knew of our assumption that Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did, it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the Philippines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes turned on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly with its conquest.

Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology and our estimate of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the execution of the unexpected, the gain from which it estimated would be incalculable value. In the daring attack Japan was compensated by the gain to her of immobilizing and substantially destroying the Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan's left flank in its southward move. The value of such a result was tremendous.

It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability to concentrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and the Philippines. By that time Japan believed it would be so intrenched that dislodgment would be substantially impossible.

Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total of eight available to its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the destruction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, at least for long months to come. The daring, therefore, of this attack was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been disastrous to the Japanese Navy.

But in making this estimate of Japan's risky action and its considered chances, we were doing so from the Occidental point of view. We were completely ignoring the Oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap price of life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without any foundation of Occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordinary advantage. Hull and Grew had warned of this psychology and her penchant for unexpected, reckless and suicidal moves.

This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature has since then become well-known. It was our failure to take into consideration this extraordinary chance-taking characteristic, due to the violent and uncivilized reasoning of the Japanese mind, that would approve the making of such a long military and naval chance for the satisfaction of the first blow, and a disastrous one, that was so satisfactory to the Oriental mind, which misled us.

2. *Time Element—The Important Factor in All Estimates.*—This analysis is recited for the reason that apparently no one from the Chief of Staff down considered *at the time the attack was made* that any such attempt would be made.

This *time* element is important in understanding the state of mind of the responsible authorities of the United States. The military estimates of he situation from the War Department, the Navy Department, and in Hawaii, clearly shown a reasoned and correctly stated analytical estimate of the situation. The missing link in our search for the reason why steps were not taken to carry out the logic of the military and psychological estimate of the situation seems to be in this belief that there was ample time to prepare Hawaii. It was generally thought that Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all, until some time later after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines and intermediate islands. In that, the United States' calculations went far astray for lack of understanding of the long-chance type of the military and naval minds of Oriental Japan.

As a consequence a policy was followed that was disastrous to the defense of Hawaii. They gambled upon having time for preparation that did not exist.

3. *Expected Time to Continue Training.*—That assumption of time for preparation resulted in using a portion of the Hawaiian Army Air Force and the Navy as a training force for the training of green personnel followed by the removal of experienced personnel thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters. The Board, although it realizes the great need of organized air forces to serve as training units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few available, nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this outpost which should have been on a purely combat basis and not subect to the weakening process of a periodic turnover.

Let us look at the consequence of this. The Navy was either training ashore or constantly training at sea through its three task forces. Those operations in the area were not, as Short thought, for the purpose of combat reconnaissance

or defense duty, but they were training maneuvers for the constant training of new personnel to be used elsewhere.

The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the War Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position of importance in Hawaii. This evidently strongly influenced Short's decision to Adopt Alert No. 1.

He testified:

"In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B–17s to the Philippines. We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the Philippine Islands. We had only 6 Flying Fortresses in com [47] mission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a Flying Fortress was relatively new and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there and say he could fly a Flying Fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of old obsolete B–18 bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight, but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. They were put on those. They were put on A–20s for a little time, and finally got to the B–17s. With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the gunners so they could protect themselves from the Japanese going over the Mandated Islands.

"General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.

"That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3 (R. 285–286).

"* * * We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines" (R. 390).

And again he testified before the Roberts Commission:

"Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about training rather than expecting something to happen at the time" (Roberts Record 1622). (See page 531 of the Grunert Record.)

General Martin, Chiew of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even more vigorously that the selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced by their desire to keep on training.

"General FRANK. Was there any advantage of conducting Air Corp training in any one of three alerts? . . .

"General MARTIN. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to get men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization.

"General FRANK. Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?

"General MARTIN. Of course there was a difference. There would be more under Alert No. 1" (R. 1864-1865).

Admiral Kimmel said:

"The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic station, and they greatly depleted their stuff" (R. 1764-1765).

It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great emphasis on training, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet an attack.

4. *Short's Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice—Time Element Again.*—General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i.e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated. General Short testified:

"The one thing that that letter (General Marshall's first letter of February 7th, 1941) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest co-operation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else" (R. 355).

Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the Navy which he was charged with securing. That is evidenced by his following statement:

"I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any piece of information that he thought was of interest" (R. 363).

He testified that he relied for reconnaissance upon the task forces of the Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles to each side, giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area, and with three forces that would have meant covering 1,800 miles (R. 284, 384). Admiral Pye, commander of one of the three task forces of the Pacific Fleet, testified that:

"The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about eight days and about fourteen days in port" (R. 1036).

Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794–1795; Cf. Pye 1037, Burgin 2673). He said that this was well known and undoubtedly Short knew about it (R. 1771–1773; Cf. Short 359). The Short and Kimmel testimony is in conflict on this point.

Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly the 14th Naval District, or the War Department for securing information as to the movement of Japanese ships (R. 291). He said that the combination of the continuous flow of information that the Navy Department had as to the location of Jap ships and the Navy task forces doing long-distance reconnaissance with their carrier-borne planes, led him to the position that "it was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject. It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity" (R. 300–301). It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain McMorris statement, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, that there would be no Japanese attack in early December (R. 299–301).

He said he was further strengthened in his opinion, during the period of the 27th of November to the 6th of December, that the Navy either knew "where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle the situation" (R. 303).

Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from the Navy that was available to them. There does not seem to have occurred anything that led him to think he was not being told all the pertinent official naval information there was available. He relied [48] upon complete official interchange which was not in practice.

An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were insufficient for long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly confesses this situation (R. 375); General Short further points out that the Army had insufficient planes for reconnaissance (R. 377–378). Although General Short "looked" on task forces as the best means of reconnaissance" (R. 384), he did not know nor try to find out their routes (R. 359–360, 475). Short could easily have learned that the task forces conducted only incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794–1795) and that the Navy was devoting itself to the submarine menace in the areas in which they had their exercises (R. 1040, 1757, 3041). Short knew that his inshore patrol was of limited value (R. 473); that Admiral Bloch did not have the planes to carry

out the agreement (R. 375); and that all that Admiral Bellinger had was a limited number of PBY reconnaissance planes (R. 456, 1598, 1810); that Bloch had none (R. 1493, 1526, 1532, 1771) and the carrier-borne planes were normally used for anti-submarine reconnaissance (R. 1039-1040).

General Short's knowledge of the situation at the time of these events in 1941 is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said:

"I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did affect a decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than from without" (R. 1856).

General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task forces out influenced his decision, saying:

". . . I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; . . ." (R. 1873).

This was despite the fact, as he said:

" . . . we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of time, and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about" (R. 1857).

As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his own admission:

"General FRANK. Another thing: Do you feel that the Navy withheld from you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable to you?

"General SHORT. I don't believe that they purposely withheld anything from me that they thought really concerned me.

"General FRANK. Don't you think that that information about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have vitally affected you?

"General SHORT. Yes, possibly.

"General GRUNERT. Did the Navy understand your mission and your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you?

"General SHORT. Oh, I think they did, definitely" (R. 409–410).

He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of December 7th of the Japanese submarine. He did not learn of it until the 8th, when Admiral Kimmel himself told him about it (R. 364–365). By his implicit trust in the Navy he let them not only get the information but to evaluate it. In connection with the information about the Japanese submarine sunk by the Navy early December 7th, he said this as to the Navy action:

"They did not connect it (the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with the general raid, they thought it was sparate" (R. 365).

But the point is that Short should have been given this information and have made his own evaluation. As he now testifies, if he had known of this submarine information it "might have worked out to our very great advantage if they (the Navy) had been handled differently" (R. 310). In this connection he said, "It was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he (Bloch) could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong . . ." (R. 311).

Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th and the 30th of November (R. 361). He said he was not advised of the naval dispatch of December 3rd, 1941, and never saw that message. That was the message that showed that the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying certain codes and ciphers, and burning certain documents. He said that he did not receive the naval messages of December 3rd, December 4th, and December 6th from the Navy Department to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, regarding the destruction of confidential documents.

He said:

"General GRUNERT. You had none of the information that was disclosed in those three messages?

"General SHORT. No, sir" (R. 425).

He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise: "I felt that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given me anything

they thought had any bearing on my job; that if they were sure it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern me in any way they might have given it (the information) to me" (R. 358).

This situation was summed up as follows:

"General FRANK. The question as to whether or not you got the information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?

"General SHORT. Absolutely.

"General FRANK. Do you feel that you were secure in that?

"General SHORT. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had" (R. 358).

As to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for reconnaissance, he did not have any regular means of knowing where they were or what they were doing, "except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and Bellinger) happened to talk about in a personal kind of way" (R. 359).

This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with the Navy was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248–1249), which resulted in that he neither got the information completely, accurately, nor consistently, instead of delegating it to his trained staff officers dealing with equally trained staff officers of the Navy so a professional, systematic job could be done. He relied on confidence and natural trust rather than certainty of information; and on personal visits and informal conferences instead of the definitions of an established organization smoothly operating to an effective end.

[49] H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK

1. *Reason for Analysis of Action Taken After December 7, 1941.*—The question of insufficient means with which to adequately defend Oahu has been raised. General Short's energy was admirable and well directed towards improving the defense of Oahu. As a consequence, we have examined the situation as to what he did before the attack and what he did after the attack with what he had. The first part of the examination has already been related in the previous portions of the report. We now propose to examine two questions: How effectively was Short able to use this very same material, personnel, and available facilities after the attack; and what did Washington do after the attack in giving help to Hawaii that might have been done before?

2. *Hawaii and Washington Action.*—Upon learning of the attack General Short immediately ordered the Number 3 Alert (R. 1118). The 24th Division was in all battle positions by 1600 hours December 7, 1941. The 25th Division was in all battle positions by 1700 hours December 7, 1941. The Division Artillery drew its ammunition and secured its issue of a unit of fire to take to beaches within one to two hours. It is significant that the war garrison was increased by Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 after December 7 to defend Kaneohe Bay, "back door to the island," and that increases in air strength and in engineers for aviation purposes were granted (R. 325). Harbor troops had ammunition "immediately at hand." The antiaircraft had theirs sometime later. The first of the sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0900. At noon there was started evacuation of women and children from Hickam and Wheeler fields and harbor defense positions. The Ordnance Depot went into two underground rooms. Slit trenches were then dug (R. 316–317).

The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was put by Washington in complete control of building of field fortifications. The troops started on field fortifications. The slit trenches were not completed on 8 December (R. 321). The outlying islands were further garrisoned (R. 332). Orders were issued in connection with the defense against chemical air attack, air raid instructions were issued, klaxon horns were distributed for the aircraft warning service and old gas masks were exchanged for new (R. 529–531). The Interceptor Command, inactive before December 7 and still in the training stage (R. 1825), was activated 17 December (R. 4136–4137). After December 7 "the Navy took us over body and soul . . . . we did exactly as they ordered us to. We were a part of their Naval Air Force, so to speak," said General Rudolph (R. 1223). Washington gave unity of command. Directives came from the War and Navy departments to establish a joint operating center for a joint staff of Army and Navy. This was done in tunnels in the Aliamanu Crater and put into use in February 1942 (R. 1534).

Daily reconnaissance was made after December 7, using Army B–17s and Navy PBYs and "anything they had," even the B–18s. Navy planes were sent from the mainland by Washington after December 7; many B–17s came out almost

immediately. Additional PBYs were received and those damaged on December 7 were repaired. If the planes that were available by Washington after December 7 had been available before December 7, distance reconnaissance could have been made, according to the testimony of Admiral Bloch (R. 1532–1534). However, the necessity for the ferrying of bombers to the Philippines ceased since they, too, were under attack.

The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after December 7 (R. 2604).

The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as follows. After December 7 the ammunition was issued for use with the guns in the field (R. 2605). The skeleton crews were replaced with full crews on the fixed coastal guns (R. 2611). Only 40 per cent of the allowance of automatic weapons existed before December 7, which was rectified after that date (R. 2613). The whole command was put on a five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and 3 became obsolete, the men in camp after December 7 remaining right at their guns (R. 2639). The radar and Interceptor Command installations, formerly under the control of the Signal Corps, were taken away from the Signal Corps immediately after December 7 and placed under the Interceptor Command (R. 2644).

The aircraft warning system was started full time on December 7 as it could have been weeks before, had the order been given (R. 4133). After December 7 the aircraft warning system personnel continued to operate efficiently. They did so in conjunction with the 24-hour duty of the Interceptor Command. As Colonel Bergquist said, in contrasting his efforts to get the aircraft warning service and the Interceptor Command co-operating before December 7, after December 7 "I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted" (R. 1205–1206). The AWS work moved much faster after December 7 (R. 1218). After December 7 the controversy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, which contributed to the delay in the activation of the Interceptor Command, disappeared (R. 1216–1217).

After December 7 the fighter planes were kept ready to take off instantly (R. 3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a 24-hour basis, as it could have been before, said Colonel Powell, Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department Corps (R. 3913). The aircraft warning sets were in continuous operation after December 7 with three groups operating four hours each (R. 1029).

Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian employee, testified that he as a trouble shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the Aircraft Warning Service after Colonel Wyman was relieved because progress was unsatisfactory (R. 2135). He found he was able to complete certain construction projects at aircraft warning stations by scouting around for parts. Prior to December 7 the crews on those projects were not working because they said they had nothing to work with (R. 2149–2151).

The most remarkable change between December 6 and December 7 was the change in construction activities under the District Engineers, Colonel Wyman.

A new field was begun at Kahuku on December 7. Bunkers were built at Hickham Field; the field at Haliewa was expanded; construction of a new field at Kipapa was started; a temporary field was put on the Schofield golf course. The troops started on field fortifications (R. 321). Authority was requested to build ten airfields. Bombers were put on the outlying islands. "We were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds." Barracks were built with WPA money (R. 325). A pool of lumber was authorized for the Quartermaster (R. 328).

All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken over and put to work. Priorities were established on jobs and get more accomplished, according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Company (R. 3737). A job at Wheeler Field had not been completed for a long time, due to the delay of plans from the Engineers (R 2542) Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar station jobs had been delayed for many weeks with the material on the ground awaiting someone to act. The Hawaiian Constructors had not put it up. After December 7 the witness Bartlett went to the site, erected the tower in five days and had the station operating

On December 7 the runways under construction at Bellows Field were incomplete. On the Wednesday after December 7 the work began on a 24-hour-a-day basis. The second runway was completed in seven days, that is, by the following Thursday, said Colonel Weddington, base [50] commander at Bellows Field (R 3020). After December 7 antiaircraft emplacements were constructed at Bellows Field. When the attack struck, the planes were concentrated practically wing to wing, but after the attack they were dispersed on the field, 50 to 75 feet apart (R. 3014).

The Corps of Engineers also evidenced an appreciation of the situation by raising the contracting authority of the District Engineer from $50,000 before December 7 to $5,000,000 after December 7. The Corps of Engineers' red tape of sending all contracts and changes to Washington to the Chief of Engineers was then eliminated by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman (R. 3435, 3874). The Robert E. McKee Company, which had been discarded by Wyman when he went to the islands in the middle of 1940, was invited by him after December 7 to join the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2405–2407).

Slit trenches had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R. 1916), but they were built extensively, together with air raid shelters, after December 7 (R. 838).

After December 7 Admiral Pye testified the Navy kept its forces out of the harbor fairly continuously except for the time necessary in port to overhaul matériel and receive supplies (R. 1045).

We, therefore, find that after December 7 an active and vigorous employment of facilities, matériel and personnel was made, and full support and supplies were furnished by Washington some of which might have been done before December 7. The support from the mainland was vastly different after December 7 than before, and the record so reflects this condition. For instance, before December 7 G–2 did not submit to General Short any strategical estimates but after December 7 they submitted such a statement weekly. After December 7 the suspected aliens were rounded up and interned, the Japanese consul and his 200 agents were put out of business and all necessary steps were taken to monitor both telephone and radio communication, all of which might have been done without stirring up the civilian population or the Japanese prior to December 7, 1941.

I. SUMMARY

The foregoing concludes the story of Pearl Harbor with the exception of the matter of the construction of the Hawaiian defenses and the particular part of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., with respect to those defenses. Col. Wyman's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster is treated in Chapter V.

In order to not disturb the continuity of the complete Pearl Harbor story both at Hawaii and in Washington, the next succeeding Chapter No. IV is devoted primarily to the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster of those in Washington who had some part in the matter. In this way Chapters III and IV, when read together, will give a balanced and complete picture of the principal events and actions taken which contribute to the result of the attack on December 7, 1941.

List of things done and action taken on or after 7 December 1941 by persons in the Hawaiian Islands: Bloch, volume 13, pages 1532–34; Klatt, v 13, p 1465–66; Pye, v 9, p 1045; Phillips, v 10, p 1118; Murray, v 27, p 3080; Martin, v 17, p 1825, 1850, 1911; Lockard, v 9, p 1029; Bartlett, v 22, p 2510–11; Midkiff, v 25, p 2805–07–14–40–41; Bergquist, v 10, p 1205–06–16–17–18; Rudolph, v 10, p 1223; Weddington, v 27, p 3020–13–14; Howard, v 17, p 1916; Pratt, v 18, p 1986; Locey, v 25, p 2790; King, v 23, p 2542–37–38; Fielder, v 26, p 2981; McKee, v 21, p 2405–07; Burgin, v 24, p 2603–04–07–09–11–13–14–15–39–44; Reybold, v 6, p 580; Davidson, v 36, p 4133–36–38–42; Powell, v 32, p 3904–11–13; Wyman, v 29, p 3435–36—v 32, p 3874 (affidavit—v 29, p 3433–34; Perliter, v 30, p 3712; Benson, v 30, p. 3737; Farthing, v 7, p 838; Tillman, v 19, p 2135–49–51; Short, v 4, p 314–15–16–17–19–20–21–22–25–28–30–31–32–37—v 5, p 500, 529–30–31–34–36.

CHAPTER IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON

1. *General.*—The preceding chapter has dealt primarily with Hawaii and the actions of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian Department. It has to some degree and to a lesser extent, by reason of the chronological sequence, dealt with what was done in Washington both with respect to the internal activities in Washington and what Washington sent to Short. This chapter, therefore, will be devoted primarily to the activities in Washington and only secondarily in Hawaii.

2. *War Council.*—The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has discussed the activities of the group in the War Department known as the War Council. He also described the group consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Navy, Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, who were also called colloquially the "War Council." The third group was that which included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally Commanding General, Air Force, General Arnold.

All three of these bodies were informal and constituted simply a group of men exchanging ideas and attempting to determine policies without regularity of record of what they did, as far as this Board has been able to determine. It was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group.

3. *Secretary of State.*—The responsibility apparently assumed by the Secretary of State (and we have no other proof that anyone else assumed the responsibility finally and definitely) was to determine when the United States would reach the impasse with Japan. It was the Secretary of State who was in charge of the negotiations with the Japanese; it was the Secretary of State who had long and numerous conferences with the Japanese. He was the contact man and the responsible negotiator.

He was doubtless aware of the fact that no action taken by him should be tantamount to a declaration of war. That responsibility rests with Congress. It is important to observe that the President of the United States had been very careful, according to the testimony of the Secretary of War, to be sure that the United States did nothing that could be considered an overt act or an act of war against the Japanese.

For, as Mr. Stimson testified in the phrasing of the message of November 27, he was particularly concerned with so phrasing it so as to carry out the President's directive which was in accordance with our constitutional method of doing business. Mr. Stimson said:

"I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally would do; to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts" (R. 4057).

Mr. Stimson was referring to the status of the negotiations of the previous day on November 26, when the Ten Points were handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese, and to the fact that the President, as of the 27th of [*51*] November, 1941, was still desirous that no overt act be committed by the United States.

With this clear understanding, let us see how these serious responsibilities were discharged. In making this statement we are deeply sympathetic with the state of mind, the irritation, the exasperation, the chicanery, trickery and deception of the Japanese ambassadors with whom the Secretary of State had so long and manfully struggled. What he did was human, but the results are the things with which we are concerned.

Undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been frequently advised through the meetings of the War Council of the inadequate status of the defenses of the United States. Our Army and Navy were not ready for war, and undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been fully advised of that fact. So serious was this situation that General Marshall and Admiral Stark drafted a joint memorandum under date of November 27 on this subject.

This memorandum was addressed directly to the President, according to the testimony of General Marshall. It contained two things: first, a statement that the most essential thing then from the United States viewpoint was to gain time and to avoid precipitating military action so long as this could be done consistent with the National Policy because of the fact that the Army and Navy were not ready for war; and second, attention was called to the desirability of counter military action against Japan in event she engaged in specific acts of aggression (described in the memorandum). The memorandum then recommended among other things that "steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of warnings to the Japanese against taking such aggressive action" (R. 9–10–11). The situation was delicate.

Now let us turn back to Mr. Stimson's testimony. The War Council met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November 1941. The *tentative* U. S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression of it:

"Hull showed me the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, secured it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic."

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this Government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:

"We are an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall."

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.

Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. His diary describes it:

"Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the entire matter was left for further consideration.

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary continues:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that *he* had about made up *his* mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposal at all."

Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' Truce."

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten Points" which they took as an ultimatum.

It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it.

Again Mr. Stimson's diary relates "The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it" (R. 4051-2-3).

Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be a fact.

Witness what is says as of the morning of the 27th of November 1941:

"The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'"

His diary continues:

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says, "A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of need for further time was discussed" (R. 4054).

The advice from the Army and Navy to delay matters and get more time for defense preparations and not precipitate the issue evidently did not reach the President or the Secretary of State in time to be considered befor the memorandum of the 26th was delivered to the Japanese. It seems well established that the sending of this "Ten Point" memorandum by the Secretary of State was used by the Japanese as the signal for starting the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attacking force departed from Tankan Bay on the 27–28 November for its attack on Hawaii. It also appears that the delivery of the 14-point reply of the Japanese to this memorandum was contemporaneous with the attack.

4. *War Department.*—The intentions of the War Department not to precipitate war, as far as the War Department was concerned, are clear and unmistakable. The messages sent to the Hawaiian Department show this to be a fact. The Navy apparently had the same idea because many of their messages likewise so indicate the situation and the Hawaiian Department was given the benefit of those messages.

To be concrete: the Navy message of October 16 concluded with the sentence, "In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose previous intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan"; the message of November 24, from the Navy

Department to Hawaii said in conclusion: "Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation nor precipitate Japanese action"; the message of November 27, #472 [52] from the Chief of Staff to General Short says, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act . . . these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population nor disclose intent"; the message from G–2 on the same day warns against an incident with Japanese population by saying, "Axis sabotage and espionage probable". All this had an effect upon Short because his reply to the message of the 27th was "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy."

In order to prevent an untoward action by Short the message of the 27th as originally drafted started with the opening words, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated" (R. 4270) were changed by the Secretary of War after consultation with the Secretary of State to the softer caution contained in the Stimson-drafted sentences: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable. Hostile action possible at any moment." Then followed the caution not to commit the first overt act.

In continuing on beyond November 27th, was the message from G-2 on November 28, #484, sent by General Arnold which was devoted to sabotage and defensive measures. On the same day the War Department sent message #482 to Short with similar tone and tenor. Short replied to #482 on the 28th with a very long message all dealing with sabotage and espionage. This ends the communications with Short by the Army until the final message of December 7, which arrived too late.

Short was never informed of the Secretary of State's action in delivering the "Ten Points" counter proposals. He testified he first saw or heard of that document after the White Papers were published. General Short said, "I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out."

The message of November 27th did not convey to Short what it was meant to convey by the people who drafted it. While confusing, it contained information and instructions the significance of which should have been appreciated by Short and his staff.

The two Navy messages of October 16 and 24, both of which cautioned against precipitation of an incident, could have added to Short's confusion in interpreting the message.

The impression that the avoidance of war was paramount was heightened by the message immediately following the one of the 27th. In the first place, Short had no reaction from the War Department to his reply that he was acting only to prevent sabotage and to keep contact with the Navy. He felt confirmed in this action by the message on the 27th, from G-2, saying, "Actions of sabotage and espionage probable." Immediately following that the next day were two additional message dealing with sabotage and espionage.

From that time on, November 28, until the message that was received after the attack, Short received no other word by courier, letter, radio, or otherwise. The only claim that he received any additional information was that he was told of messages of December 3, 4, and 6, about the Japanese destroying their codes and the Navy being instructed to destroy some of its codes. Short denies receiving this information.

These acts of omission and commission on the part of the War Department undoubtedly played their part in the failure to put the Hawaiian Department in a proper state of defense.

The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end of peace and the beginning of war.

If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was a responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert.

As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached G–2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December

6; it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G–2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying this message to General Marshall on the night of December 6th, it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of this situation, standing operating procedure should have required delivery of this vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself, was responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate office.

This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon (Honolulu time) of December 6. Additionally, this same information was given to General Gerow's Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there is no evidence of action taken by that Division.

The responsibility of War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full development of the Japanese preparation for war and its probable date.

Again, the equally important and vital information of December 7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morning of December 7. Colonel Bratton made an immediate effort to get the Chief of Staff at that hour. It was not until nearly three hours later that any action was taken by the War Department, when time was of the greatest importance.

Under the circumstances of the clear and explicit revelation of Japanese intentions, arrangements should have been made for immediate action to further warn Hawaii and not leave the situation to be acted upon when the Chief of Staff could not immediately be reached. The responsibility is the Chief of Staff's for not providing an arrangement by which another could act in so critical a situation when he could not readily be reached.

Strange as it may appear, the War Department did not know the actual state of readiness of Short's command from November 27th to December 7th, 1941, though this information was contained in Short's report of action taken on November 27th.

5. *Conflict between the Army and Navy Messages.*—The practice of having General Short secure through the Navy in Hawaii copies of the naval messages tended towards confusion. We have taken occasion to compare the messages of the Navy and the Messages of the Army delivered to General Short from October 16 to December 7. We find:

a. That they were conflicting.

b. That the Navy messages were predominant with warnings of a conflict and the Army messages predominant with the idea of avoiding a conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and espionage.

Short naturally took his choice between the two types of messages and followed that of the War Department. Examination of the Navy messages of October 16, 24, November 27, December 3, 4, and 6, will show that their [*53*] tenor was predominantly war. One Army message of November 27 and two of November 28 predominated in antisabotage warnings.

Furthermore, the Navy message of November 27 and the Army message of November 27 from the Chief of Staff were conflicting: the Navy message flatly stated, "This is a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended." Now, contrast the opening sentences of the Army message which indicates that negotiations may still continue, where it says: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. Only barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue."

The Navy message contained no warning to Hawaii to take precautions against sabotage or overt acts, and no precautions as to the civilian population. To the contrary, the Army message gave explicit directions on this subject. This was followed on the same day by a G–2 message, which said, "It appears that the conference of the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable." The Navy war warning was further diluted in its effect upon Short by the Arnold-AG sabotage message on the 28th of November; and the additional G–2 message on sabotage on the 28th. These November 28 sabotage messages undoubtedly influenced Short to continue on his sabotage alert.

Thereafter Short had only silence from Washington. Short was given no further clarification of this conflict amongst the messages.

There is no explanation why Short was not told of the so-called ultimatum. It was known to the Japanese because it was handed to them.

6. *Military Intelligence Division.*—Within the scope of its activities, this Division performed well. It gathered much valuable and vital data. Through Colonel Bratton it insisted on the dissemination of this information to Field Commanders.

There was a broad field for investigation, however, which was not touched by it or any intelligence agency of the American Government, either military or civil. In this field were the Mandated Islands, the home land and the home waters of the Japanese Empire, and the areas in which the Japanese Navy and Army were operating.

In these fields, reliance was placed upon sources of information which were inadequate. The Japanese Navy was lost to us for considerable periods in those months prior to the outbreak of war. The task force which made the attack on 7 December 1941, left home ports, assembled at Tankan Bay, and notwithstanding that it was a relatively large convoy, sailed for thousands of miles without being discovered. Part of its aircraft was in flight for the targets at Pearl Harbor and on Oahu before we knew of its existence. Its detection was primarily a naval job, but obviously the Army was intensely interested. Elsewhere in this report, the mass of detailed information which the Japanese had assembled relating to American activities has been discussed and is not repeated here.

Discussing this subject before the Board, General Miles, G–2 in 1941, testified as follows:

"But to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency" (R. 107).

The advantages accruing from this situation could have been calamitous. The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our Intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our Intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem.

In the past our Intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these.

7. *War Plans Division.*—The War Plans Division, the supervising agency for the War Department for Overseas Departments, was charged with directing the preparation of and co-ordinating the war plans for Hawaii. It had the responsibility and duty to insure the implementing of such plans.

Aside from the letters and telegrams sent throughout 1941 to General Short (and there were no letters from General Marshall to General Short after the first of November 1941) no action after November 1, 1941, appears to have been taken by way of communications or inspections, or full report of any sort, to reveal whether General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it correctly, what his problems were, and what help could have been given him.

The War Plans Division took no action when Short put the Alert Number 1 into operation and so reported. It took no steps to stop the use of the Hawaiian Department as a training station and put it on a combat basis, such as an outpost should have been, with threatened war. It took no steps to find out if the Hawaiian defenses were being implemented and built according to schedule and the right priorities. It took no steps to put the control of the building of its defense on the Department Commander so that he could coordinate the building of defenses with his other defense preparations.

General Gerow's own testimony clearly pictures the lack of organization and management of the War Plans Division of the Overseas Departments, such as the Hawaiian Department. The War Plans Division was responsible for the Overseas Department, said General Gerow (R. 4334–4335). The War Plans Division was familiar with the equipment situation in Hawaii, such as lack of parts for radar (R. 3425). It was their duty to do all they could to correct the deficiencies but there is no proof that any action was taken (R. 4325–4326). The War Plans Division was responsible for drafting the operational messages to the Hawaiian

Department. Gerow was responsible for drafting the message of the 27th and managed the drafting and final sending of that message. He admitted that he failed to follow up to see if the message of the 27th was being carried out and that was the War Plans Division's responsibility.

He said:

"Admiral STANDLEY. Then who would have been interested in following up that message to see whether those instructions were obeyed or not?

"General GEROW. The War Plans Division, Sir, should have been——

"Admiral STANDLEY. War Plans Division.

"General GEROW. Should have been responsible for following it up, sir.

"Admiral STANDLEY. That was not done then?

"General GEROW. No, sir, it was not.

* * * * * * *

"Admiral STANDLEY. Then those instructions went by the board; nobody followed them up, then?

"General GEROW. That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th" (Roberts Report 1857–1858).

And he again admitted that he made an error in not realizing that the reply of Short, which referred to Message No. 472 by number, referred to that message. He thought it referred to a G–2 message (Roberts Report 1857–1858).

[*54*] He also testified as follows:

"General GRUNERT. Without such co-ordination, there was liable to be confusion and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff?

"General GEROW. It was done, usually, General, I believe by a matter of getting concurrences between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something that was going to be sent out" (R. 4336).

* * * * * * *

"General GEROW. The co-ordination of concurrences, and then most of these important messages, I believe, went through the Secretary of the General Staff.

"General GRUNERT. Then it appears to be the Secretary of the General Staff?

"General GEROW. No.

"General GRUNERT. It appears you do not know just who does it, do you?

"General GEROW. Well, no sir" (R. 4337).

He testified that it was not his particular duty in 1941 to co-ordinate all messages of the War Department that went to our overseas possessions (R. 4338).

Therefore the War Plans Division under General Gerow failed as follows:

a. General Gerow failed to take action on Short's reply showing that he was taking precautions against sabotage only. He again failed to take action in that he assumed liaison with the Navy meant Short was taking the correct steps. The documents in the War Plans Division shows that the Navy's responsibilities did not not start until war was imminent or had taken place and that some formal action by Washington or the Hawaiian Department putting the agreements into effect was necessary.

b. He was responsible for drafting the confusing message of November 27.

c. He took no steps to deliver to Short additional available information. As Gerow testified as to Short's reactions to the message of the 27th: "No one knows what he would have done had he been in that position and *not having perhaps all information we had here*" (R. 1851).

d. He did not check on the Hawaiian Department's activities to determine its state of readiness from November 28 through December 7 (R. 4306).

e. He relied upon the message of November 27 to give Short all the information he needed for full preparation for war, but did not check to find out if that was a fact (R. 4256).

f. The joint air estimate of General Martin and Admiral Bellinger under the joint agreement of General Short and Admiral Bloch as approved by Admiral Kimmel, stated that air attack was the prime threat against Hawaii; and when General Gerow was advised in a conference with the Secretary of War and the report to the Secretary of War from the Secretary of State, in addition to the Intelligence information with which he was provided as to the status of the international situation, it was incumbent upon him to do two things which he failed to do:

(1) To correct Short's mistake in going to Alert Number 1 instead of to Alerts Number 2 or 3; and

(2) To direct immediately the activation of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Defense Plan to put the Army, in conjunction with the Navy, on a complete war footing, ready for any eventuality.

8. *Navy Department.*—The Navy Department undertook by a signed agreement to provide long-distance reconnaissance in Hawaii. It assumed this responsibility admittedly without means of carrying it out in Hawaii.

The Navy in Hawaii failed to advise Short of the sinking of enemy submarines in the outer harbor between six and seven a. m. the morning of December 7. The Navy failed to advise Short of the Jaluit task force so that he could evaluate the information for himself.

9. *Chief of Staff.*—The responsibility for the conditions in the military component of the War Department as depicted in this chapter rests with the Chief of Staff.

At about this time, November 25–December 7, 1941, there seemed to have been in the War Department a firm conviction that war was imminent but also there seems to have been the conviction that it would start in the Southwest Pacific and evidently nobody had any belief that Hawaii was immediately in danger. There was the belief both in Hawaii and in Washington that war was on our doorstep but not on Hawaii's doorstep. This resulted in the main consideration being given to General MacArthur and the Philippine Islands and the resulting second consideration during this critical time to Hawaii. The unfortunate thing was that the Japanese "crossed us up" with a daring surprise attack. When the famous November 27 message was being prepared, consideration first was given to send it only to MacArthur and then it was decided to include Panama, Hawaii and the Western Defense Command. This shows the trend.

As a result of the message of November 27 Short ordered only a sabotage alert and so reported to the War Department as of the same day. The import of Short's reply was little noticed in the War Department by either General Marshall or General Gerow. Just as General Short failed to interpret the full seriousness of the November 27 message, likewise the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division failed to interpret the limited defense that Short's reply indicated in the face of known impending war.

There was failure of understanding at both ends of the line. The Washington officials had full knowledge of impending events, which full knowledge was not available to Short.

A cardinal principle in good management is the necessity to "follow up" on directions. The War Department had nine days in which to check up on the state of defense in Hawaii, which it did not do.

Repeatedly, since General Short took command in Hawaii in February 1941, General Marshall during this peacetime had written to him at length, advising him on details of operation and here, late in November, with war expected almost daily, he communicated none of those personal messages containing needed inside information.

The evidence indicates that the manner in which authority to act was delegated or not delegated had its influence on this situation. The Chief of Staff had three deputies, Generals Bryden, Arnold, and Moore. None of these three was given the secret information concerning the known Jap intentions. When General Marshall went away on November 27 he had, prior to departure, prepared a first draft of the November 27 message. It was the Secretary of War who initially followed through on it on November 27. Then it was given to Gerow to complete. Complete authority to act in General Marshall's absence does not seem to have been given to any one subordinate. Had there been an officer either with authority or with courage to act on the information that was in the War Department on the evening of December 6, and had he sent a message to Short, Hawaii should have been fully alerted.

As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence in the War Department that it was only a matter of days before war would ensue and the War Department had notice that Hawaii was on only a sabotage alert, inadequate for full warfare. Had a full war message, unadulterated, been dispatched or had direct orders for a full, all-out alert been sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the attack with what it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of the line. Responsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii. Hawaiian responsibility has been treated in Chapter III.

To summarize: insofar as the Chief of Staff is related to these events there are specific things which appear in the [55] record with which he was personally concerned. The following are of this nature:

a. Failure to advise his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Bryden, Arnold, and Moore, of the critical situation in the Pacific so that they might act intelligently for him in his absence.

b. Failure to keep General Short fully informed as to the international situation and the probable outbreak of war at any time.

c. The delay in getting to General Short the important information reaching Washington on the evening of December 6 and the morning of December 7.

d. Noting without taking action the sabotage message of Short which presumptively was on his desk on the morning of November 28, 1941.

e. His admitted lack of knowledge of the condition of readiness of the Hawaiian Command during the period of November 8 to December 7, 1941.

The Board is impressed with the absolute necessity of considering the conduct of all responsible officers in the light of the situation as it existed in November and early December, 1941.

It was a case of intelligent men arriving at the best decision possible with all the facts that were before them. This is the basis for successful procedure in either military or civil affairs. In both of these fields occasional mistakes are made notwithstanding that such principles are followed. Such was the case at Pearl Harbor.

This recital is in explanation, not justification. The thinking in the War Department and the Hawaiian Department was faulty in that it emphasized probabilities to the exclusion of capabilities.

10. *Summary.*—In summarizing the "Responsibilities in Washington" it appears that the issue between the United States and Japan was precipitated before the Army and Navy could prepare themselves to follow through on the consequences thereof and that co-ordination and co-operation between the State, War and Navy departments lacked effectiveness, at least in this respect.

As to the War Department's responsibilities there was:

a. A lack of organization for war.

b. A lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department and to control its actions.

c. A lack of instructions to the Hawaiian Department based upon full knowledge of its actions and full knowledge of the international situation.

d. Failure on November 26–27, November 28, during the period from November 28 to December 7, and on December 6 and 7, to take adequate and prompt action on vital information then at hand.

These responsibilities in no way mitigate those of General Short as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. However, they do add others to the list of those responsible.

(Chapter V of this report, as well as the conclusions based thereon which relate to Colonel Wyman, have been omitted in accordance with the statement of the Secretary of War dated August 29, 1945.)

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS

I. EXPLANATIONS

As a prelude to the citation of conclusions the following is pertinent:

1. *Scope.*—Attention is called to the fact that the record developed by the investigation of this Board contains a great amount of evidence, both oral and documentary, relating to incidents and issues about which no conclusions are drawn. Evidence was introduced on these so that anything which might have had a bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster would be fully explored. The Board considered that its mission implied the revealing of all pertinent facts to the end that charges of concealment would be fully met. In formulating its conclusions the Board has selected for treatment only those things which it considers material for a clear understanding of the events which collectively caused the Pearl Harbor disaster. The full report of the Board discusses and analyzes the testimony in its entirety and must be read for a clear understanding of the history of the Pearl Harbor attack.

2. *Estimates Upon Which Action Was Based.*—The responsible officers in the War Department and in the Hawaiian Department, without exception, so far as this Board has been able to determine, estimated the situation incorrectly. They were influenced in this estimate by facts which then seemed to impel the conclusion that initially the impending war would be confined to the land and seas lying south of the Japanese homeland, as forces of the Japanese Army and Navy were concentrating and moving in that direction. British and Dutch forces were being organized and made ready to move in opposition. The Philippine Islands which were in this theater constituted a threat to the flank of the Japanese forces if the United States should enter the war. Supplies and rein-

forcemens were being rushed to the Philippines. There was complete ignorance of the existence of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor. Intelligent officers in high places made the estimate and reached the conclusions in the light of these known facts. They followed a sane line of reasoning. These statements are in explanation, not justification.

The estimate was in error. The procedure in arriving at it was faulty, because it emphasized Japanese probabilities to the exclusion of their capabilities. Nevertheless, the thinking of these officers was colored and dominated by this estimate and their acts were similarly influenced.

3. *Relationship of Commanders in Hawaii.*—The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, the commanders of the Army and Navy forces in Hawaii, were very cordial. They were making earnest and honest efforts to implement the plans which would result in the two services operating as a unit in an emergency. These highly desirable ends had not been accomplished at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

4. *Interchange of Information—State and War Departments.*—The Board was impressed with the apparent complete interchange of information between the State Department and the War Department. As a result the War Department was kept in close touch with international developments and the State Department knew of the Army's progress and its preparations for war.

II. GROUPING OF CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions group themselves logically in two divisions: the Pearl Harbor attack, and operations of the Engineers in Hawaii. We shall consider these in the order stated.

1. *Pearl Harbor Attack.—a.* The attack on the Territory of Hawaii was a surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and [*56*] the Hawaiian Department. It was daring, well conceived and well executed, and it caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize its destructiveness.

b. The extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster was due primarily to two causes:

1. The failure of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department adequately to alert his command for war, and

2. The failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to direct him to take an adequate alert, and the failure to keep him adequately informed as to the developments of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which in turn might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one.

c. We turn now to responsibilities:

1. The Secretary of State—the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the Secretary of State in delivering the counterproposals of November 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the War and Navy departments to gain time for preparations for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government.

2. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.

(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war.

3. Chief of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties, in the following particulars:

(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the substance

of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.

(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the message of November 27, 1941, (472) which contained confusing statements.

(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to take corrective action.

(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two services in the manner contemplated.

4. Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars:

(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our Government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral cemmanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

(d) To replace inefficient staff officers.

CHAPTER VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations: None.

GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, President.
HENRY D. RUSSELL,
Major General, U. S. Army, Member.
WALTER H. FRANK,
Major General, U. S. Army, Member.

FRIDAY, 20 OCTOBER 1944.

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[57] STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF WAR STIMSON

On Dec. 1, 1944, I made a public statement in this matter as follows:

"By joint resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of Dec. 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons at the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a board of three general officers which was directed 'to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper.'

"This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

"I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So

far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

"The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

"So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a command status. This was done on Jan. 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

"Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

"In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

"Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based."

Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was assistant recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to be taken was correct.

Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the FBI, and others. From these same sources there came to the Government additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan.

The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War Department will make available to appropriate committees of Congress the full reports and the record of the testimony.

My conclusions are as follows:

I

The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor in so far as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation.

Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local situation and conditions. Before Dec. 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese attack.

I find that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until the latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical [58] events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that he was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared for the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.

I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would have modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation, and, as later pointed out, I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan.

I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiaircraft defenses sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded.

This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz: the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.

The underlying cause of this error of judgment was General Short's confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him it must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned, including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better

informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in Southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.

Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of Nov. 27, 1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others.

But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility of such an attack was his own definite responsibility.

To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.

To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous forms of attack on that outpost to the opinion of another service.

Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater commander.

I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my statement of Dec. 1, 1944, and in my judgment the additional investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been taken.

II

Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had specially assigned duties.

[59] The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G–2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders.

I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation; that he was warned that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures—the all-important measure to be taken at the time.

Furthermore, as heretofore stated, I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justi-

fying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty.

There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent comunication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate.

The information available to the War Department on or before Dec. 7, 1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following: Information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by Nov. 25, 1941, later extended to Nov. 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no further; and information available the morning of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1 P. M.,Dec. 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded tha t the War Department had earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, was that the War Department had information through secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this information and had given it to him prior to Dec. 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that General Short had been fully advised by the War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any time.

The War and Navy departments also had certain information which was not forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor.

Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible.

Information was received by the War Department on Dec. 6, 1941, as to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G–2, War Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G–2 who received the message on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9 A. M. on the morning of December 7.

When the Chief of Staff received the above-mentioned information on the morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Government at 1 P. M. and the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message, which in the case of General Short, did not arrive until after the attack.

Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about Nov. 20, 1941. to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to Dec. 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed.

With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event.

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage *ONLY* and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the [*60*] wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December, 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division.

Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received oher assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

III

The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for

some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hopelessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts.

It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such situation in this case. The scattered and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.

IV

The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts Commission in their report of Jan. 23, 1942 [41] and the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans Divisions are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.

V

In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have prolonged the negotiontions until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.

VI

There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investigation of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed on Dec. 1, 1944, were as follows:

"I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or other directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there

[41] This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts; Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney.

is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy."

The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.

I also stated on Dec. 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate General." Until those officials are ready to report, I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman.

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[61]

NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

FINDINGS OF FACTS

I

Pearl Harbor is situated on the Island of Oahu, near the city of Honolulu, the capital of the Territory of Hawaii, distant 2,100 miles from San Francisco. It is the only permanent outlying United States Naval Base in the Eastern Pacific. It possesses great strategic importance as a point from which naval operations in defense of the Western United States can be conducted, and offensive operations against an enemy to the westward launched and supported. The United States possesses no base on the West Coast of the United States that meets these requirements to an equivalent extent.

II

Prior to 1940 certain subdivisions of the Pacific Fleet and, beginning in May, 1940, the entire Fleet operated in the Hawaiian area with Pearl Harbor as a base. In May, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.

For the purpose of conducting exercises and maneuvers at sea designed to increase efficiency and readiness for war, the remaining major vessels of the Pacific Fleet were organized in three main Task Forces. The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at least one of these Task Forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently, during Fleet maneuvers, the entire available Fleet was at sea.

The vessels and the Fleet planes thus rotated their scheduled periods in port, periods essential to the mobility of the Fleet for purposes impossible of achievement at sea. At no time during 1941 were all the vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

The operating schedule in effect on 7 December, 1941, was issued in September, 1941. In accordance with its provisions Task Force One, under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N., and part of Task Force Two were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. Task Force Three, under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. N., was at sea, engaged chiefly in escorting the aircraft carrier *Lexington* to Midway, to which point planes were being ferried. Part of Task Force Two, under the command of Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr., U. S. N., and including the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, was returning from ferrying planes to Wake.

Task Force One included the preponderance of the battleship strength of the Fleet. The three battleships of Task Force Two had been left behind in Pearl Harbor because their slow speed did not permit them to accompany the ENTERPRISE to Wake. It was purely a coincidence that all battleships of the Pacific Fleet, except one undergoing overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December.

III

Beginning at 0755, Honolulu time, on 7 December, 1941, an attack was delivered from the northward of Oahu by Japanese carrier aircraft against units of the United States Pacific Fleet then moored and anchored inside the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, against Army and Navy aircraft, and against shore installations on the Island of Oahu. An attack delivered simultaneously by Japanese midget submarines was without effect. The details of these attacks and the extent of

the loss of life and of the damage inflicted by Japanese aircraft have since been made matters of public record.

Within the same 24 hours the Japanese also delivered attacks on the Philippines, Wake and Guam, as well as on Hong Kong and Malaya. The attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be disassociated from these. All were the reprehensible acts of a warrior nation, war-minded and geared to war through having been engaged in hostilities for the past four years, and long known to have aggressive designs for the dominance of the Far East. The United States was then at peace with all nations and for more than 20 years had not engaged in hostilities.

In time of peace it is a difficult and complicated matter for the United States to prevent an attack by another nation because of the constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered. This is a military consideration which gives to a dishonorable potential enemy the advantage of the initiative, deprives the United States of an opportunity to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and places great additional responsibility on the shoulders of commanders afloat in situations where instant action, or its absence may entail momentous consequences.

IV

From 1 August, 1939, to 25 March, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations, charged by law under the Secretary of the Navy with the operations of the Fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, was Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet from 1 February to 17 December, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from 7 February to 17 December, 1941, was Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, U. S. A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District from 11 April, 1940, until 1 April, 1942, was Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N. He was an immediate subordinate of Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in protecting Pearl Harbor. With respect to those duties connected with the defense of Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral Bloch's responsibility was solely to Admiral Kimmel. It is an established fact that this responsibility was discharged to the complete satisfaction of the latter.

Admiral Kimmel and Lieut. General Short were personal friends. They met frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect and, in general, this was true as regards their subordinates. They frequently conferred with each other on official matters of common interest, and invariably did so when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the Base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.

For some time preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States, engaged in the protection of shipping and the patrolling of sea lanes in the Atlantic, was passing through the preliminary stage of a transition from a state of national military unpreparedness to an ability to cope successfully with two resourceful and fully pre- [*62*] pared enemies. The vigorous and convincing representations made by Admiral Stark before congressional committees, beginning in January, 1940, showed clearly that the Navy was unprepared for war and greatly needed ships, planes, and men. These representations, linked with the fall of France, resulted in an Act of Congress in June, 1940, whereby appropriations were voted for practically doubling the size of our Navy.

During all of 1941 and for some time thereafter the problem confronting both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, was one of expansion and of distributing, to the best advantage, the limited supply of ships, planes, guns, and men and intensifying the training of personnel while production was being stepped up.

Under date of 30 December, 1940, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th Naval District and the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, after conference with Admiral Richardson, the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Lieut. Gen. Herron, the then Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, initiated correspondence addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations in which he set forth the inability of the 14th Naval District to meet a hostile attack with he equipment and forces at hand. He pointed out that, as Naval Base Defense Officer, he had no planes for distant reconnaissance. He gave as his opinion that neither in numbers nor

types were the Army bombers satisfactory for the purpose intended. He invited attention to the serious deficiency on the part of the Army with regard to both fighting planes and antiaircraft guns. He noted also that an antiaircraft warning system planned by the Army was scheduled for completion at an indefinite time in the future.

This letter was forwarded to the Navy Department by Admiral Richardson, by endorsement. He concurred in the opinion that the Army aircraft and antiaircraft batteries were inadequate to protect the Fleet in Pearl Harbor against air attack, and urged that adequate local defense forces be provided. He further expressed the opinion that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection, and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet.

Under date of 24 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, based upon the representations made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and in general concurrence therewith. In this letter the belief was expressed that, *in case of war with Japan*, hostilities might be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or on the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The dangers envisaged in the order of their importance and probability were considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack. (2) Air torpedo plane attack. (3) Sabotage. (4) Submarine attack. (5) Mining. (6) Bombardment by gunfire.

Defense against all but (1) and (2) being considered satisfactory, it was proposed that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii; also that the Army give consideration to the question of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses at Pearl Harbor; that local joint plans be drawn for defense against surprise aircraft raids; that there be agreement on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action against a surprise aircraft raid; and that joint execises for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held.

The Secretary of War, under date of 7 February, 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. He pointed out that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of all overseas Army departments and held a high priority for completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. He outlined the details of the Hawaiian project and stated the number of pursuit planes and antiaircraft guns eventually to be supplied. He stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning system was expected to be delivered in Hawaii in June, 1941, and that all arrangements for installation would have been made by the time the equipment was delivered.

Copies of these letters were furnished Admiral Kimmel, Lieut. Gen. Short, and Rear Admiral Bloch.

In a letter dated 17 October, 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that the only increment that had been made to the local defense forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, was the U.S.S. *Sacramento*, an old gunboat of negligible gun power and low speed. He urged that the Department send a number of small fast craft equipped with listening gear and depth charges for antisubmarine purposes and further urged that he be sent two squadrons of VSO planes to be used for patrol against enemy submarines.

Admiral Kimmel forwarded this letter with the following endorsement:

"There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its security at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can possibly be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs."

The Chief of Naval Operations replied, under date of 25 November, 1941, that no additional vessels could be supplied for the present but that certain sub chasers, due for completion in May, 1942, had been tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval

District, certain privately owned vessels might be expected at a future time, and that there were no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District.

It is a fact that, through 1941, the demand for munitions and war supplies exceeded the capacity of the nation and in all important commands there existed marked deficiencies in trained personnel and in material equipment and instruments of war. Although shortages were inevitable, it is a further fact that they had direct bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor.

VII

On 5 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, submitted a joint memorandum to the President, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

On 7 December, 1941, the U. S. Pacific Fleet was numerically inferior to the Japanese naval forces in both combatant and auxiliary vessels.

Aware of this existing weakness in relative fighting strength, and of the vigorous steps being taken by the United States to overcome deficiencies, Japan early sensed the advantage of striking before these steps could become effective. Her advantageous position was strengthened by her extensive espionage system which utilized her civilian, consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world, and enabled her constantly to keep accurately informed of the U. S. naval building program and of the location and movements of U. S. naval vessels.

The topography of Oahu is peculiarly suited to the observation of Pearl Harbor and its activities. The local [*63*] officials of the United States were unable to overcome Japan's advantage in this respect. It was impossible for them to prevent anyone from obtaining military information and, because of legal restrictions imposed by the federal statutes, they could not interfere with the mails and the transmission of messages by radio, telegram, and cable.

In addition, haveing in mind Japan's traditional tendency to distort legitimate actions of a peaceful nation into deiberate threats to her own security and prestige, the War and Navy departments were compelled to take every precaution to avoid offending her supersensitive sensibilities. For example, as of 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to "take such preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative action against Japan" and, on 28 November 1941, the War Department directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to "undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act."

In contrast with the ease with which Japanese in United States territory, particularly in Hawaii, were able to obtain and transmit to Japan military information of value, every obstacle was placed in the way of such information being collected in Japan by foreign nationals.

As an instance of Japan secretiveness and surveillance of foreigners, including those of the U. S. diplomatic services, the U. S. naval attache in Tokyo was compelled to report to the Japanese Navy Department whenever he contemplated an excursion beyond the limits of the city, and he was closely watched at all times. He was effectively prevented from obtaining any information as to the type and number of Japanese ships under construction and the capacity of their naval shore establishment, as well as of the location and movements of Japanese ships.

It is a fact that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941.

VIII

A naval base exists solely for the support of the fleet. The fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. Periodical visits to a base are necessarily made by mobile seagoing forces in order that logistics support may be provided and opportunity given for repair and replenishment, for rest and recreation, and for release of the personnel from a state of tension.

To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirements that the seagoing personnel shall have the additional responsibility for security from hostile

action while within the limits of a permanent naval base is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare.

There is not, and there has not been, any lack of understanding on the part of the Army and Navy on this point. The defense of a permanent naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent. To be adequate, the defense must function effectively during the periods when the Commander in Chief and all the units of the Fleet are absent.

In the case of naval districts lying beyond the continental limits of the United States, the commandant of the district occupies a dual status. As commandant of the district, he is governed by all existing instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts and is answerable direct to the Navy Department. He is also an officer of the Fleet and as such is under the Commander in Chief of the Fleet for such duties as the latter may designate.

The fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was thus designated as an officer of the Pacific Fleet is the circumstance that links the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the duty of assisting the Army in defending the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor. Except for this, the chief responsibility of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was for the readiness, the efficiency, and the security of the vessels of the Fleet while at sea. It is through gaining and maintaining control of vital sea areas that a Fleet contributes to the defense of the shore and its activities.

The defense of the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor was the direct responsibility of the Army.

IX

Under date of 27 February 1941, the Commandant, 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral Bloch, in his capacity as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued an operations plan establishing security measures, including air defense and surface ship patrol, in order to co-operate with and assist the Army in protecting Pearl Harbor and safeguarding Fleet.

Under date of 28 March 1941, joint agreements were reached between Lieut. Gen. Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, as to joint security measures for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. It was agreed that when the threat of a hostile raid or attack was considered sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander was to take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such portion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warranted.

Joint air attacks upon hostile *surface* vessels were to be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Army bombardment strength to participate in each such mission was to be determined by the Commander, Hawaiian Department, the number of bombardment planes released to Navy control to be the maximum practicable.

Defensive *air operations* over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu were to be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Commandant, 14th Naval District, was to determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control to be the maximum practicable.

When naval aircraft under the command of the Naval Base Defense Officer were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft so made available were to be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

The Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely without aircraft, either fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units. The Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N., was by Admiral Kimmel placed under Rear Admiral Bloch's orders, and was by the latter directed to consult with the Army and to prepare a detailed naval participation air defense plan. Rear Admiral Bellinger thus was given the additional status of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, while retaining his status as an air officer of the Fleet.

Under date of 31 March 1941, plans were drawn up and jointly agreed upon by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. These plans were complete, and their concept was sound. Their basic defect lay in the fact that the naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet. This [64] circum-

stance was forced by necessity, but was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that, to be adequate, the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance from the Fleet.

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise. It was not possible for the Commander in Chief of the Fleet to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer, because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at sea.

X

Shortly after assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel issued specific comprehensive instructions as to the steps to be taken for the security of the Fleet in the operating sea areas. Aware of the inadequacy of the shore defenses of Pearl Harbor, he also required the vessels, while at the base, to assist to the limit of their resources. These instructions were revised and brought to date on 14 October 1941, were given wide circulation within the Pacific Fleet, and were sent for information to other commands and to the Navy Department.

The security of the Pacific Fleet, operating in the Hawaiian Area and based on Pearl Harbor, was predicated on two assumptions:

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt

"(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

"(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two."

The measures prescribed to provide against these possibilities included continuous inshore, boom, and harbor patrols, intermittent patrol of the inner and offshore areas by destroyers, daily search of operating areas by air, the covering of sortie and entry, and daily sweeps for magnetic and anchored mines. The only entrance to Pearl Harbor was guarded by an antitorpedo net.

The Task Forces operating at sea were screened defensively by aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Water-tight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle outlooks were kept posted, the ships steamed darkened at night, and the use of the radio was restricted to a minimum.

Admiral Kimmel, recognizing the potentialities of the submarine as an instrument of stealthy attack and believing that Japanese submarines were operating in Hawaiian waters, was of the opinion that this form of surprise attack against his Fleet was the one most likely to be employed by Japan. Therefore, he had issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule "shoot first and explain afterwards."

Actually, in execution of these orders, a midget submarine was discovered in an operating area, attacked and destroyed by the combined efforts of a naval patrol plane and a destroyer of the inshore patrol, about an hour prior to the air attack on the morning of 7 December. There was nothing however, in the presence of a single submarine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent.

It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective. No naval units were either surprised or damaged while operating at sea in the Pacific prior to or on 7 December 1941.

XI

While vessels of the United States Navy are lying in port, it is the invariable custom to keep on board a number of officers and men sufficient to provide for internal security, and to protect against fire and the entrance of water. The force so remaining on board is always balanced as to ranks and ratings so that all

requirements can be met in case of emergency. A watch is maintained day and night.

In other than normal situations a "condition of readiness" is placed in effect. On the morning of 7 December considerably more than half of the naval personnel were on board their ships in Pearl Harbor, more than ample to meet an emergency in port. Their efficiency and their heroic behavior on that day are proof of their fitness for duty.

The Navy's practice in numbering its three prescribed "conditions of readiness" is opposite to the method adopted by the Hawaiian Department of the Army in numbering its "alert." With the Army, the No. 3 alert represents the maximum state of readiness, while the Navy refers to that state as No. 1. In the interest of clarification, definition of the respective states of readiness is here set forth:

ARMY ALERTS	NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINESS
No. 1 Defense against sabotage and uprisings. No threat from without.	No. 1 Entire crew, officers and men at battle stations. Action imminent.
No. 2 Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to No. 1.	No. 2 Provides the means of opening fire immediately with one half the armament. Enemy believed to be in vicinity.
No. 3 Requires occupation of all field positions.	No. 3 Provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter.

The alert in effect in the Hawaiian Department of the Army at the time of the attack was their No. 1. The condition of readiness of the vessels in Pearl Harbor at that time was an augmented Navy No. 3. This condition had been in effect for many months preceding that date. To assume a high condition of readiness in port and to man guns and stations which cannot be utilized in any circumstance is to impose on the entire personnel an unjustified state of tension and to defeat the purpose for which the vessels have entered the base; i. e., to make repairs, to replenish supplies, to give the personnel rest and relaxation, and thus to prepare for operations at sea.

The same holds true with regard to the patrol planes of the Fleet, and to a small number of fighters that had been left behind by the absent carriers. They were part of the Fleet, engaged in daily operations and, when not [65] operating, were undergoing overhaul or the crews were being rested in anticipation of further operations. At the time of and immediately prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December 1941, some were in the air covering the movement of a task force, others were on 30 minutes' notice, some others were on 4 hours' notice, and the remainder were under overhaul.

These planes were not part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. To have kept the crews awake and ready with engines warmed up, in the absence of any indication of an impending attack, would have been to undermine their further usefulness.

The Navy controlled none of the guns mounted on shore. The only means available to the vessels of the Fleet for contributing to their own defense against aircraft while in Pearl Harbor was their antiaircraft batteries. The antiaircraft batteries installed on the ships in Pearl Harbor were incapable of a volume of fire at all comparable to that of the batteries of the same ships today.

On all ships inside Pearl Harbor a considerable proportion of the antiaircraft guns was kept manned day and night and with ammunition immediately at hand. Also, by prearrangement with the Army, there was in effect a system, correct as to its details, for the co-ordinating of the antiaircraft fire of vessels of the Fleet in port with that of the Army on shore.

Existing Fleet orders provided for the establishment of air defense sectors within the Pearl Harbor area, and for the berthing of ships within the Harbor in such positions as to develop the maximum antiaircraft gun fire in each sector, commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port.

These orders were carried out to the letter. On the morning of the attack the vessels of the Fleet brought hostile planes, as they came within one or more of these air defense sectors, under heavy fire intensified within a very few moments by the full fire of the entire antiaircraft batteries of all ships.

It is a fact that the Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to their defense.

XII

An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. Once launched, the attacking planes can be prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or antiaircraft gunfire or both. Even when a determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire, some of the attacking planes rarely fail to get through and inflict damage.

To destroy an aircraft carrier before she can launch her planes requires that her location be known and that sufficient force, in the form of surface or underwater craft, or aircraft, or all three, be at hand. To have the necessary force at or near the point of intended launching in time to insure the destruction of the carrier, it is necessary that the carrier's presence in a general area, and within narrow limits of time, be known or predicted with reasonable accuracy. Even in time of war the fulfillment of this condition is difficult where vast sea areas are involved, and where both the point from which the carrier departs, as well as the fact of her departure, are unknown.

This was the case during the days immediately prior to 7 December 1941. Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port. Their departure and whereabouts were a closely guarded Japanese secret and were likewise unknown, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.

Although the U. S. Ambassador to Japan reported, as of 27 January 1941, that there was a rumor to the effect that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was planned, its authenticity was discounted in the Embassy for the reason that such an attack, if actually contemplated, would scarcely be likely to be a topic of conversation in Japan.

The Navy Department informed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, of this rumor and stated that the Navy Department "places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future."

In time of war, an outlying naval base may be expected to become an enemy objective, sooner or later. It is an established fact, however, that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941.

The attack of 7 December 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was unpredictable.

XIII

Where a carrier's presence in a general area is not known in advance and is not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must be resort to procedure which will give warning of a hostile approach. The usual procedure employed by carriers bent on delivering a surprise attack, although by no means the only procedure possible, is to arrive about 700 miles from the objective at dark the night preceding the attack, steam at high speed during the night, and launch the planes at dawn, about 400 miles from the objective. It is this general procedure which establishes early morning as the time when an air attack is most likely to be delivered. The events of 7 December 1941 point to the likelihood of this procedure having been followed by the Japanese.

The greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air attack is obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted prior to dark the night before. In such event, a maximum warning of about 12 hours may be obtained. In the case of an island base, such as Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to cover the circumference of a circle of 700 miles radius each day (the direction from which the attack is expected being unknown) in order to obtain either positive or negative information.

Assuming 25 miles visibility (which in the Hawaiian area is not found everywhere nor always assured), an effective daily search requires the daily employment of 90 patrol planes which, in turn, requires that double or triple that number (180–270) be available, it being impossible to employ the same planes and crews every day, or even every other day.

If only the dawn circle of 400-mile radius is to be searched daily, the total number of planes required to be available is 100–150. The maximum warning is then reduced to about two hours.

Where planes are not available to cover all sectors, the selection of sectors to be omitted is left purely to chance and under such circumstances the advisability of the diversion of all planes from other duties is questionable unless there be information as to the fact of a hostile approach and of the direction, within reasonable limits, from which the approach is expected.

Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty, even if the necessary number be available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the Fleet incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarines over an extensive sea area as a means of continuously guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war.

[66] It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in case of emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers, and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved.

In brief, the deciding factors were:

(a) The Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch, although charged with the conduct of the reconnaissance, had no patrol planes permanently assigned to his command.

(b) The only naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian area were the 69 planes of Patrol Wing Two and these were handicapped by shortages of relief pilots and crews. They were a part of the Fleet, and not a part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. The only other planes suitable and available for daily long-range reconnaissance were six Army bombers.

(c) The task assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent—how imminent he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information.

(d) If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations.

(e) The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance.

It is a fact that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not justified in the abscence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time. It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with he inadequate number of Fleet planes available.

XIV

At the time of the attack, only a few vessels of the Pacific Fleet were fitted with radar. The radar of vessels berthed in a harbor such as Pearl Harbor, partially surrounded by high land, is of limited usefulness at best and does not provide the necessary warning of a hostile approach.

The shore-based radar on the Island of Oahu was an Army service and entirely under Army control. The original project called for 6 permanent (fixed) and 6 mobile installations. The fixed installations had not been completed by 7 December 1941 and only 3 sets had been shipped to Oahu up to that time. On that day there were in operation 5 mobile sets located in selected positions, with equipment in efficient condition, but inadequately manned.

Training of personnel had started on 1 November 1941. Lieut. Gen. Short earlier had requested that the Navy assist in this training, and 15 of his men had been sent to sea on vessels of the Fleet for that purpose. Admiral Kimmel also had detailed the Pacific Fleet Communication Officer as liaison officer with the Army. He could not supply six other naval officers requested for permanent duty in the Information Center of the air warning system because no officers were available for such detail.

During the second week of November, 1941, Commander W. G. Taylor, USNR, was, by Admiral Kimmel, detailed to the Army Interceptor Command for duty

in an advisory capacity, in connection with the setting up of the Army air warning system. Commander Taylor had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar in the stage of its development that existed at that time.

On 24 November 1941, he called a conference for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a wartime basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment would be needed. Two naval officers and 6 Army officers were present at this conference.

The minutes of the conference, concurred in by all present, included an exhaustive statement of deficiencies and the steps to be taken for their remedy. Copies of the minutes were furnished the conferees and copies were forwarded to the Acting Commanding Officer of the Interceptor Command, and to the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. Steps agreed upon as necessary for the improvement of the system had not become effective by 7 December 1941.

The Army Interceptor Command was barely in the first stages of organization by 7 December. Four of its officers had been sent to school on the mainland in order to fit them for their new duties. Until 17 December 1941, the organization was on a tentative basis only and the actual order setting up the Command was not issued until that date. One of the principal weaknesses of the Interceptor Command on 7 December 1941 was that the Information Center had no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile.

Between 27 November and 7 December 1941, the Air Warning System operated from 0400 to 0700, the basis for these hours being that the critical time of possible attack was considered to be from one hour before sunrise until two hours after sunrise. On weekdays training in the operation of the system also took place during working hours.

On the morning of 7 December the only officer in the Army Information Center was 1st Lieutenant (now Lieut. Col.) K. A. Tyler, Army Air Corps. He had received no previous instruction as to his duties, had been on duty there only once before, and on the morning in question was present only in the capacity of an observer for training. At 0715 that morning he received a call from the radar station at Opana, located in the northern part of the Island of Oahu, to the effect that a large number of planes, bearing approximately north, had been picked up on the screen. Assuming that these were friendly planes because he had heard indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route from Hamilton Field, California, to Oahu, he did nothing about this report. These B-17s actually arrived over Oahu during the attack, and many of them were destroyed.

At the Opana station, where this report originated, Private Locard (now 1st Lieutenant) and Private Elliott (now sergeant) were on duty with instructions to observe and track flights and report them to the Information Center. Private Locard had had some previous training but Elliott none. The station was scheduled to shut down at 0700, but as the truck had not come to take these men to their camp for breakfast, Private Locard continued to operate the radar set in order to assist in the training of Elliott.

Shortly after 0700 there was picked up on the screen an unusually large flight of planes, coming in from a northerly direction at a distance of about 136 miles. Checking the equipment to make sure, Locard decided to call the Information Center and did so when the planes had come in to 132 miles. Having reported the fact to [67] the Army officer on duty (1st Lieut. Tyler), Locard and Elliott continued to track the planes in to twenty miles from Oahu, when they lost them due to distortion.

For information of this flight to have been of value as a warning, it would have been necessary for the planes first to have been promptly identified as hostile, and then their presence and their bearing and distance immediately reported to and received by higher authority, and disseminated throughout the Command. The organization and training of the Information Center and Communication System at this time was not such as to permit these important requirements to be fulfilled. Actually, the oncoming planes were not identified as hostile until the Japanese marking on their wings came into view.

XV

The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes. These torpedoes were designed especially for the form of attack in which they were used. Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an

attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions of restricted length of approach, the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not practicable.

After a study had been made of the problem of protecting vessels in port against torpedo attack, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 15 February 1941, stated that it was considered that the relatively shallow depth of water (about 45 feet) limited the need of antitorpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor; and in addition, that the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles.

The letter further stated that certain limitations and considerations must be borne in mind in planning the installation of antitorpedo baffles within harbors, among which was the following:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpeodes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

On 13 June 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter to the Commandants of the various naval districts, modified limitation (a) by stating that recent developments had shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights as much as 300 feet and, in some cases, make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet with excellent runs, This letter, however, did not modify the view expressed in the letter of 15 February as to the need for antitorpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor.

Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the activity of U. S. aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing winds would render it ineffective.

The especially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fall in the category of the so-called secret weapon, of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mine are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an initial advantage which continues until the defense against them has been perfected.

It is a fact that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to the secret development of a specially designed torpedo.

XVI

Strained relations between the United States and Japan had existed and been a source of concern to this country for many months prior to 7 December 1941. That the Japanese policy in the Far East was one of aggression had been well known for many years. Their program of expansion, which envisaged

Japan as the dominating power in the Western Pacific, was in direct conflict with the policies of the United States and Great Britain, and opposed to agreements established by treaty.

At the instigation of the Japanese, negotiations were begun by the State Department on 12 May 1941, looking to the peaceful settlement of existing problems. On 17 November 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was joined by Mr. Kurusu in the capacity of special envoy.

On 26 July 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. The order freezing these assets required a system of licensing shipments to Japan, and no licenses were issued for oil or petroleum products.

There was a feeling on the part of U. S. officials that hostilities, unless prevented by some means, would become an actuality in the not distant future. They were familiar with the Japanese trait of attacking without declaration of war, as had been done against China in 1894, and against Russia in 1904.

The Secretary of State held numerous conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, at which the negotiations with Japan were discussed. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations attended many of these conferences and were kept informed of the progress of these negotiations. At the same time efforts to improve the military position of the United States were being vigorously prosecuted.

On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Admiral Kimmel by dispatch that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, that the new Cabinet would probably be anti-American, the hostilities between Japan and Russia were a possibility, and that the Japanese might also attack the United States and Great Britain. In the same dispatch, Admiral Kimmel was directed to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions, nor constitute provocative action against Japan.

On the following day, 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated, "Personally I do not believe that the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you (that of 16 October) merely stated the 'possibility.'"

[*68*] For the purpose of viewing the events of the succeeding months in their true relation to the events of 7 December, this date of 16 October 1941 may well be taken as the beginning of a critical period which terminated in the attack of 7 December 1941.

In accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October, Admiral Kimmel made certain preparatory deployments, including the stationing of submarines off both Wake and Midway, the reinforcement of Johnston and Wake with additional Marines, ammunition, and stores, and the dispatch of additional Marines to Palmyra. He also placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the Fleet which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coast navy yard, and placed in effect additional security measures in the Fleet operating areas.

He reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps taken and received written approval of his action. He continued the measures which he had already placed in effect looking to readiness for war, preparation of the Pacific Fleet for war being his assigned task.

He did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his staff, all experienced officers of long service, and sought by every means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand.

On 24 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed also to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to Commandants of naval districts with headquarters at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Panama, which stated:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately."

The contents of this dispatch were made known to Lieut. Gen. Short and discussed with him.

The reaction on Admiral Kimmel and his advisers was to direct their attention to the Far East. They did not consider that the expression "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" included the probability or imminence of attack in the Hawaiian area, specific mention having been made of the Philippines and Guam with no mention of Hawaii.

They recognized the capability of Japan to deliver a long-range surprise bombing attack and that she might attack without a declaration of war. They reasoned that she would not commit the strategic blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States territory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the American people in war against Japan. Public opinion in the United States was far from being crystallized on the question of taking steps to curb her expansion in the Western Pacific.

Conceivably, Japan might well have taken aggressive action against British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, gaining the oil and other raw materials that she was seeking, without military interference from the United States. An attack elsewhere than in the Far East seemed, therefore, to be only a remote possibility and not enough of a probability to warrant abandonment of the preparation of the Fleet for war.

To continue these preparations was, therefore, Admiral Kimmel's decision, made on his own responsibility in the light of the information then available to him and in the knowledge that every precaution within his power, compatible with maintaining the Fleet in a state of readiness for war, had already been taken.

On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Continental districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

This dispatch was sent also the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and has since become known as the "war warning message."

On the morning following the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral Kimmel discussed its contents with Lieut. Gen. Short, Rear Admiral Bloch, the flag officers of the Fleet present, and the members of his staff.

After much further study, Admiral Kimmel and his advisers interpreted the warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readiness to undertake active operations was expected. They were unable to read into it any indication that an attack against the Hawaiian area was to be expected, particular attention having been directed to the Japanese activities in the Far East, with objectives in that area specifically mentioned. No reference was made to the possibility of a surprise aggressive move "in any direction," as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November.

There was nothing to indicate that defensive measures should take precedence over all others. The "appropriate defensive deployment" that was directed was not interpreted as referring specifically to the Pacific Fleet, in view of the deployments of the Pacific Fleet already made in compliance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October. In addition, since that date, a squadron of submarines had been sent to the Philippines, leaving only 5 in Pearl Harbor.

There were other considerations which no doubt influenced Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Department's dispatch of 30 November, addressed to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and sent to Admiral Kimmel for his information, ordered the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea. This appeared to indicate that the authorities in Washington expected hostilities to occur in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.

On 28 November the Chief of Naval Operations advised Admiral Kimmel that the Department had requested, and the Army had agreed to, the relief of Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine planes with Army pursuit planes. This action, involving as it did a complicated problem and the movements of sizeable U. S. naval forces westward to effect their transfer, was an indication of the fact that the authorities in the

War and Navy departments did not then expect a hostile movement toward the Hawaiian Islands.

On 28 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations repeated to Admiral Kimmel the information contained in a dispatch which the War Department, on 27 November, had transmitted to Lieut. Gen. Short, and other Army addressees, to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated, that Japanese future action was unpredictable, that hostile action was possible at any mo- [69] ment, and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act in case hostilities could not be avoided. Such measures as were undertaken were to be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

To this dispatch Lieut. Gen. Short had replied on 27 November: "Report Department alerted against sabotage. Liaison with Navy." The steps taken caused the Army planes to be grouped in such manner as to afford better protection against sabotage, although militating against their taking the air promptly. In the absence of a reply from the War Department, Lieut. Gen. Short considered that the alert he had placed in effect was approved.

Lieut. Gen. Short having, on 28 November 1941, received instructions from the Adjutant General of the Army to take measures to protect military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, reported in detail the measures that he had taken and repeated the fact that he had placed in effect Alert (No. 1) against sabotage. He interpreted the dispatch from the Adjutant General as further indicating that his alert against sabotage constituted complete compliance with the War Department's wishes.

There was no mention in any of the dispatches received by Lieut. Gen. Short, between 27 November and 7 December 1941, of the possibility or probability of an attack against Oahu.

As further evidence of the prevailing sentiment against the liklihood of an immediate move toward Hawaii, it is a fact that a flight of B–17s from the Mainland arrived over Oahu during the attack of 7 December, without ammunition and with guns not ready for firing.

These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.

From 26 November to 7 December 1941, conversations between our Government and Japan did continue, notwithstanding the statement contained in the war warning message under date of 27 November 1941, that negotiations with Japan, looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific, have ceased.

This statement was based upon the note delivered by the State Department to the Japanese representatives on 26 November, a copy of which was furnished the Navy Department. It did not in itself discontinue negotiations and conversations, but, on the contrary, gave an "outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan." The stipulations contained therein were drastic and were likely to be unacceptable to Japan.

The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War and Navy departments because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that war would be declared. The sending of the note therefore began the final phase of the critical period which culminated on 7 December.

Although it was stated in the press that a note had been delivered, none of its contents was given out to the public until after the attack. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note nor of its contents until many months after the attack.

In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, dated 26 May 1941, he had invited attention to the importance of keeping commanders, well removed from Washington, informed of developments and eventualities, stating:

"The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available."

From time to time during this critical period there was received in the War and Navy departments certain other important information bearing on the current situation. The testimony as to this information forms a part of the record of this Court. The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the Court having been informed that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution of the war.

This information was not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. No facilities were available to them, either in the Fleet or in the Hawaiian area, which would enable them to obtain the information direct. They were dependent solely upon Washington for such information.

With regard to not transmitting this information, the stand taken by the Chief of Naval Operations was that the "war warning message" of 27 November completely covered the situation. The fact remains, however, that this message, standing alone, could not convey to the commanders in the field the picture as it was seen in Washington.

Only three other messages were received by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Chief of Naval Operations between 26 November and 7 December one informing him that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London to destroy certain codes, and the other two relative to the destruction of United States codes at Guam and outlying islands.

In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it decoded and [*70*] sent to the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and Hawaii, with instructions that the naval authorities in those areas be informed of its contents.

The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m., Washington time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at 7:33 a. m. (Honolulu time). Thus there remained but 22 minutes before the attack began for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. Gen. Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours after the attacking force had departed.

Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means available to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.

XIX

It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate commanders, particularly those in distant areas, constantly supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military error.

It is a fact that Admral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important information in his possession during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese Situation as seen in Washington.

OPINION

Based on Finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules.

Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be construed as an overt act.

Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., and Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and co-operative, that there was no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either, and that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the common interest.

Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in personnel and material which existed during 1941 had a direct adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.

Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not obtainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941.

Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided in the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits.

Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N., in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.

Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.

The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment with the Fleet.

Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.

Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and bearing in mind

that he had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December 1941, which resulted in the hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' antiaircraft batteries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although had all antiaircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree which is problematical; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost might thus have been reduced.

The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance that the attack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.

[71] It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it could not be known *when* an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December.

Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable.

Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.

Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight of Army B–17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view.

Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which was unknown to the United States.

Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.

Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which influenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning message" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.

Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in

that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.

The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.

Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.

RECOMMENDATION

The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.
EDWARD C. KALBFUS,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

The Court having finished the inquiry, then at 4 p. m., Thursday, October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the Convening Authority.

ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.
HAROLD BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate.

Nov. 2, 1944.

NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY—FIRST ENDORSEMENT

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.

1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.

2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either of two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judge Advocate General must hold, [72] as a matter of law, that such a finding or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8; CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936, P. 11.

3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII:

"In the early forenoon of 7 December 1941, Washington time, the War and Navy departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon.*"

4. The Findings, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the War and Navy departments did in fact make the inference and deduction underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past tense of the verb "appear," and used the expression "appeared to indicate," rather than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such an impression would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December 1941, held positions in the Navy Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions.

6. Therefore, any finding, opinion, or inference that the responsible officials of the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack that an attack on Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes this fact, as shown by its findings (last paragraph of Finding XVII) that:

"These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere."

7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of the Opion expressed by the Court that:

"Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.*"

As has been previously pointed out, the information herein referred to was not construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area.

8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at which the War and Navy departments had information indicating a break in diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by the Japanese on that date, was "in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time." It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this finding, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this information was known in Washington on 6 December 1941. The evidence before this Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m., the morning of 7 December 1941.

9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to transmit certain information to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person in the naval service. "That is only an apparent, and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that "had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken." This statement, as well as the Finding of Facts and Opinions taken as a whole, indicate that it was the conclusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed, that the evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December 1941, and that any casual connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record.

10. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinions and recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, legal.

/s/ T. L. GATCH,
The Judge Advocate General.

6 NOVEMBER 1944.

NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY—SECOND ENDORSEMENT

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 15 July 1941.

1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks:

[73] 2. (a) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two thirds of its time at sea and one third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.

(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.

(c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.

(d) Fact V sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the Union States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.

(e) Fact VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 December 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and Navy departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.

(f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that the United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.

(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor *should* have been strong enough for self-defense. The fact that it *was not* strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in the defensive measures.

(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long-range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have overstressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.

(i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive antisubmarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "augmented Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Conditions of readiness No. 3" provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect [74] to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that "Condition of readiness No. 3" is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50 per cent were on 4 hours' notice. This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of

large numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also, points out that there were no long-range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI reads:

"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941 was the best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."

This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.

(j) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

(k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long-range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170° and 350° to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.

(l) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army Bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.

(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, through the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no antitorpedoes baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.

(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:

(1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such employments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.

(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.

(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and the indications were that a *surprise aggressive* [75] *movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

(o) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:

(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days; that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that the Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.

(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a dispatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.

(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.

(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:

(1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior to this period which was made available in the Navy Department but which was not sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire in some cases to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral

Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel this information, because to do so might compromise the sources from which it was obtained. This contention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information which he was receiving. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the dispatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at Admiral Stark's disposal. I have to concur in this view.

(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the handling of certain information which was received in the Navy Department on the 6th of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this information indicated the Japanese views concerning certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the countries, and leaves no doubt that the United States' proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December, further trustworthy information was received which indicated that the Japanese Government had finally given up hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This information was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at the State Department.

(3) At about 10:30 a. m. on 7 December, further reliable information was received in the Navy Department. The substance was that the Japanese Ambassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred to in the preceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on that day. This information was of significance because 1:00 p. m. in Washington was dawn in Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter, to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least some officers therein, appreciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility—even the probability—of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this information came to his attention about 11:00 a. m. and that he immediately telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan was imminent and that an attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the need for sending this message, but after brief consideration, asked General Marshall to include in his proposed dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00 p. m. Washington time on 7 December; and that while the War Department did not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, he, General Short, was to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication. He sent this via commercial radio, which was the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The dispatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time.

This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already under way. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances

attending vessels within the limits of Pear Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their [76] air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours' advance warning would have been of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.

(4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every reason to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says that "the significance of this dispatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intention to strike the United States.

(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency. This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency."

(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 28 November reliable information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short-wave news broadcast. When these words were heard, codes were to be destroyed. This information was available in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected broadcast. On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. Various officers testified that the implementing broadcasts were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts*[42] *were never sent Admiral Kimmel.* However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London to destroy certain codes.

(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May, 1941, had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."

(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.

(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify;[43] however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.

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[42] Later investigations indivate that the vital implementing broadcasts were not, in fact, received by the Navy Department.

[43] Admiral Wilkinson's testimony was later received but did not change any of the opinions or facts established.

3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.

(a) In the opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's disposition on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.

(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and material at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which was given to him.

(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.

(d) The Court holds that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.

(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance [77] knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing of the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.

(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.

(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place 7 December could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.

(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII, the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long-range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this

phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about long-range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.

(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII, the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, the hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in the campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.

(j) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the Court expressed the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisors did not construe this information as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the views of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the information in question, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1 : 00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident that, though Admiral Stark did not have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this information, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.

4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.

5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God," beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to support an adequate Army and Navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

(a) Admiral Stark was, of course aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and

accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

[78] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain information available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the information which he received indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m., which information Admiral Stark received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this information been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last-minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message of 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December information that the Japanese were destroying their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.

8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the records bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

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1 DEC 1944.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.

1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find that the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral K.mmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.

2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain all of the revelant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.

1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:

"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of co-ordination then in effect for joint co-operative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hositilities. The attitude of each, that he was not re- [79] quired to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."

2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses likely to have knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committeed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.

5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET" in the interest of national security, and the balance "SECRET."

The material which was classified "TOP SECRET" was so classified by the Court of Inquiry and retained in that classification upon the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations because of the extreme care which has been necessary to safeguard information in the hands of the Navy Department and especially the sources of that information. These sources were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the Office of Strategic Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations now informs me that it is still in the public interest that the sources of this information be safeguarded. Accordingly, I have directed that all of the report of the Court of Inquiry be made public except that part, publication of which in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations would necessarily disclose the sources of secret information. To the same end in the discussion of the report of the Court of Inquiry the evidence before the Court and the additional evidence discovered by Admiral Hewitt's investigation herein I have avoided any reference which would disclose the sources of secret information.

6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations and by me was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations. Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, as investigation officer, to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop and clarify the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation was completed on 12 July 1945.

9. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record are approved subject to the following remarks:

(a) *Court of Inquiry Finding II.* This finding states in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.

The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack.

The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.

(b) *Court of Inquiry Finding III.* This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ." make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. Though, in contrast with our constitutional principles, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was but a repetition of the historically treacherous Japanese method of inaugurating hostilities and commencing a war, yet it does not appear that there was any proximate casual relationship between the constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long-distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent [*80*] the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.

(c) *Court of Inquiry Finding IV.* This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.

Upon the basis of all the evidence including Admiral Hewitt's investigation it appears that:

(1) No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

(2) The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

(d) *Court of Inquiry Finding V.* The Court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and co-operative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.

In this connection upon all the evidence it appears:

(1) The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

(2) The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual co-operation and not unity of command. Co-operation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

(3) A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.

The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii,

which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions. They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the antisabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know which degree of alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.

That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.

In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual co-operation, of joint command, was not working effectively—it failed.

War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be unity of command. However, it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.

I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack. The evidence supports the conclusion that the attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer.

(e) *Court of Inquiry Finding VI.* This states in substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

(f) *Court of Inquiry Finding VII.* The Court finds that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.

The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct. Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that:

(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the war plans;

(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.

[*81*] (g) *Court of Inquiry Finding VIII.* This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the ships of the Fleet in port had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.

(h) *Court of Inquiry Finding IX.* The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.

The Second Endorsement states that the Court has overstressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes; that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal; that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could; that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened, that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.

(i) *Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX.* Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his duties.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.

(j) *Court of Inquiry Finding X.* This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.

(k) *Court of Inquiry Finding XI.* The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.

In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.

(l) *Court of Inquiry Finding XII.* The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."

It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by

the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In this testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:

"Q. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"A. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." . . .

"Q. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

"A. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"Q. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

"A. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

It is to be noted further that the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb" and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral [82] Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese carriers.

In view of the foregoing, I do approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander of Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

(m) *Court of Inquiry Finding XIII.* It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of the available planes was not justified.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular

cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December.

In addition to these comments, with which I concur the following points may be noted:

(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long-range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.

(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

(3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long-range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

(5) There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

(6) The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

(7) If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sector probably would have been searched.

(8) The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

(n) *Court of Inquiry Finding XIV.* This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.

The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least an hour's warning of the attack.

(o) *Court of Inquiry Finding XV.* This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.

The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in restrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which this Court of Inquiry seems to rest its findings is the further finding that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's findings. This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded led by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13–15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11–12.

The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required

no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.

It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.

Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.

In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.

(p) *Court of Inquiry XVI.* The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving [*83*] the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Phillippines or Guam, was a possibility.

The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "*A surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility . . ."

It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

The Court refers in its findings to a part of a personal letter sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.

(q) *Court of Inquiry Finding XVII.* The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.

In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would be ccompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, not all of which was available to Admiral Kimmel.

It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the "war warning" of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by

Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates.

The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Phillippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, indicated, however, that on December 1 there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that on the basis of all information up to December 2, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.

(r) *Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX.* These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information in his possession constitutes a military error.

The comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington.

The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.

With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.

During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. From this evidence the following conclusions appear:

(1) Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army Intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war.

(2) The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy departments was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to Intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had [84] information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

(3) The information obtained by the Navy Department was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

(4) Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all

important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, certain information indicating the imminence of an attack by the Japanese that was available at Washington on the morning of December 7th, were unfortunate.

(5) Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(6) The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.

10. From the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt it appears that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu but no information was obtained prior to December 7 which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

11. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that that disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.

That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.

(a) The destructive potentiality of air torpedo attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.

(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army and the Navy, in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.

(c) Within the Navy itself, conduct of the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and matériel programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operation the undi-

vided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.

In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack, would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.

12. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.

(a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement on the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:

(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was a definite step toward breaking relations;

(2) Certain information indicating Japanese interest as to the disposition of the ships within Pearl Harbor;

(3) In failing to appreciate the significance of the information which he received on the morning of 7 December indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. and in failing to transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available;

(4) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communication sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the [85] sense of mounting intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.

I concur generally with these.

Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941. Although it was not known on 6 December precisely when or where the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time. On the morning of December 7 by 10:30 Admiral Stark had information indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.

(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph (5) (b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific islands.

In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941

should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reinforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing and other commanders of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against submarine attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him, viz.:

> (1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers; (2) He could have rotated the "in port" period of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port; (3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.

The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practical precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

> (a) Establishment of long-distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
>
> (b) Establishment of a higher condition of antiaircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
>
> (c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage-control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
>
> (d) Installation of antitorpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
>
> (e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.
>
> (f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.
>
> (g) Checking with Army as to readiness of antiaircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.

The evidence indicates clearly, however, that Admiral Kimmel's most serious omission was his failure to conduct long-range air and/or sea reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt.

The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the Aircraft Warning Service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.

During the critical period after November 27, the limitations of the Aircraft Warning Service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air and/or sea reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings would have had

a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.

In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase co-operation between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the [86] record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.

13. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Naval Court record concludes that:

> "6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
>
> "7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."
>
> The first endorsement of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy states his conclusion and recommendation that trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence produced.

14. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto; and the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt, and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:

(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.

(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold B. Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.

(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.

(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made to the extent that such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

15. Accordingly, I direct:

(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made to the extent that such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN

AUGUST 30, 1945.

I have read it [the Pearl Harbor reports] very carefully, and I came to the conclusion that the whole thing is the result of the policy which the country itself pursued. The country was not ready for preparedness. Every time the President made an effort to get a preparedness program through the Congress, it was stifled. Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of preparedness, he was vilified for doing it. I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.

EXHIBIT NO. 182

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

1 January–1 July 1941

Prepared by G–2, War Department



CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

January 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Status of Language Officers in Japan.

1. Attached is a paraphrase of a radiogram of November 29, 1940, from the Military Attache in Tokyo concerning the status of language officers attached to the Embassy. This matter has been taken up with the State Department. It is not believed that there is any real danger of internment of these officers, should diplomatic relations be severed, because of the large number of Japanese officers in this country who would be subject to reciprocal treatment. On the other hand, the Japanese Embassy has four Assistant Military Attaches, and we have but one in Tokyo. We could quite properly appoint three of our language officers in Japan Assistant Military Attaches, which would give them diplomatic status and somewhat improve their living conditions. The State Department concurs in this line of action. The agreement of the Japanese Government is not required.

2. Action recommended.

The Secretary of War directs that orders be issued detailing Captain G. Stanton Babcock, Cavalry, Captain William J. Verbeck, Infantry, and Captain Stuart Wood, Field Artillery, as Assistant Military Attaches to Japan in addition to their present duties as language officers.

Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

1 Encl. 1

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CONFIDENTIAL

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

APPROVED

By order of the Secretary of War

WM. BRYDEN

Deputy Chief of Staff

[Signed] WALTER B. SMITH

Lt. Col., Gen. Sec., W.D.G.S.

CHIEF OF STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

1940 DEC OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL., INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT
IC 2483-286
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CONFIDENTIAL RADIO 29 NOVEMBER 29, 1940, No. 425, FROM MILITARY ATTACHE, TOKYO, TO MILID

Complying with the request of G-2 for expression of opinion I am informed by the Embassy that should diplomatic relations be severed the language officers would not be entitled to diplomatic immunity and would thus be liable to internment. Request Department of State be consulted with a view to making the language officers' position stronger by their restoration to the diplomatic list or by assigning these officers as Assistant Military Attaches. or by providing them with such other designation as will serve to prevent their possible internment. In this connection note should be taken of the number of officers in Washington from Japan who have been assigned following a short period of duty as language officers to duty as Assistant Military Attaches in Washington.

Creswell

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G-2/2342-190

G-2
CHS-SRB

January 24, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Southward movement of a portion of the Japanese Fleet.

1. The following is the substance of a report dated January 23, 1941 from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations:

A Japanese task force comprising 4 heavy cruisers, 2 aircraft carriers, 1 seaplane tender, 1 light cruiser and 16 destroyers is under orders to proceed to the Southward or to French Indo-China.

A landing operation, against light opposition, to seize an advanced base seems to be indicated.

It is possible that an attempt will be made to seize a base in southern Indo-China, probably Camranh Bay. An alternative possibility is a move against the Dutch in the vicinity of Kalumbaru Bay.

2. G-2 concedes the possibilities outlined above but offers the opinion that a more probable reason for the organization of this force was to put pressure (if needed) on the French authorities in Indo-China to bring about a cessation of hostilities between Thailand and French Indo-China. (See Confidential Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, No. 88, dated January 22, 1941.)

Fk

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copies to:
Sec. of War
Sec. of State
CNO

JAN 24 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD SECTION COPY

O-2/242-103 January 27, 1941.

I. B. No. 17

BRIEF CURRENT APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION

Revision No. 1

Copy No. 1 to Mr. McCloy, Office of the Secretary of War
Copy No. 2 to the Chief of Staff - sent in envelope Jan 31/41 - OMC
Copy No. 3 to the Record Section
Copy No. 4 to Branch Headquarters
Copy No. 5 to Aviation Section
Copy No. 6 to Balkans and Near East Section
Copy No. 7 to British Empire Section
Copy No. 8 to Central European Section
Copy No. 9 to Eastern European Section
Copy No. 10 to Far Eastern Section
Copy No. 11 to Latin American Section
Copy No. 12 to Western European Section
Copy No. 13 to Envelope in Folder - spare
Copy No. 14 to " " " "

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G-2/242-103
Copy No. 4.

Revision 1.
23 January, 1941.

IB #17

BRIEF CURRENT APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION

1. The three outstanding factors in the present situation are: (a) German military initiative; (b) Indeterminate political relations between Germany, U.S.S.R. and Japan; and (c) Morale.

(a) German Military Initiative: Germany retains the military initiative which she has held since the beginning of the war. Her land forces have not been actively engaged since June. Her air forces have only been partially engaged against England - her full air power has not yet been used. Her submarine forces have probably been used to their full extent and are still being so used. Her surface fleet, small in numbers but of considerable potential raiding value, has not yet been used to any large extent. Germany can use her military initiative with great, if not overwhelming effect in any part of Europe, and possibly also in North Africa or the British Isles. It is the most powerful concentration of disposable land and air forces, both quantitatively and relatively, the world has ever seen.

(b) Temporarily Stable Political Relations Between Germany, U.S.S.R. and Japan: Japan signed up as a full member of the Axis on September 27, 1940. The Soviet Prime Minister, Molotov, went to Berlin on November 12, 1940 under a German publicity build-up which indicated immediate and far-reaching political readjustments. Japan has as yet shown little indication of willingness to play her obvious part in the Axis--to attack the British Empire in the East and to draw off or to divert the potential military power of the United States. She has, on the contrary, shown considerable hesitancy in playing her hand, except in Thailand where she has encouraged the Thailandese to harass and to attack French Indo-China. There are good indications that she cannot entirely rid herself of her fear of the Soviets and that she is still uncertain as to the ultimate outcome of the war, and hence of her best long-term policy with regard to it. Japan recently renewed her fisheries

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agreement with the U.S.S.R. for a period of one year instead of five, as proposed by her. As a possible result of Molotov's visit to Berlin, on January 10 three Soviet-German accords were signed—economic, political and boundary—which indicated that Soviet-German relations are stable for the time being and that there is no probability of an attack upon either of these countries by the other. It appears probable that in case Germany moves into Turkey that the U.S.S.R. will remain neutral.

(c) Morale: The factor of morale, both military and national, has attained a value in this war even greater than Napoleon's evaluation of 3 to 1 over material. The fall of France, a first-class military power, within a few weeks, was very largely due to national and military morale debased to an unforeseen degree. This factor also accounts for the unpredictable defeat of the Italians at the hands of the Greeks, and to a certain extent with their defeat by the British in North Africa. On the other hand, an amazingly strong national morale in Great Britain has enabled the British to withstand intense bombardment and severe shipping losses. It also probably accounts to some extent for the failure of the Germans to attempt invasion last fall. The American policy of all-out aid to the democracies will undoubtedly have a considerable and an increasing effect in raising the high morale of those countries, and in still further lowering the morale of Italy. The morale of Germany is still high; but the prospect of facing a long war, made possible through American aid to her enemies, may in time have a serious effect on German morale.

2. The Defense of the British Isles.

This is the primary military consideration in the existing situation. The fall of those Islands would profoundly affect every country now engaged or potentially engaged in the war, and might well decide the ultimate outcome of the war. There are three possible ways by which the British Isles can be conquered: (a) by aerial bombardment, (b) by shipping losses and (c) by invasion.

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(a) Aerial Bombardment: So far the German aerial attack, now at the end of its sixth month, has not succeeded, either through subduing British will to resist or through a crippling degree of material losses. It has probably reduced British production of essential war material by something in the order of 20% to 30% of what it otherwise might have been. It has further caused a very considerable and accumulative damage to the essential facilities of life—transportation, water, gas and electric power, sewerage, and, to some extent, housing. Through this and other causes, British war production has probably reached its peak. The aerial attack has not been made with the full air force at the disposal of Germany. There is some question whether Germany can afford to risk full air attack on Britain, in view of her need to retain air supremacy on the Continent. But her air force is growing, and she may be expected to increase materially its use against Britain. In view of the customary waterlogged condition of secondary French and Belgian airfields prior to April 15, a full-out attack on Great Britain by the German Air Force prior to that date is contingent upon building concrete runways which may or may not have been done. Toxic gases have not yet been used. This also must be expected in an all-out German attack on Britain. What the effect will be of materially increased German air attack or the use of toxic gases on congested British cities cannot be predicted.

(b) Shipping Losses: The continued defense of Britain is dependent on receipt of large supplies of food for the people and of material essential to its war industries. Considerable shipping is also required in other war theaters by that far-flung Empire. The shipping losses to date have been serious: they are not, though they might become, critical. The Germans are believed to have approximately seventy submarines in commission. Their production of submarines, though known to have been slowed up, may still reach a seriously high figure. Their submarine warfare is greatly aided by air reconnaissance and bombing attack, and by the enormous extent of the submarine and air bases, from Northern Norway to the Spanish border, now available to them.

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Their attack on the British shipping is rendered more effective by the inability of the British to use Irish ports for anti-submarine operations, and by the ability of the Germans to use surface raiders to some extent. British shipping losses materially decreased in the month of December. The British are still believed to have approximately 5,000,000 tons of ocean-going shipping over and above a minimum required to sustain the British Isles and to carry on the war at its present tempo. They are also believed to be capable of building approximately 1,200,000 tons of ocean-going shipping per year. The British losses in ocean-going shipping for the calendar year 1940 are believed to have been approximately 3,190,000 tons. It is quite possible that the shipping losses in 1941 may be very much higher than those in 1940; but, unless this occurs, the figures indicate that the British Isles cannot be starved out by shipping losses within the next year, and before considerable American tonnage may be available to them.

(c) Invasion: A German invasion in great strength is an ever-present threat to the British Isles. Such a military operation would be of unprecedented difficulty. The British have 1,650,000 regular troops, fairly well equipped, with prepared defenses, relatively strong naval forces and about 1,800,000 Home Guards. The success of the Germans would almost certainly be dependent on their attainment of practically complete air superiority over vital areas. But the attainment of such air superiority is a distinct possibility. Furthermore, the Germans have a great advantage in being able to launch overseas expeditionary forces from a broad base, approximately 600 miles in length, from the western tip of Brittany to the Frisian Islands. From these bases, expeditionary forces would have relatively short sea-transits to England. The Germans also have another base line, of approximately the same length, north from Esden along the Norwegian coast; but from this line they would have considerably longer sea-transits. They also have the

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possibility of attack on Ireland by sea or air, but also over a considerable sea distance. An invasion of Britain in some form, and probably in great strength, is certainly indicated by the extensive German preparations for it, and still more by the fact that that operation alone offers the possibility of immediate and decisive success.

(d) To sum up the defense of Britain:- Any one of the three forms of attack above discussed may lead to German success. Aerial bombardment may break the British will to resist if the force of the German attack is materially increased or if toxic gas is extensively used. Nevertheless British morale is high, and the success of German aerial attack must be rated as by no means certain, no matter what form or itensity that attack may take. British shipping losses are serious but not critical, and the experience figures of the past year do not indicate that they will be critical during the present year. An invasion of Britain is a most difficult military operation, though possible at all times, and probable as the summer approaches. Its success must be rated as problematical.

3. The Mediterranean Theater: So far, Axis operations in this theatre have been left to the Italians. They have shown signal incompetence on land, sea and air. Their morale is at a low ebb and can be expected to fall still lower. The British control the Eastern Mediterranean, including the Suez and the Red Sea approaches thereto, with a good base at Alexandria and important strategic outposts in Greece, Cyprus, the Levant and Lybia. They also hold, though somewhat shakily, the Western Mediterranean from their base at Gibraltar. The Middle Sea is largely dominated by the Axis, in spite of the British outpost at Malta. The Germans are pushing considerable air forces into Italy and the Italian islands. They can also rapidly send land forces into Italy. German air forces based on Sicily and Sardinia can, and probably will enormously strengthen the Axis hold on the

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Middle Sea, and may make possible the secure transport of German land forces to Tripoli or to Tunis. Such forces, supporting the considerable Italian Army still in Lybia, would probably again throw the British on the defensive in Egypt and might possibly seriously threaten the British hold on Alexandria and the Suez. It is also possible that a major German land offensive might be launched at the end of this winter, through Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, to the Suez. Such a major offensive would be largely dependent on the security of the German flank vis-a-vis U.S.S.R. and on the resistance to be expected from Turkey; at the present it appears probable that there is nothing to fear from the U.S.S.R. In any event, it would be a long and difficult operation, flanked by British air bases in Cyprus and in Iraq. German occupation of the Iberian Peninsula would present only logistic difficulties and is to be expected. Gibraltar would be rendered untenable as a naval base, but could not be taken except by extended siege.

4. The Far East: The Japanese Army is very largely engaged in the Chinese war and held in Manchukuo by potential Soviet hostility. The Japanese Navy and much of the Air Force is disposable. Economically Japan is very weak. All factions in her government are not united behind the bold course which the European war opens to her. The southward expansion would, from the short view, come up against the considerable resistance of which the British and Dutch are capable in Singapore and Java, and, from the long view, the much more serious question of American and British sea and air power at the end of this war. The probabilities are that Chinese resistance will be continued, and that neither the U.S.S.R. nor Japan will commit itself to irrevocable lines of policy or action in the Far East until the ultimate outcome of the European war seems clear to them.

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By authority A. C. of S., G-2

Date 1/29/41 (R.S.B.)

Initials

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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CHB/mrb

I. B. 20

January 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Subject: G-2 Estimate of the Situation - Alaska.

In compliance with request contained in Secret Memorandum WPD (4397-2) dated January 18, 1941, the following is submitted as a G-2 Estimate of the Situation - Alaska.

1. It is assumed that the United States has entered the war as an ally of Great Britain, and Japan has come into the war against the United States. The corollary to this assumption, from Japan's point of view, is that while our main effort is being made in the immediately vital area, Europe and the northern Atlantic, Japan must secure her own position in the Pacific. She must realize that, unless the Anglo-American alliance is decisively defeated, she must eventually face it, plus China and probably the U.S.S.R.

2. Under the above assumptions the action of Japan with respect to operations against Alaska is estimated as follows:

Taking the long view, the possibility that she may eventually have to face the Anglo-American alliance, Japan's primary mission in war would be to defend and protect her vital area against superior air and naval forces. This vital area is centered on the Island of Honshu, and the Inland Sea is, from the standpoint of the Japanese fleet, the strategic nerve center from which this may be accomplished. Within that area lie safety, maintenance, supply, secrecy, the ability to strike outward in several directions, and coordinated agencies to assist in wearing down any attacking foe. It is the strategic, impregnable area dominating all Japanese waters and the sea routes along the Asiatic Coast.

To move in force to the North Pacific would be to give up all the above listed advantages without any corresponding gain. Hence it is not believed that Japan has plans for use of the Aleutian Islands or the Alaska Peninsula or of Alaska for primary fleet operations against the United States, but this does not preclude plans for minor operations.

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RECORD SECTION

#420102

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In the first phase of the war, however, and if unopposed, Japan can reasonably be expected to occupy the Aleutian Islands, the Alaska Peninsula, and other undefended portions of Alaska with special reference to Southeastern Alaska. She may be expected to do this immediately upon the outbreak of war, with not less than a division reinforced with aviation, antiaircraft artillery, submarines and small craft.

This action would be taken for two reasons: (1), in the first phase of the war, to provide Japan with light naval, submarine, and air bases from which to raid and attack United States commerce and its northwestern ports, and to strike by stealth at our main fleet if still in the Pacific; (2), in preparation for a second and, for her, a far more serious phase of the war, she must deny the use of the Aleutian Islands to the United States as a base from which to launch an attack on Japan proper.

If opposed, the kind and quality of such opposition will be the determining factor in the situation.

With our fleet in the Atlantic and our Alaska Defense Force in its present state of organization and equipment, the Japanese would probably attempt to seize and hold the Aleutians and perhaps the Alaska Peninsula and Southeastern Alaska as outlined above.

If our fleet should be kept in the Pacific and if our defenses of Alaska were completed and at war strength, it is highly improbable that any such attempt would be made.

Between these two extreme conditions lie many variations.

In any case, in a war with Japan we may expect naval raids and surprise attacks against Pacific ports of the mainland as well as against Alaska.

In answer to the specific questions contained in your Secret Memorandum dated January 18, 1941, the following is submitted:

"b. Will Japan operate against Alaska?

"(1) In winter) Season of the year will not be
In summer) a determining factor. Each season offers certain advantages and disadvantages. The pivotal consideration is who gets there first with effective forces.

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"(2) With parachute troops? No.
With air infantry? No.
With air bombs? Yes.
With naval forces? Yes.

"(3) While the United States Fleet is:

In the Hawaiian waters?) Much less likely in
In the Atlantic?) the former case than in the latter, but not improbable in either case if our Alaskan defenses have not been completed.

"c. If Japan does operate against Alaska,

(1) What would be her objectives?" Primarily to deny us the use of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska as bases from which, eventually, to launch an attack on Japan proper; secondarily to provide Japan with light naval, submarine and air bases from which to make immediate raids on our commerce and northwestern ports, and to strike by stealth at such naval forces as we may then have in the Pacific.

"(2) What strength forces will she employ?" Not less than a reinforced division plus composite air and light naval units.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

td

MARTIN EXECUTIVE OFFICE G-2 U.S. 1941

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4120104

WPD 4297-2

SECRET WPD
By authority of A.C. of S, WPD
1/17/41 A.D.
Date Initials

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

1-17 242-107

January 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Subject: G-2 Estimate of the Situation — Alaska.

1. It is requested that War Plans Division be furnished with a G-2 Estimate of the Situation, based on the following assumptions and conditions:

a. The United States has entered the war as an ally of Great Britain, and Japan has come into the war against the United States.

b. Under the above assumptions, will Japan operate against Alaska —

(1) In winter,
In summer?

(2) With parachute troops,
With air infantry,
With air bombs,
With naval forces?

(3) While the U.S. Fleet is —
In the Hawaiian waters,
In the Atlantic?

c. If Japan does operate against Alaska —

(1) What would be her objectives?

(2) What strength forces will she employ?

L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

fmm

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. JAN 18 1941

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

CONFIDENTIAL

Far Eastern Section
January 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MASON:

SUBJECT: Report of Japanese Intention to Attack Pearl Harbor.

Ambassador Grew, (Tokyo) informed the State Department January 27, 1941, that his Peruvian colleague had stated to him that the Japanese are planning a "mass attack" on Pearl Harbor. His information came from a variety of Japanese sources. Ambassador Grew concedes that the idea appears fantastic but passes the report on for what it may be worth.

R. S. BRATTON
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
21 1941
10568-40
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G-2/10568-40

G-2
CHM/RSB WAR DEPARTMENT

I. B. 29

February 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, W.P.D.:

Subject: Japanese attempts to secure virulent strains of yellow fever virus.

1. On January 31, 1941, Lieut. Col. James S. Simmons, Medical Corps, Office of the Surgeon General, brought to G-2 certain correspondence he had had on the above subject with Dr. J. H. Bauer, International Health Division, Rockefeller Foundation.

2. Colonel Simmons, in presenting this correspondence, stated that there was evidence therein which led him to believe that the Japanese are endeavoring to obtain virulent strains of yellow fever virus for the purpose of waging bacterial warfare.

3. The Military Intelligence Division concurs in Colonel Simmons' belief and is taking steps, through proper agencies, to prevent any of the known supplies of virulent strains of yellow fever virus from falling into Japanese or other totalitarian hands, through undercover activities or theft. The Surgeon General has taken steps to prevent any supplies being acquired by the Axis powers through purchase or other open means.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

td

Copy for Deputy Chief of Staff

#120137

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD SECTION COPY

SECRET

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 2/5/41 Initials

G-2/2657-288

WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence Division G-2
Washington
I. B. 31

G-2

February 5, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Brief Estimate of the Strategic Situation.

1. The War.

a. Germany with 220 Divisions, 750 Squadrons (11,000 first line planes), 120 submarines, is concentrated on interior lines with her homeland surrounded by buffer states. The strategic initiative is hers. With Japan an ally tending to counterbalance Russia and America, with Italy still an effective deflector of enemy forces, with the economic and political assets of the Danubian countries within her control, Germany has a clear field to attack.

b. Britain with its equivalent of 68 Divisions, 170 Squadrons (3,100 first line planes), 368 warships, is dispersed on exterior lines with her homeland the theater of combat and encircled by hostile regions available for assault positions. She is perforce on the defensive. Without an aggressive ally, except as the United States is such, she is subject to Japanese coercion in the Far East, to opposition in India and South Africa; yet her Empire remains essentially intact and determined.

2. The Battle for Britain. It is well known that the unrelieved defense must succumb to the persistent offense provided the assault is on converging lines, with superior forces, with increasing intensity, without regard for losses, by skilled leaders of coordinated units with special devices for special needs and utilizing the element of surprise.

These are all characteristics of the present German Army. Whether it has them in sufficient intensity to overcome British doggedness deficiently prepared is the question. That question according to evidence now accumulating is likely to be answered by the launching of a general Axis offensive within the next 90 days—probably sooner than later. Bolatia Invasion is still likely with the Germans

3. The Battle of the Mediterranean. This is a flanking operation of secondary import having some influence but no dominating effect on the Battle for Britain.

4. The Battle of the Far East. Here the Chinese hold most of the Japanese Army deployed and preoccupied. The Japanese Navy however is unhampered in the South China Sea, where it now begins the initial operations of Japanese expansion into this region.

5. The Peace.

a. Russia draws closer to Germany with thoughts of further advances into Finland and the seizing for Communism of opportunities arising from the three conflicts.

b. Native India seeks freedom.

c. The United States in her unpreparedness and through her current relationships to the belligerents finds herself open to offensive reprisals. Evidence accumulates that such reprisals in the form of "fifth column" activities within and between the nations of Western Hemisphere are likely to become acute as the Battle of Britain approaches.

#120138

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SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Distribution:

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
INTEL. DIV.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE, SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF

23140-65

DISPOSITION SLIP

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject of paper: _____

To	TALLY No.	DATE
____	Office, The Ass't Sec. of War	
____	Adm. Ass't S/W	
____	A. C. of S., G–1	
✓	A. C. of S., G–2	2/19/41
____	A. C. of S., G–3	
____	A. C. of S., G–4	
____	A. C. of S., W. P. D	
____	The Adjutant General	
____	Budget & Legislative Planning Branch	
____	Statistics Branch	
____	Executive for Reserve Affairs	
____		

For—

____ Necessary action. ____ Draft of reply.
____ Preparation of study. ____ Direct reply.
____ Note and return. ✓ Note and file.
____ Remark and recommendation. ____ File.
____ Comment or concurrence. ____ Signature.
____ Inviting attention to {notation / direction} of Sec. War D. C. of S.

C/S has noted this and
will see it.

REC'D Executive Office C-2, W.D.G.S. FEB 20 1941

By direction of D. C. of S.:

Mrs. Robinson
To the G.S.

WAR DEPARTMENT
O. C. of S.—Form No. 8 3—10116 28

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR 18 1941
2340-65
WAR DEPARTMENT

SECRET

G-2/2340-65

February 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: British pressure for American naval aid at Singapore.

1. The British staff conferees have repeatedly emphasized that Singapore is, in their view, the key to the strategic situation and must be held against Japanese attack. At their meeting yesterday they presented strong arguments for the dispatch of an American force of four heavy cruisers to Singapore.

2. Within the past four days similar pressure has apparently been exerted by the British, or through British influence, from Tokyo, Vichy and London. A long dispatch was sent by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on February 7, in which he indicated that the Japanese will attack Singapore and repeated the British thesis that "the importance of Singapore to Britain is fundamental." He urged American assistance to prevent the fall of Singapore. On February 8 our Embassy at Vichy repeated French intelligence from the Far East, through the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, also indicating the imminence of a Japanese move to the south. The French Minister stated that he formerly felt the Japanese were merely bluffing, but now he is sure they are in earnest.

3. Yesterday a long dispatch was received from our Military Attache in London stating that one of his assistants was confidentially informed, presumably by the British War Office, that the Japanese attack was imminent and intimating strongly that we should send naval assistance.

4. It is difficult to believe that all of this pressure, coming almost simultaneously from Tokyo, Vichy, London and Washington is coincidental, or indeed that the various reports are founded on any definite indications of the imminence of a Japanese attack on Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. The reports quoted in the London dispatch of the 10th, regarding

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Japanese concentrations and merchant shipping pool, are probably correct, and were known to us some time ago. The British interpretation of these reports, as indicating the imminence of a Japanese attack, is, however, still questionable. It all looks very like concerted British pressure on us to commit ourselves in the Far East — a pressure that has been applied rather consistently during the past three months.

3. It should also be noted that the London dispatch of the 10th stated that Mr. Hopkins was returning to the United States with the full British view on this subject, and that the latter had also been communicated to Lord Halifax and to our State Department through our Embassy.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

td

Copies to: Secretary of War
War Plans Division

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31

CONFIDENTIAL

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2342-191
APR
WAR DEPARTMENT
G-2
CMB-TSB

G-2/2342-191 I. B. 36

February 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Subject: Japanese landing operations.

1. Landing operations have, for some time, been part of the peacetime tactical training of Japanese Divisions. During the course of the war with China which started in July 1937, ample opportunity has been afforded various Japanese units to perfect the technique of this operation under service conditions so that today it follows a pattern tried and tested by war.

2. The tactics and technique of Japanese landing operations are as given in the attached extract from the Digest of Military Information - Japan, Confidential (see Tab 1).

3. It will be noted that the Japanese have had complete air and naval supremacy in all their landing operations in China. While it is improbable that under present conditions Japan would have complete air and naval superiority in any attack on the Hawaiian Islands or Panama, it is highly probable that she would have them in any surprise attack on the Philippines or Alaska.

4. Considerable detailed information of methods of defending against enemy landings used by other countries, especially the British in the present situation, is available in this Division.

5. As the defense plans of the overseas possessions are your staff responsibility, your recommendations are requested as to what use should be made of the information outlined above in connection with those defense plans and the training and equipment of the troops involved.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Inclosure Notebook in FE

Copies to:
Deputy Chief of Staff
G-3

FEB 20 1941

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G-2

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 25 1941
242-112
WAR DEPARTMENT

February 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Military cooperation with China.

1. The Military Attache of the Chinese Embassy, Colonel Teh-Chuan Kuo, has made an informal, though strong recommendation, that discussion be initiated between his office and some War Department agency for the purpose of coordinating the actions of the Chinese Army with those of any possible American military or naval activities in that area.

2. Colonel Kuo stated that his Government was very desirous of such cooperation and that discussions could be initiated at any time the United States Government desired.

3. This memorandum is furnished for information only. No reply has been made to Colonel Kuo, and none is necessary.

Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

TLC/lrd

NOTED BY C. S. FEB 2 1941

Copy to War Plans Division.

SECRET
By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date FEB 20 1941 (TLC)
Initials

NOTED BY C. S. FEB 2 1941

NOTED BY C. S. FEB 24 1941

32

CONFIDENTIAL

2657-H-519
4
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2
CHM/RSB

G-2/2657-H-519 I.B. 39

February 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Subject: Japanese Bacteriological and Parachute Troops.

1. This Division has information from the Commanding General Philippine Department, considered by the latter as highly reliable, to the effect that:

a. A bacteriological warfare battalion is attached to each of the 5th and 9th Chemical Warfare Regiments Japanese Army;

b. Two hundred fully trained Japanese parachute troops arrived at Taiping Cheung airdrome (in Southeast China) on December 18, 1940.

2. Although no such units as the 5th and 9th Chemical Warfare Regiments, Japanese Army, have as yet been identified by G-2, the Division is inclined to concur in General Grunert's evaluation of the information contained in 1 a. above. In this connection see I.B. 39, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, February 5, 1941, subject Japanese Attempts to Secure Virulent Strains of Yellow Fever Virus.

3. The information contained in 1 b. above is in all probability factual, as G-2 has reliable information from a number of other sources to the effect that parachute training is being conducted in the Japanese Army. It is estimated that from 1,500 to 2,000 troops have been so trained to date.

4. As the defense plans of our overseas possessions are your staff responsibility, your recommendations are requested as to what use should be made of the information outlined above in connection with those defense plans and the training and equipment of the

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CONFIDENTIAL

troops involved.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

mailed FEB 26 1941

CC:
Deputy Chief of Staff
G-3
Surgeon General
Chief, Chemical Warfare Service

sub

MAILED EXECUTIVE OFFICE U.S. FEB 26 7:1 NCM

CONFIDENTIAL 7 12

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Wnt Hqd SCW
G-2
original to SW

G-2/242-109

February 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Use of Military Intelligence in the conduct of war.

1. As I reported to you verbally this morning, I fear that our conduct of war, should we become involved, will be unduly influenced by two factors:

(a) British over-confidence and complacency,
(b) Naval preoccupation with plans against Japan.

2. I am convinced, from my experience in Europe during this war, that the Allied disasters were largely attributable to an over-confidence which went to the extent of ignoring their own military intelligence. While in England I was repeatedly told by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that the German Army was in many respects seriously inefficient, that there were bad cracks in the morale of the German people and that he had no doubts as to the successful outcome of military operations once the Allies came to grips with the German Army. Other high British Army and Air authorities repeatedly stated that the British and French Air Forces were rapidly overtaking the German Air Force in numbers of planes. In France, late in April, I saw the heads of the French Army. Their attitude was much the same as that of the British Army Chiefs. General George, in particular, explained in detail on the maps his plan for the Allied advance into Belgium and subsequent active operations against the German Army, which he viewed with confidence.

3. I cannot believe that Allied Intelligence was so hopelessly bad as to have justified in any way this great overconfidence. I have had a recent opportunity to check this with General Beaumont-Nesbitt, who was Director of Military Intelligence in the War Office until he came here last month with Lord Halifax. He knew better than British war direction would indicate.

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(2-27-41) (3) WDMID 3847

4. In December this Division submitted estimates on the German Air Force which have been seriously questioned by high officials of our Government. Only yesterday the President stated that the figures on the German Air Force which he had received from the British were about half of G-2's. We have checked and rechecked our figures, and confidently believe in them. Naval Intelligence also supports them. Day before yesterday a cable was received from our military attache in Berlin which gives an estimate of 12,500 first line planes and a hundred per cent reserve. This is 13 per cent in excess of our figures. In view of the lamentable results of Allied over-confidence, I believe it would be disastrous for us to accept the British rather than our own estimates of German strength.

5. It would probably be still more disastrous for us to base our conduct of war on British estimates of the situation, whether those estimates be world-wide or confined to a specific theater.

6. The supreme confidence of the British in their ability to defend the British Isles and the vital sea lanes of those Isles is having a marked effect, both in the Staff Conferences now under way and in their political representations for naval support at Singapore. In spite of the directives governing the Staff Conferences, which specify the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean areas as the main theaters of operation, the Conference has spent at least three-quarters of its time discussing strategy and operations in the Western Pacific and in the Malaysian theater. British over-confidence as to the security of the United Kingdom results in an influence which parallels that of our Navy's preoccupation concerning the Japanese Fleet. At yesterday's meeting of the Conference the American naval conferees went so far as to state that no considerable naval reinforcements would be sent into the Atlantic until the question of Japanese entry into the war had been decided. This would result in the whole of our main force being held on the other side of the world by merely a Japanese <u>threat</u> of participation in the war and as a deterrent to such participation. And the British appear to accept this thesis, at least so far as the security of the United Kingdom is concerned.

7. In sum, I believe the War Department faces serious danger of having its plans deflected by British estimates of the situation which are totally at variance with its own estimates but which are supported by the Navy's preoccupation with Japan.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

SECRET -2-

OCI/7-1090-21

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CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

To Sec. of War
10.8.41

March 7, 1941

MAR 28 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. 2657-244 4 WAR DEPARTMENT

Memorandum to Chief of Staff

Spanish Estimate of Situation

1. Herewith memorandum prepared by Secretary Welles dated February 19, on the Spanish estimate of the situation (date unstated), as transmitted through the British Ambassadors at Madrid and Washington.

2. The value of this data lies in the presumption that it comes from General Franco after his conversations with Mussolini and Petain. In sum, it is to the effect that

a. Immediate attack by Japan upon Hongkong and Singapore.

b. German attack in April against Greece and the Dardanelles.

c. All-out German attack on England at the end of March, with actual invasion late in May or early in June.

d. German invasion of Spain in May or June.

e. The USSR will neither help nor hinder the Germans.

f. Spain refuses to cooperate with either Italy or Germany.

3. It may also be noted that General Franco's estimate of the German air strength corresponds very closely to ours—10,000 planes in front line, 10,000 reserve.

4. The subject memorandum was written by Secretary Welles on February 19th but reached us only today. I'm having discreet inquiries made in the State Department regarding this delay.

Noted by S/W
3/10/41
Exhib.

Sherman Miles

SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MAR 28 1941
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-244
3
WAR DEPARTMENT

March 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Foreign Liaison Officer, War Department.

FROM: Liaison Officer.

Subject: Plans of the Axis Powers for the Immediate Future.

I enclose for the strictly confidential information of the appropriate officers of your Department a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which took place on February 19 between the British Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State concerning the plans of the Axis Powers for the immediate future.

Orme Wilson
Liaison Officer

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation between the British Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State.

(COPY:U-L:EMA)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Date: February 19, 1941.

Subject: Conversations between Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Spain, and Spanish authorities.

Participants: The British Ambassador, the Right Honorable the Viscount Halifax;
The Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.

Copies to: S, A-B, PA/D, Eu

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Lord Halifax called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador gave me the following information which the British Government had received yesterday from Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Madrid.

Sir Samuel Hoare had learned from the highest Spanish authorities in whom he had confidence that General Franco in his conversations with Mussolini had been informed that the Axis plans for the immediate future were as follows:

1. An attack in the immediate future by Japan upon Hong Kong and Singapore.

2. The German armies early in April would move through Bulgaria against Greece and the Dardanelles.

3. The Soviet Government will neither hinder nor help.

4. The all-out attack on England will take place the end of March. The Germans, General Franco was informed, were stated to have 10, 000 front line planes with one hundred percent reserve. Their plan of attack will be, from the day the final action starts, to keep at least 2,000 planes continuously in the air over England undertaking as much material destruction as possible,

and

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

and that this will be timed with an all-out German submarine offensive to remain in full force around the British Isles in order to destroy all shipping communications. It is the German hope that this will result in pulverization within England and complete isolation of England from the outside world and that thereafter, late in May or early in June, the actual invasion will take place.

5. The Germans have eight divisions and one armored division in occupied France near the Spanish border to attack Spain, but the Spanish authorities believe that there is no actual danger of invasion of Spain before May or June.

The meeting between Mussolini and Franco took place upon the initiative of Mussolini. Sir Samuel Hoare was assured that Franco refused all requests from Mussolini for help from Spain and limited himself to stating that Spain would not compromise her present position of neutrality. It was further stated that Franco had likewise asserted that he would not contemplate any arrangement with Hitler which would alter the status of Spain.

Finally, Sir Samuel Hoare was informed that the conversations between Franco and Pétain had been limited very largely to a discussion of the measures of joint cooperation between Spain and France which might be undertaken for the purpose of resisting increasing German pressure.

U:SW:IJ

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CCD

G-2/2342-190

G-2
OCD

March 7, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, W.P.D.

Subject: Japanese Naval Dispositions.

1. Transmitted herewith a memorandum originating in the Navy Department in reference to Japanese Naval dispositions.

2. As indicated in Paragraph 5 of the Naval communication, the reasons for this concentration are unknown but the joining of the Special Task Force with the Combined Fleet points to a threat or mission which may be considered too great for the former. The following probable actions may be indicated:

a. As a covering force to assist and protect the landing and further occupation of Indo-China in force.

b. A maneuver in the vicinity of the Philippine Islands which may be interpreted as a threat by the United States (this as a sop to the other Axis partners) or a maneuver to test the defense of the line of communication southward or the homeland during major operations in the Singapore-Netherland East Indies area.

c. The movement of a larger naval and military strategic force to Hainan or Formosa for future operations.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure:
Memo for Chief of Naval
Operations from ONI
dated March 5, 1941.

MAR 8 1941

CCD

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COPY

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence

Washington, D. C.

Op-16-F-2

March 5, 1941

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese Naval Dispositions.

References: (a) Memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations on same subject dated February 25, 1941.

1. After juncture was made between the Japanese Special Task Fleet reported in reference and the Combined Fleet in the vicinity of Okinawa Island in the Loochoos, a very large and powerful concentration has gathered in the Bako-Takao area. This force is composed of the following units:

BB-	6	(Battleships)
CA-CL-	24	(Cruisers (heavy and light))
CV-	6	(Aircraft carriers)
DD-	60	(Destroyers)
SS-	42	(Submarines)
AV-	4	(Seaplane carriers)
Auxiliaries-	20	(A good portion transports)
	162	

2. In order to form a concentration of this size and strength, it is evident not only that the Special Task Force has been returned to the Combined Fleet, but that additional units from either or both the Fourth Fleet and forces held in home waters have been added.

3. The China Expeditionary Fleets are held intact, operating in usual areas.

4. Fleet aircraft, reinforced by shore-based aircraft from the Kanoya and Genzan Naval Air Stations and others, are very active in operations connected with this fleet.

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5. It is unlikely that such a strong balanced force, comprising 60-70% of all combatant Japanese naval vessels, should have been assembled purely for training purposes at this critical time. Although it is not to be inferred that this force is unexpected to launch an attack, it is certainly held in a high state of readiness for whatever developments may occur.

O. A. Rood.

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By authority A. C. of S. G-2
Date 3/18/71 (JB)
Initials

G-2/2657-228

G-2
CHM/TJB

I. B. 31-2

March 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Brief Estimate of the Strategic Situation.

1. The Belligerents.

a. Germany with 250 Divisions, 850 Squadrons (12,500 first line planes), 300 submarines, is concentrated on interior lines. The strategic initiative is hers. She and her allies are pressing the British Empire at all points within their reach on a world-wide front, with the main effort exerted against the British Isles.

b. Britain with its equivalent of 68 Divisions, 170 Squadrons (3,100 first line planes), 368 warships, is dispersed on exterior lines, with her homeland part of the theater of combat and partially encircled by hostile assault positions. She is perforce on the defensive. Without an aggressive ally, except insofar as the United States is such, she is subject to Japanese coercion in the Far East, to opposition in India and South Africa. Yet her Empire, encouraged by the repulse of the Italian attack on Egypt and by her own air counter attack, remains essentially intact and determined.

c. Italy, defeated in the Mediterranean, now is receiving active German support. This constitutes a diversion in a theater still secondary, but of import to both Britain and France through their African holdings.

d. Japan, not yet drawn into the main current of the war, finds her ground forces largely contained by China. By means which are primarily political, she is penetrating cautiously into Malaysia, also a secondary theater of operations.

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2. The Non-belligerents.

a. The conquered European nations are resentful but passive.

b. U.S.S.R. continues to work with Germany, but her ultimate decision has not yet been made.

c. Turkey approaches a pivotal position, with involvement of the Middle East to India.

d. Time increases the U.S. menace to Germany. There is presaged an increase in the Axis "fifth column" offensive within and as between the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

3. Possible lines of action open.

a. To Great Britain - the strategic defensive.

b. To Germany - the strategic offensive, to wit:

(1) Naval and aerial siege of Great Britain. This will be prosecuted regardless of other action taken.

(2) Invasion of Great Britain in near future.

(a) Advantages - If successful the war is probably won. Forestalls American assistance.

(b) Disadvantage - A very difficult operation, failure in which would ultimately be decisive.

(3) Control of the Mediterranean, including neutralization of Gibraltar and conquest of Egypt and the Near East, with outbreaks in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and India.

(a) Advantages - Prospects of success favorable. Oil resources attainable. Follows line already adopted of aid to Italy.

(b) Disadvantages - Indecisive. Main effort made in a secondary theater. Great dispersion of forces. Defeat of Britain still necessary, and British strength meanwhile increased. War prolonged.

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(4) Attack on the U.S.S.R.

(a) Advantages - Short-term success practically certain. Political and economic consolidation of continental Europe and permanent accession of economic strength assured, after some considerable delay due to reconstruction.

(b) Disadvantages - Indecisive. Strength accrues to principal opponent, Britain, during breathing spell. War prolonged. Also stoppage of supplies from U.S.S.R. for some considerable time. Great dispersion of forces.

(5) Combination of attack on Britain with an attack in the Mediterranean or on U.S.S.R. Possible as far as accumulated strength is concerned but contrary to German doctrine of concentration on a single objective.

Note: We must beware of slogans. The German doctrine of no-war-on-two-fronts is a military theory applicable to Germany as a relatively small country in Europe, but not necessarily to the greater Reich which must be a world power or nothing. To succeed, the Reich must expand its military power, which may mean a war on several fronts (as happened in the last war) as well as several other obvious disadvantages which dispersion of forces entails. Furthermore, as far as Britain is concerned, it must be remembered that Germany can hold her under air and sea menace without permitting the British Isles to become an active front in land warfare.

4. Conclusions.

Despite recent German activity in the Balkans, it is believed that the most probable line of immediate German action is the evolution of the naval and aerial siege of Great Britain into an attempt to invade that island. This may be done at any time between this date and the middle of May. There is evidence pointing to the launching of this attack, if it is undertaken, early in April. (See Tab A.)

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Five Incls.:
Tab A - The Spring Offensive.
Tab B - The Battle of Britain.
Tab C - A German Attack on the U.S.S.R.
Tab D - The Mediterranean Situation.
Tab E - The Far Eastern Situation.

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By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date MAR 18 1941 (GH)
Initials

PART I

THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

In the Far East, encouraged by recent American measures and pronouncements and by renewed aircraft aid from the U.S.S.R., China continues to resist Japan. There is no evidence that Japan is any nearer the goal of a successful termination of her war in China.

Australia-New Zealand, with potential military man power of one and a quarter millions, have but six divisions, three abroad and three at home. Their naval, air, munitions and coastal defenses arrangements are negligible. They could be a great factor in the Far Eastern situation, now minimized because of unpreparedness. A portion of one Australian division at Singapore, scattering detachments throughout Austro-Asia is the sum of their contribution.

The U.S.S.R. has acceded to Japan's request for an economic agreement, but politically she continues to maintain an attitude of uncompromising and enigmatic aloofness.

The Netherland's Indies Government's attitude toward Japan's economic pressure has stiffened to the extent that Japan feels checkmated on this front, for the present.

To the southwest Japan continues her step by step advance toward a position in readiness from which she can launch an offensive against the Dutch Indies or British Malaya or both.

In setting herself up as a mediator of Indo-Chinese--Thai difficulties she has scored a diplomatic triumph which has increased her prestige in East Asia. She has control of the province of Tongking and of the airdrome at Saigon. There is strong probability that she will also secure control of Cam Ranh Bay, the finest natural harbor on the south Indo-China coast, as a naval base.

From Thailand there is little doubt that Japan will secure access to a network of air bases which, coupled with Cam Ranh Bay, will fulfill her requirements for the next major move.

There is evidence that strong pressure is being put on Japan by Germany to cause her to attack Britain in Asia and involve us in a Pacific War. It is evident, however, that the Japanese Government has no intention of becoming involved to this extent at this time.

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It is probable that, while completing her preparations for an advance further southward, Japan will not actually move until convinced that Germany will be victorious in her onslaught on Britain.

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0-2/10641-374 I.S. 48 C-2
RSB

March 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Appropriate Temporary Grade for the Commanding General, Philippine Department.

I. Discussion.

1. a. This Division is of the belief that strong pressure is being put on Japan by Germany to cause her to attack Britain in Asia, with the ultimate intention of involving us in a Pacific War.

b. While it is evident that the Japanese Government has no intention of becoming involved to this extent at this time, it is probable that she will continue her preparations for an advance further southward against the day she becomes convinced that Germany will be victorious in her onslaught on Britain.

c. The Philippine Islands lie directly in the path of Japan's advance to the southward and the American forces there are in a sense hostages to fortune.

2. The Chief of Staff has recently authorized the strengthening of the Philippine command in personnel, armament and equipment, but has not conferred increased rank upon the Department Commander.

3. This Division is of the belief that military and civilian morale in the Philippines will be greatly improved, our prestige in the Western Pacific area considerably enhanced with consequent deterrence on Japan, if the Department Commander be designated Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces in the Far East with temporary rank as Lieutenant General.

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II. Action recommended.
That the Commanding General, Philippine Department, be given temporary promotion to the grade of Lieutenant General and designated as Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces in the Far East.

III. Concurrences.
A. C. of S., WPD ( )
G-1 ( )

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 28 1941
2610-I-138
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WAR DEPARTMENT
G-2
CHM/RSB

G-2/2610-I-138

I.B. 50

March 25, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Military Assistance to China.

1. Mr. Lauchlin Currie, the President's recent envoy to Chungking, has been contacted by this Division. From this, it appears that the President and the State Department are considering ways and means of giving increased aid to China. This aid may take any or all of the following forms: monetary loans, sale or loan of military supplies and munitions, including combat planes, dispatch to China of American Military and Economic Missions, a so-called "American Air Foreign Legion".

2. This division believes that increasing effective aid to China will serve the interests of our National Defense; that it can be carried out with small risk of involvement in war with Japan; and that it will not materially diminish our aid to Britain. But aid to China should be controlled by the War Department. Such a control could best be effected through a military mission to China headed by a general officer. Mr. Currie stated that Chiang Kai-shek would welcome such a mission. The British now have a major-general and his staff in Chungking. It might be well, however, to avoid the term "Military Mission", usually associated with Allies in a war, and accomplish the same purpose by considerably increasing the personnel of the Military Attache's office in China and heading it by a general officer.

3. Action Recommended. That this Division be authorized to consult the State Department with the view to increasing, with the consent of the Chinese Government, the personnel of the Military Attache Office in China to a total of one Brigadier General (or colonel to be promoted to Brigadier General) and six assistant military attaches.

4. Concurrences.
A. C. of S., G-1 ( )

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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CHM/RSB

G-2/2657-I-463 I.B. 51

March 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: The Chinese Power of Resistance.

1. It is not known what recommendations will be made to the President by Mr. Lauchlin Currie, recent envoy to Chungking. When contacted by this Division on or about March 20th, however, Mr. Currie appeared optimistic over China's chances of winning her war with Japan. It appeared from conversation with Mr. Currie that the President and the State Department are considering ways and means of giving increased aid to China and that this aid may take any or all of the following forms: monetary loans, sale or loan of military supplies and munitions, including combat planes; dispatch to China of American Military and Economic Missions; and a so-called "American Air Foreign Legion."

2. The same optimistic note is sounded in an editorial by Alsop and Kintner on "Lauchlin Currie's Report on China" published in the Washington Post, Tuesday March 25, 1941 (see Tab No. 1).

3. A decidedly less optimistic estimate is given in a report dated January 31, 1941 from the Assistant Military Attache, American Embassy in Chungking. Pertinent extracts of this report are given in Tab No. 2.

4. Both the prospects of increased military aid to China, as indicated in paragraph 1 above, and China's dependence on it, as indicated in paragraph 3 above, would suggest the advisability of War Department influence in determining the kind, amount, and use of such aid.

MAR 28 1941

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Washington Post, March 25, 1941

Capital Parade

By Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner

Lauchlin Currie's Report On China

IN THE FIELD of Far Eastern policy, the past ten days have seen two important developments. The first was the return from China of Lauchlin Currie, the economist and presidential assistant who journeyed to Chunking to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his advisors cope with a dangerously inflationary currency situation.

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Currie does not pretend to be a military expert, but he is a good reporter, and he is said to have brought back to the President a remarkable list of the Chinese needs for starting a counter-offensive against Japan.

The list, considering the nature of modern war, is magnificently brief. A dozen odd flying fortresses, 200 up-to-date pursuit planes, comparatively small quantities of aviation gas, steel alloys and other raw materials, and a certain amount of heavy artillery and ammunition would be enough, according to the Chinese leaders speaking to the President through Currie. With this comparative handful of supplies, the Chinese think they could knock spots out of the Japanese invaders.

THE SECOND development is not unrelated to the first, indicating that our Far Eastern policy is already hovering on the verge of boldness. It is the dispatching to Australia and New Zealand of several heavy and light cruisers and a considerable number of destroyers on a "courtesy visit." Although Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox has indignantly rejected any suggestion of ulterior motive, any observer not too obtuse must conclude that this "courtesy visit" is in reality an effective compromise between the two main factions in the Navy Department.

The cautious faction, composed the chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, and most of the members of the general board, has maintained that any substantial American naval force crossing the 180th meridian would be attacked or turned back by the Japanese. The officers with Far Eastern experience, who are poorly represented on the general board, are the faction of daring. They have maintained the contrary proposition, that such a force as has now been sent to Australia and New Zealand would not only not be attacked, but if sent to Singapore would also be enough to deter the Japanese from further adventures in Malaya. Anyone examining the map can see that warships "courtesy visiting" and enjoying "recreation" at Sydney and Auckland can proceed to Singapore without much danger of Japanese interference.

The plunge of sending ships to Singapore may not be taken, but the mood suggested by the "courtesy visits" to Britain's Pacific dominions augurs a friendly reception for the Chinese requests for aid. These have, of course, been presented before, through other messengers, among whom Dr. T. V. Soong, China's great finance minister, was the most persuasive. Even before Currie's departure for the Far East, Dr. Soong might have succeeded in getting his country what it needs, had it not been for the demands of the European fighting on the defense production machinery.

CURRIE, HOWEVER, will speak with special authority, as a man close to the President, who has seen for himself. He spent enough time with the Chinese leaders—30 hours with Chiang Kai-shek alone—to receive a dependable impression. And he is said to have come back a convert to boldness on all points.

The division between the Chinese Communists and Chiang Kai-shek, which has worried so many people here, he is reported to dismiss as in the first place cured, and in the second a sign of Chinese self-confidence and belief in ultimate victory. The problem of getting in the supplies he thinks little of, for the Japanese talk of "closing the Burma road" is nonsense, so long as there are hundreds of fervently energetic coolies to repair the damage of every bomb the Japanese drop. The problem of air fields and air personnel he also minimizes, having been impressed by the opinions of the foreign air experts at Chungking on Chinese flying, and having seen with his own eyes 75,000 coolies building one of a chain of vast fields intended to be used by the flying fortresses.

As for the effectiveness of the proposed Chinese offensive, he makes two points. First, the Japanese in China are in a far worse state of exhaustion and demoralization than is generally assumed here, and thus not likely to stand up under strong attack. And second, with the flying fortresses alone, to drop incendiary bombs on Japan's concentrated, almost undefended paper and matchwood industrial area, a body blow could probably be struck at the Japanese war effort.

ON THE OTHER side of the balance sheet, Currie is described as agreeing with virtually all the other Far Eastern experts, that the only present danger to China is a flank attack on Singapore, after which supplies going over the Burma road could be shut off at the road's mouth. The reinforcement of Singapore is now known to have been substantial, however, amounting to at least 20,000 men. The Netherlands Indies are also increasing their a[illegible] and really effectiv[illegible] have been made t[illegible] oil wells in case o[illegible] tack. The Japanese [illegible] more than five divi[illegible] Island and in Nor[illegible] for their Malayan a[illegible] a hard job ahead. [illegible] the best informed [illegible] conservatives in the Japanese navy have beaten the daredevils after a hard policy tussle, and the adventure has been put off pending the outcome of the spring and summer fighting in Europe. Thus there is a little time to consider the decision on Far Eastern policy which Currie's report calls for.

KINTNER

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AMERICAN EMBASSY
Office of the Military Attache
Chungking, China

January 31, 1941

Subject: Comments on Current Events. (No. 13).

To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

2. The Chinese Power of Resistance.

In considering the question of how long the Chinese can continue to hold out, it is difficult to point to any definite indications that their power of resistance is weakening. The Japanese have not captured an important point in China since they took Ichang on June 15, 1940. Since the end of 1939, Japanese operations in China have been confined principally to advances and withdrawals, such as the move to the north and return from Canton in December, 1939; the march to the northwest and back in Northern Hupeh in November, 1940; and the most recent operation of a similar description in southern Honan.

A discouraging aspect of the situation, however, is that the Chinese Army now has no air force and very little artillery, and is consequently incapable of assuming the offensive. Also the routes over which munitions can come into China are very undependable. Under such circumstances the writer cannot see how the Chinese Army can be expected to keep up resistance indefinitely, unless aid comes from outside. The writer does not expect any sudden collapse, but he fears that the time may come in the not too distant future when the power of national resistance will be lowered to the point where the Japanese can materially reduce their forces in China, at which time Japan will really begin to win the war. Just because this time has not yet arrived is no assurance that it never will.

The writer believes that Chiang Kai-shek is as determined as ever to keep up resistance and that nothing can shake him in this resolve. It is entirely possible, however, that the time may come when Chiang can no longer inspire his armies in the field with the will to continue resistance in the face of daily increasing difficulties. It is also possible that factions in the Chinese Government who favor peace may get beyond Chiang's control. Even under such circumstances, however, the writer would expect to see no formal surrender to Japan. Rather he would expect to see a slow

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disintegration of the Chinese armies in the field, a virtual cessation of activity on all fronts, and a resulting gradual rapprochement with Wang Ching-wei or some other puppet at the head of the Nanking Government.

The writer's discouragement over the present situation would vanish in the twinkling of an eye if the United States should begin to render material assistance to China, or if war broke out between the United States and Japan. The latter eventuality looks unlikely at the present writing, but it is worth while to consider what aid the United States could give China which would really help her to continue resistance.

Further loans will not help a great deal for no matter how much the Chinese can buy abroad it will not do them much good if the materials cannot be brought into China. Airplanes, unless accompanied by pilots and maintenance crews will soon be crashed up, but the effect on Chinese morale would, in the opinion of the writer, be worth the cost of the planes. Artillery would help the Chinese a great deal, particularly pack artillery. Antiaircraft guns would stiffen the defense of China's life line, the Burma Road, but would require expert technical direction to be effective. Hence it appears that aid of the sort which China really requires might bring the United States close to war with Japan. It looks as if public opinion in the United States would not support a war with Japan now, accordingly the writer is still discouraged.

3. Supply Routes.

The question of supply routes is one which worries the writer no little. The capacity of the road from Kansu through Sinkiang to the Turk-Sib Railway is small and the variety of munitions which can be transported over it is limited by the fact that such munitions must originate in or pass through Soviet Russia. Probably about 5,000 tons per month of supplies, mostly gasoline and parts for motor vehicles, are coming into China from the coast, principally from Ningpo and from Biss Bay, northeast of Hongkong. These openings can be stopped at the will of the Japanese. This leaves the Burma Road as the main link with the outside world and it is unlikely that it can be depended upon for the transportation of more than about 9,000 tons per month.

During the past few days the Japanese have bombed the bridges over the Mekong River and damaged them to an extent which will require some time to repair and meanwhile only a very inefficient ferry service is in operation. Reliable foreign reports state that the defense of the Mekong River crossing is inadequate and unless it is improved the Japanese will probably continue to bomb the bridges at will.

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Plans for the shipment of gasoline and other valuable freight from the northern terminus of the Burma Railway into China by airplane have not yet materialized.

Thus, if about 9,000 tons of supplies can be shipped over the Burma Road during periods when bombing does not interfere too much, if a possible 5,000 tons can be brought in from the coast, and say three thousand tons come in over the Sinkiang-Kansu route, it gives the Chinese a total of about 17,000 tons per month as the maximum which they can hope to receive under present conditions. It is not believed that this is enough, particularly when present reserves are exhausted, to keep the Chinese in a position to continue effective resistance, especially if the Japanese should make a determined effort to wind up the China incident.

* * * * * * * * * * *

DAVID D. BARRETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, CWS.,
Assistant Military Attache.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-D-167
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CHM/RSB/CHC
WAR DEPART.

G-2/2657-D-167 I.S. 64

April 14, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

1. An Associated Press dispatch from Moscow dated April 13, confirmed essentially by the State Department, states that Russia and Japan have joined in a five-year neutrality pact in which each country agrees to remain neutral throughout any period during which either of the signatories is the "object of military action on the part of one or several powers."

2. The pact guarantees peaceful and friendly relations between Russia and Japan, recognizes the territorial integrity of Manchukuo and the Russian domination of Outer Mongolia.

3. This pact represents a political and military triumph on the part of Japan, and greatly increases the chances that the World War will spill over into the Pacific area as it remains one of the most serious deterrents to a Japanese "Southward Advance" against the British in Asia and the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies.

4. The signing of this treaty confirms the neutral and non-intervention policy of the Soviet Government, as evidenced by the German-Soviet and Yugoslavian-Soviet pacts. Adherence by both parties to the Japanese-Soviet pact will give Russia an opportunity to strengthen her military position on her western frontiers, in the event of changes in the Soviet-German relations and possible German aggression. Japanese aggression in southern Asiatic areas and the South Pacific would be viewed with favor by the U.S.S.R. at this time.

C. H. HAMM,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copies to:
Secretary of War
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence

MAIN EXECUTIVE OFFICE G-2 W.D. APR 14 1941

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By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 4/5/41 (RSB)
Initials

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I.B. 65

APR 22 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. 2657-H-517 1 WAR DEPARTMENT

April 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Report of a Projected Attack on Singapore by Japan.

1. The War Office in London, according to our Military Attache there, was informed this date by the British Ambassador in Tokyo that the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact will be followed by a Japanese movement against Singapore, probably timed with an expected German drive on the Suez Canal. The War Office further believes that Nazi forces are being sent from Sicily to Africa through French waters with the connivance of the French in Tunis.

2. This Division has evidence that Foreign Minister Matsuoka made no new commitments on behalf of Japan while in Rome or Berlin. (See Memorandums for The Chief of Staff, Nos. 129, 126, 129, 131 and 134). While his triumph in negotiating a neutrality pact with the U.S.S.R. has so strengthened the hands of the aggressive expansionist group in Japan as to render an attack on the Netherlands East Indies or Singapore less unlikely than prior to the signing of this pact, the present dispositions of Japan's armed forces give no indication that such an attack is planned for the immediate future. This however does not preclude overt minor hostile action.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

c.c. to:
Secretary of War
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
Office, Chief of Staff

MAILED EXECUTIVE OFFICE G-2 U.S. APR 16 1941

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RSB

April 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Gestapo activity in Japan.

1. Ambassador Grew in a dispatch from Tokyo dated April 17, 1941, reported information received from reliable sources to the effect that certain circles in Japan are perturbed and alarmed over increased activity on the part of German Gestapo agents who are compiling lists for the Japanese police of names of Japanese who are anti-Axis.

2. The Japanese people being what they are - a proud people, extremely sensitive to and resentful of any Occidental criticism or interference - a trend appears to be developing here which for psychologic reasons may be of great importance in its bearing on the military situation in the Far East and in its relation to the solidarity of the Tripartite Treaty.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence

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By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 4/23/41 (JFB)
Initials

G-2/2657-228 I.B. 31-3

April 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Brief Estimate of the Strategic Situation.

1. The Belligerents.

a. Germany with 260 Divisions, 890 Squadrons (11,000 first line planes), 300 submarines, is concentrated on interior lines. The strategic initiative is hers. She and her allies are pressing the British Empire at all points within their reach on a world-wide front, with the long range main effort exerted against the British Isles.

b. Britain with its equivalent of 68 Divisions, 170 Squadrons (5,100 first line planes), 368 warships, is dispersed on exterior lines, with her homeland part of the theater of combat and partially encircled by hostile assault positions. She is perforce on the defensive. Without an aggressive ally, except insofar as the United States is such, she is subject to Japanese coercion in the Far East, to menace in the Middle East and direct assault in the Near East. The Balkans having fallen to the Axis there is increasing probability of its successful assault upon Egypt and the Suez with subsequent extension westward to include Gibraltar and eastward to include the Mosul oil fields and the Persian gulf ports.

c. Italy, defeated in the Mediterranean, now is receiving active German support. Her morale is resurgent. Less a free agent, more a satellite she continues an effective factor under German leadership.

d. Japan. Having consummated a neutrality pact with the U.S.S.R. is now freer than heretofore to move aggressively against Malaysia when she deems it advisable to do so.

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2. The Non-belligerents.

a. The conquered European nations are resentful but passive. The value of French North Africa as a bargaining factor or as a threat to the Axis has disappeared. The same is true of Syria.

b. Russia has apparently aligned herself with the Axis powers and is an important economic factor to them. Her foreign policy is dominated by her fear of German aggression.

c. Turkey, a route to the Suez and the Mosul oil fields, faced with the rapid deterioration of her relations with Britain, now faces invasion or acquiescence to Axis demands.

d. Time increases the U.S. menace to Germany. There is presaged an increase in the Axis "fifth column" offensive within and as between the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

3. Possible lines of action open.

a. To Great Britain - the strategic defensive.

b. To the Axis - the strategic offensive, to wit:

(1) Naval and aerial siege of Great Britain. This will be prosecuted regardless of other action taken.

(2) Invasion of Great Britain in near future.

(a) Advantages - If successful the war is probably won. Forestalls American assistance.

(b) Disadvantage - A very difficult operation, failure in which would ultimately be decisive.

(3) Control of the Mediterranean, including neutralization of Gibraltar and conquest of Egypt and the Near East, with outbreaks in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and India.

(a) Advantages - Prospects of success favorable. Oil resources attainable. Follows line already adopted of aid to Italy and of Balkan offensive.

(b) Disadvantages - Indecisive. Main effort made in a secondary theater. Great dispersion of forces. Defeat of Britain still necessary, and British strength meanwhile increased. War prolonged.

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(4) Attack on the U.S.S.R.

(a) Advantages - Short-term success practically certain. Political and economic consolidation of continental Europe and permanent accession of economic strength secured, after considerable delay due to reconstruction.

(b) Disadvantages - Indecisive. Strength accrues to principal opponent, Britain, during breathing spell. War prolonged. Also stoppage of supplies from U.S.S.R. for considerable time. Great dispersion of forces.

(5) Combination of attack on Britain with the continuing of the attack in the Mediterranean or on attack on U.S.S.R. Possible so far as accumulated strength is concerned but contrary to German doctrine of concentration on a single objective.

Note: We must beware of slogans. The German doctrine of no-war-on-two-fronts is a military theory applicable to Germany as a relatively small country in Europe, but not necessarily to the greater Reich which must be a world power or nothing. To succeed, the Reich must expand its military power, which may mean a war on several fronts (as happened in the last war) as well as several other obvious disadvantages which dispersion of force entails. Furthermore, as far as Britain is concerned, it must be remembered that Germany can hold her under air and sea menace without permitting the British Isles to become an active front in land warfare.

4. Conclusions.

The British covering forces in the Balkans having been dispersed, it is to be expected that the German offensive will carry through to an assault on the main Egyptian position with a view to its capture and the occupation of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, to be followed presumably by like operations in the western basin for the neutralization of Gibraltar and in the middle east for the capture of the Persian Gulf re-entrant. Totaled, these operations still remain secondary to the primary operations in and around the British Isles, which are still regarded as the decisive theater.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:
Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Record Section (Mr. McClay,
Assistant Secretary of War).

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
War Plans Division
Washington, D.C.

WPD 4510 May 24, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. The War Plans Division has been directed by the Chief of Staff to prepare a Strategic Estimate of the Situation without delay.

2. Request that this office be provided not later than the date indicated information as follows on two premises: (a) present status (b) with United States actually participating in the war:

a. Evaluation of Germany's situation leading to a determination of strategic lines of action open to her and culminating in a decision as to her most probable line of action.
Date desired: Noon, 26 May, 1941.

b. Evaluation of Japan's situation leading to a determination of lines of action open to her and culminating in a decision as to her most probable line of action.
Date desired: Noon, 26 May, 1941.

c. Evaluation of British Empire's situation leading to a determination of lines of action open to her and culminating in a decision as to her most probable line of action.

(a) Evaluation of situation.
England
Middle East (Mediterranean Area)
Far East

(b) Shipping
On hand - All sources
Production - England and Canada
Losses sustained (average predicted)
Requirements

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(c) Supply
Food
Munitions
Strategic Articles

(d) Personnel

(e) Production

Date desired: 26 May, 1941.

g. Evaluation of Italy's situation leading to a determination of lines of action open to her and culminating in a decision as to her most probable line of action.
Date desired: 26 May, 1941.

h. Evaluation of France's situation leading to a determination of lines of action open to her and culminating in a decision as to her most probable line of action. (Include available information pertaining to Syria, Weygand's forces and the West African Situation and de Gaulle's forces with the effect each may have on the general situation.)
Date desired: 26 May, 1941.

i. Evaluation of Dutch situation including available information concerning Curacao and West Indies, Netherland East Indies, and the effect each may have on the general situation.
Date desired: 26 May, 1941.

3. Request that the information provided be brief and concise. Charts, diagrams and maps may be used to supplement the reports submitted.

/s/ Harry J. Malony.

HARRY J. MALONY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
War Plans Division.

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CONFIDENTIAL

1st Ind.

G-2, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C., May 26, 1941. To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. The information requested in paragraph 2 is furnished herewith as enclosures to this indorsement. In compiling this information the attitude has been taken that actual participation by the United States in the war would actually be a development from the existing situation with no hard and fast line of demarcation drawn. In consequence the information is furnished on the basis of the continuing development of an existing situation. The information has been amplified by the inclusion of data on the U.S.S.R., Latin America and other neutrals. Each section of the data presented is numbered in accordance with the subparagraphs of paragraph 2, basic communication, so far as applicable. For your convenience there follows below a condensed summation of the existing situation. Attention is invited to the fact that these data do not constitute a G-2 estimate of the situation but are merely information furnished in compliance with your request.

2. Summation of the Situation.

a. Germany, possessing greatly superior land, air and submarine forces, holds the initiative, which, through her concentrated leadership and integrated regime, she is successfully applying in an aggressive offensive against the British Empire.

b. The British Empire, widespread with superior surface sea power but deficient in man power, organization and battle leadership, is on the defensive and is losing ground.

c. The United States, with a superior navy in one ocean, but without effective weapons or developed commands and with but few combat organizations, stands in verbal opposition to the offensive and in material support of the defensive but for the time being without the means to take overt battle action directly against Germany in her own or anybody else's behalf.

d. All other countries are but the fringing satellites of the three great powers. China, Italy and Japan have some military though not decisive potency. The others are themselves trivial or of import only in combination with others.

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e. Russia stands unique, a power in its own right but only because of its bulk. In its inherent inefficiency it is a menace to all and of value only to one—Germany—and that because of its raw materials.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosures:
Germany
Japan
British Empire
Italy
France
Netherlands
U.S.S.R.
Latin America
European and Asiatic Neutrals.

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2. b. JAPAN

1. Military Situation. Japanese forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto in the north to Indo-China in the south. The Chinese, in spite of limited internal friction, continue to resist passively any advance by the Japanese forces. Japan is gradually establishing expeditionary forces for movement into southeast Asia.

2. Economic Situation. Japan is economically weak because she lacks essential war materials, adequate foreign exchange, sufficient foreign trade; she is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the war in China.

Economically Japan will be no worse off than she is at the present time unless greater obstacles are placed before her economic progress. A consideration of recent German, Thailand, and Indo-Chinese action would include reasons for the above statement. Japan is increasing her imports of oil from the United States instead of decreasing them. Japan could not be thrown into bankruptcy under present circumstances; if she undertakes a war with a major naval power, much greater obstacles would immediately be placed before her economic progress.

3. Political Situation. The Japanese will support any decision made by the Japanese Government. The military and naval authorities continue to be the predominant influence in Governmental decisions. It is believed that the naval authorities, and business interests will exert every effort to avoid a conflict with the United States regardless of the latter's participation in the European War.

4. Psychology of Japanese. The intense patriotism, the remarkable recuperative capabilities and an indomitable tenacity of purpose along with a frugal and low standard of living have enabled the Japanese people to accept and even support the frightful cost of the indecisive war in China.

5. Lines of Action. Japan has the following alternatives:

a. Maintain status quo in China.

b. Withdraw her armed forces from the area south of the Great Wall, make peace with Chiang Kai-Shek and only use economic penetration into southeastern Asia.

c. Withdraw sufficient forces from the Chinese mainland to facilitate a southward advance.

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(1) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong, attack British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China or by direct attack by land, sea and air.

(2) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong, and attack the Netherlands' East Indies or Borneo.

(3) Reduction of the Philippine Islands and Hongkong prior to movement to the south.

Actions indicated by a, (1), (2), and (3) are contingent on the success of the Axis forces in the European War.

6. Most Probable Action. Japan will probably withdraw sufficient forces from the Chinese mainland to facilitate a southward advance, by containing or isolating the Philippine Islands and Hongkong, and by attacking British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China.

If the United States should actively enter the European War, Japan would wait to see what allocation of American naval and military forces and supplies is; she would then make her decision as to whether she should move south or maintain the status quo.

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G-2/2657-313

May 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, W.P.D.:

Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. In accordance with your informal requests in connection with the preparation of a Strategic Estimate of the Situation, there are inclosed:

a. An evaluation of China's situation.
b. An evaluation of the Japanese Mandated Islands.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Inclosures.

6

CHINA'S SITUATION

1. Military Situation. Five hundred thousand square miles of Chinese territory including the principal ports, rivers, railroads, communication facilities, centers of trade, industries and principal islands southward to include Hainan are now under Japanese domination.

The Chungking Government with about 2,000,000 men under arms and ample reserves of personnel opposes the deployed Japanese forces from Pautow Suiyuan Province to the Indo-China border. This force is poorly equipped with rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, and is sadly lacking in weapons such as artillery, tanks, anti-tank guns, antiaircraft and aircraft weapons necessary for offensive action.

2. Economic Situation. Chinese production capacity has been reduced by the destruction of her arsenals and other manufacturing industries, inability to obtain raw materials and a woeful lack of transportation.

The small scale effectiveness of the C.I.C. (Chinese Industrial Cooperatives) cannot be over-emphasized. These cooperatives, numbering more than 110,000 in 110 different trades not only produce a limited amount of the implements of war and peace but also produce a sense of cooperation in a country where the spirit of cooperation is sadly lacking.

The Chungking Government has exportable surpluses of tin, antimony, wolfram, and mercury. The whole area of China is rich in raw materials; however, a considerable portion of this area is within the zone of Japanese occupation.

In order to support the Chinese dollar in international exchange, the Chungking Government has borrowed various sums, the last of which was a loan of $50,000,000 from the United States.

3. Political Situation. It is believed that the Chungking Government is held together by the dominant personality of China, General Chiang Kai-Shek. Although there are serious differences with the Communist elements of the Government and defection on the part of some of the leaders, only economic privations of a serious nature will separate the people in China from their leader and their cause.

4. Psychological Aspects. Four years of war have weakened the morale of a people strong in physical stamina. The economic

strain is weaning the people from the will to resist. Areas of Free China look with envy at the areas of China under Wang Ching-Wei where peace reigns and food is more plentiful.

There is a "defeatist group" in Chungking which favors peace with Japan realizing that Japan's terms are becoming more favorable.

The Chinese Army is ill-equipped, ill-clothed, and suffers from low morale, malnutrition and exhausted war reserves.

Assistance under the Lend-Lease bill is expected to raise the morale of the Chinese Army and increase their power of, and will to continue to resist Japanese aggression. Recent Russian commitments will probably preclude the possibility of future assistance to China (even though Russian statements are to the contrary) and necessitate immediate American aid to offset the adverse effects on the morale of the Chinese caused by the loss of Russian aid.

5. Lines of Action.

a. Continue to resist with American aid.
b. Offensive operations on a small scale after the receipt of aid and offensive weapons from the United States.
c. Make peace with Japan and cooperate with the Nanking Government.
d. In the event the United States participates in the war and Japan also is actively engaged, China could: closely cooperate with the United States and carry out offensive operations. The United States would find it necessary to furnish weapons and funds for sabotage and espionage along with planes, pilots and maintenance crews.

6. Most Probable Action. China will continue to resist with American aid until such time as she is able to start small scale offensive operations.

JAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS

1. General Description.

The Japanese Mandated Islands include the Marianas (Ladrones), the Carolines, Marshalls and Palau Islands (Pelews). These strategically important groups total 1,400 islands and extend roughly from 135° to 175° East Longitude, all north of the equator. The Marshalls are low and of coral formation; the other three groups are in general mountainous and of volcanic origin.

2. Strategic Importance.

The strategic location of these islands combined with the inclusion of many areas suitable for operations of ships, seaplanes, and land planes renders them particularly significant in Japanese naval policy. Except for phosphates found in Angaur (Palaus) and moderate quantities of sugar and cocoanuts throughout the islands, there are no important natural resources.

3. Defense Installations.

The Japanese have been improving harbors and facilities for years. Since 1937, it is believed that fortifications and other defense installations have been placed in various localities.

The most important anchorages are at Jaluit, Wotje, Bikini, (Marshalls); Truk (Carolines); and Ulithi and Koosai passages (Palau).

Landing fields are known to exist at Saipan, Palau, Truk, Ponape, Jaluit, Sorol, and Eniwetok; fields have also been reported at Pagan, Yap, Ruamie and Wotje.

It is reported that the Japanese are building tunnels (110-120 feet long and 40 feet wide) for use of submarines and also hangars for seaplanes in Yap, Palau, Angaur, Saipan, Ponape, and Jaluit.

4. Probable Defense.

Indications are that Japan will defend the Mandates to the best of her ability against any aggressive action on the part of the United States, using them first as obstacles in the path of any advance westward across the Pacific, and second as bases from which to launch attacks by submarine, airplanes and small craft against the flank of any American force headed for the Western Pacific along any but the northern Great Circle route.

SECRET

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 29 Nov 45 (.....)
Initials

G-2
CHM/TJB

G-2/2418-191

July 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Subject: Alaskan Security vs the German-Russian War.

1. The following memorandum is furnished in response to request in par. 2, Memo WPD 4287-3, June 25, 1941, subject: "Effect of German-Russian Hostilities on Security of Alaska."

2. The question posed by the German-German war is whether the ports and airfields of Eastern Siberia are to remain in independent Russian hands or are to be seized by Japan or are to be controlled by some sort of puppet government under Nazi or Japanese or Nazi-Japanese control.

3. Solarly in our hands as a base of operations for the fleet and the air force, Alaska not only guarantees the defense of the northern (and shortest) route to our Pacific Coast but it is a great outpost for the only true defense--namely an offensive against Japan.

4. Were Japan or the Axis to control Eastern Siberia the whole naval position of the United States would be greatly weakened. The necessity that we should be forced to entertain continually would inevitably tend to hold a large part of our fleet in readiness to defend the North Pacific. Japan's naval freedom, particularly as regards ventures to the south, would be correspondingly increased.

5. There are so many advantages to be gained from the control of the bases situated in the area, that action against them, by either important member of the Axis simply for his own account, or jointly for mutual benefit must be regarded as a definite possibility and should be provided for in our own planning.

6. Alaska has increased in strategic importance and its security is assured to a considerably improved degree. Preference would therefore seem to suggest the following steps:

a. Immediate remedy of the present personnel and material deficiencies of the Alaskan defense forces to temporary peace strength and its prompt increase to full war strength.

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
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EXHIBIT NO. 183

UNITED STATES SENATE,
May 20, 1946.

Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: I have gone over the book "The Case Against the Admirals", and it appears to me that we should have, for the record, the report on the bombing of the Utah in the fall of 1937. We should also have the program which was prepared by General Andrews and Colonel Knerr. The book states they prepared a program to submit to the War Department calling for 108 B–17's for enlarging the Pacific Fleet so it would operate in the Pacific and also provided for training of men to cost $21,000,000.

We should also have a copy of the budget of the Air Corps providing for this. We should also have the evidence showing why the War Department refused to submit the $21,000,000 item to Congress.

I believe we should also secure copies of the letters from Colonel Knerr to the Senate on the B–17 program.

On page 64 of the book is this quotation:

"The War Department cannot approve the program for developing the B–17's. Instead of the B–17 you are ordered to build a light, responsive, less expensive type of bombardment plane with a range not to exceed 300 miles."

We should put this evidence from the War Department into the records.

Sincerely,

/S/ HOMER FERGUSON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, 15 June 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.

In response to your letter of 23 May 1946 forwarding Senator Ferguson's request of 20 May 1946:

1. Annexed under Tab A is a copy of the report of the bombing of the *Utah* in August 1937, together with other papers pertaining to that exercise.

2. A memorandum dated 24 November 1937 from the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force to the Assistant Secretary of War outlined a procurement program for Fiscal Years 1940–1945 to bring the Army air strength up to the 2320 aircraft recommended by the Drum Board. The program approved by the Secretary of War on 11 March 1938 as the Woodring Program was a revision of a proposal submitted by the Chief of the Air Corps. The following table compares the numbers of four-engine bombers included in the two programs:

	GHQ Program	Woodring Program
Total objective	196	144
FY 1940 procurement	53	67
FY 1941 procurement	53	48
FY 1942 procurement	33	0
FY 1943 procurement	28	33
FY 1944 procurement	40	11
FY 1945 procurement	0	8

3. The Air Corps' tentative estimates for Fiscal Year 1940 included $23,450,000 for 67 four-engine bombers based on the Woodring Program. In accordance with the decision to eliminate four-engine bombers from the aircraft requirements for Fiscal Year 1940 and to use the funds set up for that purpose for the procurement of attack and light bombers (see Tab B), the regular estimates as submitted contained no provision for the procurement of four-engine bombers. However, subsequent estimates were submitted and approved calling for the

allocation for 126 four-engine bombers of $29,610,000 from the supplemental 1940 appropriations. These estimates were based on the 5500 Plane Program, which superseded the Woodring Program and was authorized under Public Law 18, 76th Congress, approved 3 April 1939. The program provided for 178 four-engine bombers; of that number 52 were on hand or procurable from the regular funds for Fiscal Years 1939 and 1940, leaving 126 to be procured from the supplemental 1940 appropriations. Army Air Forces inventories show 160 such planes on hand as of 30 November 1941.

4. A careful search of War Department files has failed to locate any correspondence from Major General (then Colonel) Knerr to the Senate concerning the B–17 program.

5. A careful search of War Department files has failed to locate any document containing the language quoted from page 64 of "The Case Against the Admirals."

ROBERT M. DIGGS,
Captain, A. U. S.

Incl.–2
Tab A
Tab B

Tab A

[Copy]

"Confidential" 17 MAY 1937.

Memorandum for The Secretary of the Navy:

1. To further the investigation of the defense of our coast against attack from overseas, the President desires that a Joint Army-Navy Exercise be arranged for this summer, for the information of:

The President
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
The Chief of Staff
The Chief of Naval Operations.

2. The President outlined the Problem, as follows:

Time

During the coming summer.

Locality

Between lines running Eastward from Cape Cod and from the Capes of the Delaware.

(or)

Between lines running Westward from San Francisco and from San Pedro.

The Problem

(1) Attacking Fleet cannot go North or South of the Lines.

(2) Within twenty-four hours from zero time, the attacking fleet shall be present within the limits of the area and within five hundred miles from the shore line.

(3) After arrival of the attacking fleet within the area prescribed, it should remain there for a period of twenty-four hours.

(4) The attacking fleet shall be represented by a radio-controlled destroyer. This target represents a battleship. Constructive hits will be allowed.

(5) The defending forces should be comprised of naval patrol forces, surface and air-Army bombing planes.

Object of the Problem

To locate and test, actually, the ability of the defending forces to destroy the attacking force.

(Signed) PAUL H. BASTEDO,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to: Colonel E. M. Watson, FA, USA, Military Aide to the President.

[Copy]

Secretary
Navy Department Building

THE JOINT BOARD,
Washington, July 10, 1937.

J. B. No. 350
(Serial 611)

Confidential

To: The Secretary of War.
Subject: Joint Army and Navy Exercise.
Reference: (a) J. B. No. 350 (Serial No. 608) June 10, 1937.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a) with its enclosure.

1. Relative to the contemplated Joint Army and Navy exercise covered in reference (a), The Joint Board understands that the following basic decisions have been reached on the subject by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations after consultation with the President on the substance of enclosure (A), reference (a).

a. Location. The exercise will be held in the land and water areas between the parallels 38°15′ N. (Hamilton Field), Latitude 33°40′ N. (San Pedro Bay), and within 300 miles of the coast line.

b. Time. 24 hour period beginning at 1200, August 12, 1937, ending at 1200, August 13, 1937.

c. Forces.

(1) Navy and Coast Guard: The local forces of the 11th and 12th Naval Districts, plus the Langley and Wright patrol planes, the necessary destroyer squadrons, the UTAH and such Coast Guard units as may be made available by the Coast Guard.

(2) Army: 2nd Bombardment Group, composed of 6, B–17 planes. 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups, composed of 19, B–10 planes.

d. Target. Target ship UTAH.

e. Bombs. Navy, Mark VII, water-filled, bombs not to exceed 50 pounds in weight, when so filled.

f. Command. The Commanding General, 1st Wing, GHQ Air Force, will represent the Commander in Chief of the field forces in the preparation for and in the conduct of the exercise and will command Army units engaged therein. The Commandants of the 11th and 12th Naval Districts will command the Naval contingents. Command in joint operations will be determined under the principles outlined in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.

g. Publicity. This exercise will be considered a normal joint training exercise. Any necessary publicity will be handled in a normal and routine manner so as to avoid undue emphasis and so as not to violate existing instructions covering secret and confidential material and photographs. Information given out for publicity purposes will be general in nature only.

2. *Action recommended.* Since time is pressing, The Joint Board recommends that the two Departments proceed without delay with the preparation and issue to their respective services of the necessary directives to carry out this exercise.

(Signed) Malin Craig,
MALIN CRAIG,
General, U. S. Army,
Senior Member Present.

JULY 16, 1937,
APPROVED.
(Signed) WM. D. LEAHY,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

JULY 14, 1937.
APPROVED. By Order of the Secretary of War,
(Signed) Malin Craig,
MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, July 10, 1937.

BLUE

Op–12A–CTB (SC)A16–3(9)/A21 Serial 308

Confidential

NOT TO BE SEEN BY ANY ONE OF THE BLACK SIDE PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF EXERCISE.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Subject: Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4.
Reference (a) Joint Act of the Army and Navy 1935.

1. Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4 will be held in the land and water areas included between the parallels of Latitude 38°–15′ N. (HAMILTON FIELD) and Latitude 33°–40′ N. (SAN PEDRO BAY), for a period of twenty-four hours beginning at 1200 12 August 1937 and ending at 1200 13 August 1937.

2. *Object.* To exercise Army and Navy airplanes (BLUE), operating from the coast, in locating and bombing a target (BLACK), moving at a limited distance off the coast.

3. *Limits of Exercise.* First movements by BLUE will begin not earlier than 1200 12 August and the exercise will cease at 1200 13 August (Plus 8 time). No forces, except plane guards, shall go north of Latitude 38°–15′ N. nor south of Latitude 33°–40′ N. Between the above times and between the above latitudes the target will be at sea and available for bombing.

4. *Forces.* For this exercise, in addition to the units normally under the Command of the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, the following units will be made available:

[2] *NAVY* (To the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet):

(a) Aircraft, Base Force, U. S. Fleet:

WRIGHT (Flag)—	VP—7F (About 6 P2Y–3)
	VP—9F (about 6 PBY–1)
LANGLEY	VP—11F (about 12 PBY–2)
	VP—12F (about 12 PBY–1)

NOTE: Any VP planes available in excess of 30 will be used solely as plane guards.

(b) Three destroyer squadrons for plane guard duties only.

COAST GUARD (To the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, by the Commander, Coast Guard Division, San Francisco):

Cutters, patrol boats, aircraft and Coast Guard stations within the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, as may be made available after conference between the Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, and the Commander of the Coast Guard Division at San Francisco. Coast Guard participation will be subject to distress calls, or duties of an emergency nature, which may make necessary Coast Guard services elsewhere. Such services will not be interfered with. Coast Guard vessels and aircraft will be used as plane guards only.

ARMY (To the Command General, 1st Wing, GHQ Air Force):

2d Bombardment Group—6 (B–17) planes.
7th Bombardment Group } 19 (B–10) planes.
19th Bombardment Group }

5. *Target* to be bombed will be the UTAH, which will represent a BLACK detachment of two battleships, one aircraft carrier and nine destroyers. Each battleship has 16 5''/38 AA guns and 8–0''.50 AA machine guns. Each aircraft has 12–5''/25 AA guns, 16–1''.1 AA guns and 24–0''.50 AA machine guns. Each destroyer has 5–5''/38 AA guns and 4–0''.50 AA machine guns. The UTAH actually has no guns and she will not cruise in company with other ships. All practicable precautions will be taken to avoid bombing any other ship than the UTAH.

6. *Bombs.* To avoid excessive damage to the UTAH and danger to her personnel dummy water filled bombs only will be used, not to exceed 50 lbs. in weight each when so filled, and the cases of characteristics similar to the [3] Navy Mark VII water fillable bombs. These bombs will simulate the full sized service bombs, and shall not be carried on any plane in numbers in excess of the number of service bombs which could be carried. These bombs, both Army and Navy, shall be painted different colors to distinguish the squadrons, and the Commanding Officer UTAH will be informed by the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, previous to the exercise of the colors so assigned. Arrangements will be made by the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, with the Commanding General, First Wing GHQ Air Force, so as to prevent duplication of colors. The difference in weight between the dummy bombs and the service bombs, which they simulate, will be carried by the BLUE planes in sand, or other suitable ballast, which shall be retained until the dummy bombs are released. The ballast may then be dumped at such a distance from the target as not to confuse observers. The War Department has been requested to adhere to these requirements.

7. *Distinguishing Marks.* The UTAH will fly international King flag and also spread same horizontally so as to be visible from the air. Army and Navy attacking BLUE planes will have no special distinguishing marks other than those authorized to be worn and displayed by U. S. land and sea forces. All plane guard units, less planes, will fly international Preparatory flag.

8. *Plane Guards.* Vessels and planes assigned as plane guards will take no part in the exercise other than that necessary to safeguard life of aviation personnel. Except as necessary for this, they will maintain radio silence and remain neutral. They will take care that their actions, dispositions and communications do not assist one side or the other. Three squadrons of fleet destroyers, all VP planes in excess of thirty, all Coast Guard vessels and planes, and all district craft employed in the exercise will be used as plane guards solely. All plane guards will be under the command of the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts.

9. *Artificialities.* Other than as stated previously artificialities will be avoided so far as practicable. This particularly applies to bombing altitudes and tactics employed in the presence of the UTAH. No altitudes, when in the presence of the UTAH, will be used which are less than good tactics dictates for attacking an enemy of the characteristics described in paragraph 5. The War Department has been requested to adhere to this.

10. *Command and Preparation* will be in accordance with reference (a). The Commanding General, First Wing GHQ Air Force (Brigadier General Delos C. Emmons), at March Field (Riverside, California), has been designated as the representative of the Commanding General, Field Forces, who is assumed to have taken over the supreme command of the Army in the Pacific Coastal Frontier for the purposes of this exercise. The Commanding General, First Wing GHQ Air Force will command the Army's [4] contingent for this exercise. The Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, will confer with him directly in the preparation for and the execution of this exercise.

11. *Reports.* Complete diaries will be kept by all Naval and Coast Guard units participating in the exercise and will be submitted to the Commandants under whom they operated. These diaries will be accurate as to times and descriptions of events observed. Every naval unit, which drops bombs, will submit report in accordance with the requirements for "Formation Battle Practice (Bombing Maneuvering Target)", including particularly a record of the altitudes at which bombs were dropped and the size of the service bombs which they represented. Photographic observations of bombs dropped by Navy planes shall be made from the planes dropping them. The Army will be requested to make similar observations. The Commandants of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts will forward, in duplicate, to the Chief of Naval Operations a complete report of the exercise in sufficient detail as to events, times, tracks, posi-

tions and bombing performances, as to permit an accurate analysis of the whole twenty-four hour period.

12. *Time.* Zone plus eight time will be used.

13. *The U. S. Fleet,* during the period 10–13 August, actually will be making passage from San Francisco to San Pedro. Except for detachments specifically assigned to this exercise, it will take no part in the Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4, and will be considered as not strategically present and not free to act. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, will inform the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, and the Commanding General, First Wing GHQ Air Force—March Field (Riverside, California) of the approximate positions to be occupied by the units of the fleet not participating in this exercise.

14. *Critique.* Should a critique be held after the exercise, no funds will be allowed for mileage or personal expenses in attending same.

15. *Publicity.* This exercise will be considered as a normal joint training exercise. Any necessary publicity will be handled in a normal and routine manner so as to avoid undue emphasis and so as not to violate existing instructions covering secret and confidential material and photographs. Information given out for publicity purposes will be general in nature only.

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

CC: President (1)
CinCus (1)
Chief of Staff, U. S. A. (2)
Combasfor (1) Coast Guard (1)
Comairbasfor (1)
Op–20, 22, 30, 38

ACW/mh
July 20, 1937.

AG 354.21 (7–20–37) (Misc.) E

Subject: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Air Exercise No. 4.
To: Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, Langley Field, Va.

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Air Exercise No. 4 will be held in accordance with the basic decisions contained in Inclosure (1) Joint Board No. 350 (Serial No. 611) July 10, 1937, and with the instructions contained in Inclosure (2) letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, dated July 10, 1937, subject: Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4, which will be amended to meet certain variations therefrom contained herein.

2. The numerical designation of this exercise would ordinarily be Number 3. However, in order to obviate complications resulting from instructions already issued to Naval Districts concerning a prospective exercised Number 3 on the East Coast, this exercise is designated Number 4.

3. The Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, will represent the Commander-in-Chief of the field forces in the preparation for and the conduct of the exercise. For the purposes of this exercise direct communication between the Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, and the Commandants of affected Naval Districts is authorized. It is desired, however, that the Commanding General First Wing, GHQ Air Force, confer with the Commanding General, Fourth Army, with a view to having an officer of the Fourth Army at the headquarters of the First Wing to represent the coastal frontier defense headquarters, through which information would normally pass.

4. *Object of exercise.* To exercise Navy airplanes (BLUE) in locating, and Army airplanes (BLUE) in bombing a target (BLACK) moving at a limited distance off the coast.

[2] 5. *Forces to be made available.* Approximately those mentioned in paragraph 1*c*. Inclosure (1).

6. *Location.* See paragraph 1 *a*. Inclosure (1). Relative to the statement "within 300 miles of the coast line," it is desired by the Navy Department that this information be not communicated to anyone connected with the scouting forces.

7. *Time.* See paragraph 1 *b*. Inclosure (1). Zone plus eight time (Pacific Standard Time) will be used.

8. *a. Bombs.* The Navy Department, through the Chief of Ordnance, will furnish the GHQ Air Force with 4000 Mark VII, water fillable bombs for use in

the preparation for and the conduct of the exercise. It is contemplated that these bombs will be available as follows:

1,100 bombs—Langley Field
1,600 bombs—Hamilton Field
1,300 bombs—March Field

b. Bombs used during the exercise will be filled with water and will weigh not in excess of 50 pounds, when so filled. Said bombs will be painted so as to be able to distinguish between squadrons dropping them, and the Commandants of affected Naval Districts will be informed previous to the exercise of the distinguishing paints so assigned.

c. Bombs dropped during the exercise will simulate in size the service bombs ordinarily used against a target of two battleships, one aircraft carrier, and nine destroyers as described in paragraph 9 below. Bombs in excess of those to be dropped will not be carried. The difference in weight between the dummy bombs and the service bombs which they simulate, will be carried in said or other suitable ballast, which shall be retained until the dummy bombs are released, after which the ballast may be dumped at such distance from the target as not to confuse observers.

9. *Target to be bombed.* Target to be bombed will be the UTAH, which will represent a BLACK detachment of two battleships, one aircraft carrier, and nine destroyers. Each battleship has 16 5''/38 AA guns and 8 0.50 AA machine guns. Each aircraft carrier has 12 5''/25 AA guns, 16 1.1 AA guns, and 24 0.50 AA machine guns. Each destroyer has 5 5''/38 AA guns and 4 0.50 AA machine guns. The UTAH actually has no guns and she will not cruise in company with other ships. All practicable precautions will be taken to avoid bombing any other ship than the UTAH.

[3] 10. *Distinguishing marks.* The UTAH will fly international King flag and also spread same horizontally so as to be visible from the air. Attacking BLUE planes will have no special distinguishing marks other than those authorized to be worn and displayed by U. S. land and sea forces. All plane guard units, less planes, will fly international Preparatory flag.

11. *Plane guards.* Vessels and planes assigned as plane guards will take no part in the exercise other than that necessary to safeguard life of aviation personnel. Except as necessary for this, they will maintain radio silence and remain neutral. They will take care that their actions, dispositions, and communications do not assist one side or the other. Three squadrons of fleet destroyers, all VP planes in excess of thirty, all Coast Guard vessels and planes, and all district craft employed in the exercise will be used as plane guards solely. All plane guards will be under the command of Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts.

12. *Status of U. S. Fleet.* The U. S. Fleet, during the period 10–13 August, actually will be making passage from San Francisco to San Pedro. Except for detachments specifically assigned to this exercise, it will take no part in the Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4, and will be considered as not strategically present and not free to act. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, will inform the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, and the Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force—March Field (Riverside, California) of the approximate positions to be occupied by the units of the fleet not participating in this exercise.

13. *Artificialities.* Other than as stated previously artificialities will be avoided so far as practicable. This particularly applies to bombing altitudes and tactics employed in the presence of the UTAH. No altitudes, when in the presence of the UTAH, will be used which are less than good tactics dictates for attacking an enemy of the characteristics described in paragraph 9 above.

14. *Publicity.* This exercise will be considered a normal joint training exercise. Any necessary publicity will be handled in a normal and routine manner so as to avoid undue emphasis and so as not to violate existing instructions covering secret and confidential material and photographs. Information given out for publicity purposes will be general in nature only.

15. *Command in Joint Operations.* Command in joint operations will be determined under the principles outlined in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.

[4] 16. Critique. The Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, will provide for any critique that he may deem desirable.

17. *Cost.* It is desired that the cost of this exercise be defrayed from normal training funds at the disposition of the Headquarters involved. These funds to be reimbursed from such other funds as may become available.

18. *Reports.* Photographic observations of bombs dropped by Army planes will be made by the Army. Such information together with that provided by Naval observers on the UTAH will be incorporated in a report on the exercise. This report, in triplicate, will be forwarded by the Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, through the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, to the Adjutant General of the Army.

19. The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, will take such action as is necessary to secure the bombs mentioned in paragraph 8 above; to concentrate the units of the GHQ Air Force involved; and to provide observers from units of the GHQ Air Force not participating in the exercise.

20. Copies of this letter together with its inclosures have been furnished the Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, the Chief of the Air Corps, and the Commanding General, Fourth Army, Copies, without inclosures, have been furnished the Chief of Ordnance and the Navy Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

2 Inclosures:
#1–JB No. 350 (Serial No. 611), July 10, 1937.
#2–Ltr fr CNO to Comdts. 11th & 12th Nav. Dists. dated July 10, 1937–subject: Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4.

[Copy]

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply refer to: WPD 4004–3

Subject: Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

With reference to your letter of July 10, 1937, to the Commandants of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, on the above subject, it is requested that paragraph 2, thereof, be amended to read substantially as follows:

"2. *Object.* To exercise Navy airplanes (Blue) in locating, and Army airplanes (Blue) in bombing a target (Black) moving at a limited distance off the coast."

It is further requested that related paragraphs of the reference wherein it is implied that the Navy will bomb the target be correspondingfly amended to show that the target will not be bombed by Navy planes.

Chief of Staff.

[Copy]

Naval Message

(Navy Department)

OP–12A–CTB
Branch 68

From: Chief of Naval Operations
Released by: W. D. Leahy.
Date: 22 July 1937.
NITE to NITE.

To:
CINCUS
COM 11
COM 12

To:
CHIF OF STAFF, US ARMY
(MAIL)
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRBASEFOR
COMDT. COAST GUARD (MAIL)
USS UTAH

0022 My letter regarding exercise Four of July 10th has been amended to read: Paragraph 2: "Object to exercise Navy airplanes Blue in locating and Army airplanes Blue in bombing target Black steaming at limited distance off coast all planes operating from coast". The foregoing change is at the request of the

War Department. In pursuance thereof, the UTAH will not be bombed by Navy planes in exercise Four 1300.

DISTRIBUTION:

12 * * * ORIGINATOR
10A * * * 11 * * *
13 * * *
13D (2) * * *
19 * * *
22 * * *
38 * * *
BUAER * * *
CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY * * *
COMDT. COAST GUARD * * *

Copies made in AGO for:
CG, GHQ Air Force;
CG, 1st Wing, GHQ Air Force.
Chief of the Air Corps;
CG, Fourth Army; and ACofS, G–2.

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential
J. B. No. 350 (Serial 614).

WAR DEPARTMENT

NAVY DEPARTMENT

19 OCTOBER 1937.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The following report is submitted on the Army and Navy Joint Air Exercise held as a result of the memorandum of May 17, 1937, addressed by your Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy:

Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercises. Navy patrol planes took off at noon, August 12, and located at 3:37 P. M. the target ship UTAH, steaming at 15 knots, about 300 nautical miles southwest of San Francisco. The Navy reported position of UTAH to Army and maintained contact until it was lost at 10:30 P. M. through poor visibility. On receipt of contact report from Navy, two Army bombardment groups (41 bombers), took off near San Francisco. The bombers failed to intercept the target due to lack of time for daylight search and unfavorable weather. Contact with target was not regained by Navy patrol planes until 10:45 A. M., August 13, when it was located about 245 nautical miles southwest of San Francisco. The Army bombardment squadrons took off by 9:30 A. M. on a search and attack mission, and were able to get into attack position before noon, August 13, when the exercise ended. The low ceiling and restricted visibility made it necessary to attack at altitudes of 400 to 700 feet. Three direct hits were secured from 98 bombs dropped. Each bomb simulated a 300 lb. service bomb.

Supplementary Exercise. Unfavorable weather having interfered with satisfactory operations during the above exercise, a supplementary bombing exercise for August 14 against the UTAH, maneuvering at 15 knots, about 60 nautical miles off the coast, was agreed upon. The weather proved favorable and the Army bombed from 12,000 feet with 721 bombs, securing 37 direct hits and 49 within 50 feet of the side. The attached photographs illustrate the bomb patterns at various altitudes.

Conclusions. In view of artificialities, that must necessarily be introduced into peacetime exercises, definite conclusions as to the potentialities of Army and Navy forces to attack and/or defend in problems of this sort can not be drawn. Under the actual conditions of the first exercise, it may be said that Navy aircraft were able to locate and track, and Army aircraft to bomb and hit the target under unfavorable visibility conditions.

The exercises were of inestimable value in developing coordination of Army and Navy communications and in affording the Army an opportunity to bomb a maneuvering target at sea.

HARRY H. WOODRING,
Secretary of War.
CLAUDE A. SWANSON,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Copy]

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington, October 21, 1937.

Memorandum for
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy:

I am delighted to see the report of the very worthwhile Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercises.

It is my thought that they should be made an annual feature of joint Army-Navy Coast Defense Exercises on both West coast and East coast and possibly also as joint exercises at the Canal Zone and in Hawaii. The coordination of the two services is sufficient in itself to justify this.

* * * * * * *

F. D. R.

Incl 2

Tab B

[Copy]

[1] CONFIDENTIAL

G–4 ENH

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
SUPPLY DIVISION, G–4,
Washington, D. C., July 19, 1938.

G–4/27277–19
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Revision of Present Approved Airplane Programs.

I. *Facts bearing upon the problem.*

1. The Chief of Staff directed G–4 to submit a new requirements program for airplanes in F. Y. 1940. In this program all B–17's (4-engine heavy bomber type) are to be eliminated and the funds now set up for that purpose used for the procurement of the attack and light bomber types. Experimentation and research for F. Y. 1940 to be confined to medium and light bombers, pursuit or other light aircraft.

2. *Analysis and Discussion.* *a.* The following table shows a comparison between the original F. Y. 1939 Program and the changes directed to date, including *revised cost estimates:*

Original Approved F. Y. 1939 Program			F. Y. 1939 Programs as Now Revised Bases on Latest Cost Estimates	
147	Pursuit Monoplane	$6,074,628	147 Pursuit Monoplane	$7,350,000
13	Pursuit Interceptors	1,920,477	13 Pursuit Interceptors	1,920,477
91	Bombers (2-Eng.)	13,769,574	13 B–17 Bombers (4-Eng) [1]	3,550,000
			78 B–18A Bombers (2-Eng) [1]	7,400,000
119	Attack Bombers	10,195,087	119 Attack Bombers	14,300,000
24	C. & A. Observation	1,190,880	24 C. & A. Observation	1,190,880
394	Totals	33,150,646	394 Totals	35,711,357
			For G. F. E. Deficiency FY '38	1,600,000
			Total Funds Required	37,311,357
			Savings from F. Y. 1938 to apply [1]	2,950,000
			Balance Required	34,361,357

[1] NOTE.—Savings in F. Y. 1938 funds in amount of $2,950,000 (including YB–20 Project) have been applied toward the purchase of these planes. Present indicated shortage in funds to carry out the revised F. Y. 1939 Program—$1,210,711 ($34,361,357—$33,150,646).

b. In addition to the above the following projects are under consideration for F. Y. 1939 and will require funds as follows:

[2] 9 B–18A's (remainder of options for which funds were directed to be reserved by the Assistant Secretary of War)	$ 850,000
Changes to 78 B–18A's (larger engines and superchargers to obtain greater speed)	1,500,000
Purchase of 6 Commercial type training planes (Assistant Secretary of War has directed that this item be resubmitted by Chief of the Air Corps for F. Y. 1939 procurement)	25,000
Total for Additional Projects	2,375,000

From the above a grand total of $3,585,711 will be required in addition to funds now appropriated for F. Y.1939 airplane procurement to carry out the revised program and additional projects under consideration.

c. (1) Under the directive to use the funds now set up in F. Y. 1940 estimates for 4-engine bombers for the procurement of attack-bombers, the F. Y. 1939 and F. Y. 1940 requirements for this airplane can be combined at a substantial savings in unit cost. (Present estimates indicate that for lots of over 200, the cost complete will not exceed $100,000 each—a saving of $20,000 per airplane).

(2) The following table shows the present situation with respect to the numbers of medium and light bomber types on hand, on order or in approved programs:

B–18's on hand	177	Attack on Hand (Modern type, 600-lb. bomb load)	234
B–18's on order	133	B10B's (Martin) (Part in dead storage for lack of crews)	124
B–18A's on order (revised F. Y. 1939 Program)	78	Attack-Bomber, F. Y. 1939 Program	119
Total	388	Total	477
Total Medium and Light Bomber Types			865

An additional 112 Attack-Bombers now set up in Woodring Program for F. Y. 1941.

By utilizing all of the available funds now set up in the F. Y. 1940 estimates for the 67 heavy 4-engine bombers under the Woodring Program (23,450,000), and by combining these funds with available funds for attack-bombers in the revised F. Y. 1939 Program, a total of approximately 340 Attack-bombers can be procured. This will provide 154 more bombing airplanes than originally planned for by previously approved programs (67 heavy bombers under the Woodring and 119 Attack-Bombers in the F. Y. 1939 Program—Total 186). As personnel is not available to provide crews for these additional planes they will have to be distributed to active squadrons; thus bringing the normal number of 13 per squadron to approximately 20 per squadron.

[3] Furthermore, the procurement of additional bombers will accentuate the existing shortage in bombs which was based on requirements under the Woodring Program. The approved bomb procurement program (OCS 17874–8, June 21, 1937) contemplates the procurement of bombs in step with planes to maintain a proper balance between planes and bombs.

(3) In view of the above, G–4 believes that a part of the F. Y. 1940 airplane funds should be used to reduce the critical shortage in bombs. With present stocks, including the funds in the F. Y. 1939 Appropriation Act, there will still be a shortage of $7,434,946 to complete 30 missions of bombs for the bombing airplanes in the original program. Of this amount, $3,717,473 is now carried in the estimates for F. Y. 1940. G–4 believes it to be advisable to provide the remainder, $3,717,473, by reducing the funds set up for airplanes in F. Y. 1940 by this amount (about 37 planes).

(4) G–4 also considers it advisable to deduct from the funds to be available for attack-bombers in F. Y. 1939, the $3,585,711 shown to be required for predicted deficit and the additional projects in Paragraph *b* above.

(5) Under the above plan, funds for the procurement of attack-bombers will be available as follows:

F. Y. 1939	$10,714,289	($14,300,000—$3,585,711)
F. Y. 1940	19,732,572	(23,450,000— 3,717,473)
Total	30,446,816—to be available.	

These funds will permit the procurement of approximately 304 attack-bombers by a combined procurement for F.Y. 1939 and F.Y. 1940 (estimated unit cost $100,000, which may be considerably reduced by a purchase of 300 or more).

II. *Action recommended.* The Secretary of War directs:

1. That a letter substantially as follows be sent to the Chief of the Air Corps:

a. The tentative estimates submitted for F. Y. 1940, based on the airplane requirements under the Woodring Air Corps Program, will be resubmitted on the following basis:

(1) The requirement for the 4-engine heavy bombardment type is cancelled for this Fiscal Year.

[4] (2) Funds in the amount of $23,450,000 tentatively set up for the above requirement will be reduced by $3,717,473 to provide for the critical shortage in stocks of airplane bombs. The remaining funds; i. e., $19,732,527, will be applied to the procurement of attack-bombers.

(3) Estimates will include requirements for radio and navigation equipment and armament for airplanes in Program as revised.

b. Funds in the approximate amount of $10,714,289 will be made available in F. Y. 1939 for the procurement of attack-bombers.

c. Funds will be held in reserve by the Chief of the Air Corps in F. Y. 1939 to provide for the following requirements:

9 B–18A's to complete present options (estimates $850,000).
6 Commercial type training planes (estimated $25,000).
Funds to provide B–18's in F. Y. 1939 Program with increased speed and performance (estimated $1,500,000).

2. That the Chief, Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, be advised of the above action.

3. That the Assistant Secretary of War be informed of the action directed in Paragraph 1 above.

III. *Concurrences.*

The A. C. of S., G–1 (LDG)
The A. C. of S., G–2 (ERN)
The A. C. of S., G–3 (RMB)
The A. C. of S., WPD (GCM)

ACTION TAKEN: Ltr. to C. of A. C. and copy for: ASW, 8–5–38 ERH:IG and B & L. P. B.

/S/ George P. Tyner,
GEORGE P. TYNER,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

[Stamped] Aug. 3, 1938. Approved. By order of the Secretary of War.

/S/ S. D. Embick
S. D. EMBICK,
Major General,
Deputy Chief of Staff,

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JOINT COMMITTEE INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS

(The Joint Committee Exhibit to which each Item relates will be found indicated in parenthesis following the description of the particular Item)

ITEM NO. DESCRIPTION

1. Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing the record of early flights 7 December 1941 obtained by OPANA radar detection station. (Ex. 4)
2. Map of North Pacific Ocean showing distances in miles between Honolulu, T. H. and San Francisco, California; Honolulu, T. H. and Hawaii, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Christmas Islands; and Honolulu, T. H. and Tokyo, Japan. (Ex. 5)
3. Map of Hawaiian Islands showing disposition of Army forces. (Ex. 5)
4. Map of Oahu showing Army installations, including airfields. (Ex. 5)
5. Diagram of Wheeler Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and formations of attacking planes, times of attacks, disposition of U. S. planes, and locations of bomb explosions in Japanese attack on 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 5)
6. Diagram of Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and formations of attacking Japanese planes, times of attacks, disposition of U. S. planes, and locations of bomb explosions in Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 5)
7. Diagram of Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H., showing numbers and formations of attacking Japanese planes, times of attacks and disposition of U. S. planes in Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 5)
8. Map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the disposition of the U. S. Pacific Fleet on 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
9. Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing fleet operating areas in the Hawaiian Area. (Ex. 6)
10. Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing U. S. Naval Installations in the Hawaiian area showing U. S. Naval Installations in the Hawaiian area. (Ex. 6)
11. Map of the South Coast of Oahu, T. H., showing the approaches to the Pearl Harbor Entrance Channel and the Inshore Patrol Area. (Ex. 6)
12. Map showing the Pearl Harbor Anchorage Plan, 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
13. Diagram showing air searches flown in the Hawaiian area (a) 6 Dec. 1941, (b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941, and (c) after the Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
14. Map of Oahu, T. H., showing the disposition, number, types, and operational and readiness condition of U. S. Navy aircraft on 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
15. Map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the track of the Japanese Striking Force. (Ex. 6)
16. Diagram showing air searches flown in the Hawaiian area (a) 6 Dec. 1941, (b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941, and (c) after the Japanese attack, and the track of the Japanese Striking Force. (Ex. 6)
17. Diagram showing track of Japanese plane attack routes over Oahu, T. H. (Ex. 6)
18. Map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the OPANA radar detector station. 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 7)
19. Rough sketch map of the islands of Oahu and Kaui and the Kaui Channel, bearing notations of information obtained with reference to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations 7 Dec. 1941 as described in the report of Robert N. Tait, Special Agent, CIC, dated 13 Oct. 1945 at Sasebo, Kyushu. (Ex. 8)
20. Chart of a method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius of 833 miles from Oahu employing 72 B–17D airplanes. (Ex. 13)
21. Chart showing relation of 25 miles visibility to distance. (Ex. 13)
22. Chart showing radius of action of B–17D airplane under various load conditions in relation to possible plans of action of carrier group attacking Oahu, assuming carrier speed of 30 knots and carrier planes performance 600 mile range. (Ex. 13)

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION
23.	Chart showing radius of action of B–17D airplane under various load conditions in relation to possible plans of action of carrier group attacking Oahu, assuming carrier speed of 27 knots and carrier planes performance 400 mile range. (Ex. 13)
24.	Schedule for B–17D combat crews. (Ex. 13)
25.	Map reflecting disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet 7 Dec. 1941 together with typewritten table reflecting the positions of the U. S. S. BOISE at times indicated. (Ex. 68)
26.	Guide to symbols employed on maps prepared by Admiral R. K. Turner. (Ex.109)
27.	Map dated 1 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
28.	Map dated 2 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
29.	Map dated 3 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
30.	Map dated 4 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
31.	Map dated 5 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
32.	Map dated 6 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
33.	Map showing disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet 7 Dec. 1941 and particularly the location of the U. S. S. WRIGHT on 27 November and 7 December 1941. (Ex. 125)
34.	Map of Communications Installations on Island on Oahu, T. H., as of 7 July 1941. (Ex. 133)
35.	Map of Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Police Districts, Railroad Bridges and Highway Bridges. (Ex. 133)
36.	Map of Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Electric Installations and Generating Plants . (Ex. 133)
37.	Map of City of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 152)
38.	Original Radar Plot of Station OPANA, 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 155)

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
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
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SAKHALIN
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HOKKAIDO
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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
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MIDWAY
Pearl and Hermes Reef
Lisianski
Maro Reef
Gardner Pinnacles
French Frigate Shoals
Necker
Nihoa
Kauai
Oahu
Molokai
Maui
Hawaii
HAWAII
220
3,387
1,141
2,100
716
960
1,161
JOHNSTON I.
PALMYRA
CHRISTMAS I.
Tropic of Cancer
Equator
Date Line
Monday
Sunday
Wake
MARIANAS ISLANDS
Guam
Japanese Mandate
MARSHALL ISLANDS
CAROLINE ISLANDS
GILBERT ISLANDS
Australian Mandate
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
NEW GUINEA
SOLOMON ISLANDS
PHOENIX ISLANDS
United States Great Britain
United States New Zealand
Great Britain
QUEEN CHARLOTTE ISLANDS
VANCOUVER ISLAND
SAN FRANCISCO
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAP
Scale 1:27,000,000 or 434 miles to the inch at the Equator
STATUTE MILES
MARQUESAS
Mercator Projection


NIIHAU
KAUAI
3d BN 299th INF (-K & L)
CO C 299th INF
1st PLAT SIG CO AW
AC DET
24th INF DIV (-299th INF)
25th INF DIV
HAW C A COMMAND
HAW AIR FORCE
OAHU
PEARL HARBOR
CO K 299th INF
MOLOKAI
LANAI
1st BN 299th INF (-C)
4th PLAT SIG CO AW
AC DET
MAUI
KAHOOLAWE
2nd BN 299th INF
KMC DET
5th PLAT SIG CO AW
AC DET
HAWAII
N
S
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
30 20 10 0 30 60
SCALE


OAHU
STATUTE MILES
KAHUKU PT.
HALEIWA
KOOLAU RANGE
KAENA PT.
WAIANAE RANGE
MT. KAALA
KOLEKOLE PASS
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
WAHIAWA
WHEELER FIELD
NAS KANEOHE
MOKAPU PEN.
WAIANAE
KIPAPA FIELD
WAIPAHU
PEARL HARBOR
BELLOWS FIELD
EWA
FT. KAMEHAMEHA
FT. SHAFTER
EWA FIELD
NAS BARBERS FIELD
HICKAM FIELD
NAS HONOLULU
MAKAPUU PT.
HONOLULU
BARBERS PT.
FT. DE RUSSY
DIAMOND HEAD
N


0802
25 PLANES
0900
7 PLANES
WHEELER FIELD
SCALE IN FEET
500
1000
2000
PREPARED BY OA&P SECTION, OPD


0755
3 Planes
0900
6-9 Planes
0826
5-6 Planes
N
0755
7 Planes
0755
9 Planes
0900
7-9 Planes
0825
6-9 Planes
0755
9 Planes
HICKAM FIELD
SCALE IN FEET
0
300
1500
3000
PREPARED BY OA&P SECTION, OPD


0900
9 PLANES
N
BELLOWS FIELD
150 300 450 600
SCALE IN FEET
PREPARED BY OA&P SECTION, OPD


DISPOSITION OF
U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
7 DEC. 1941
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CHINA
AUSTRALIA
UNITED STATES
N O R T H P A C I F I C O C E A N
BERING SEA
OKHOTSK SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
CHUKCHI SEA
ALASKA
VICTORIA ISLAND
HUDSON BAY
DOMINION
GILLIS AVD
GULF OF ALASKA
BRAZOS AO
COLORADO BB
CASCO AVP
WILLIAMSON AVD
TEAL AVP
6 DESTROYERS
1 SEAPLANE TENDER
1 STORE SHIP
5 SUBMARINES
3 OILERS
PROCYON AK
BOREAS AF
ALDEBARAN AF
SEPULGA AO
PLATTE AO
SEMINOLE AT
PINOLA AT
TIPPECANOE AO
BALLARD AVD
1 AIRCRAFT CARRIER
1 LIGHT CRUISER
3 DESTROYERS
4 SUBMARINES
1 TRANSPORT
1 SUB RESCUE
1 OILER
ARGONAUT SM
TROUT SS
REGULUS AK
NECHES AO
TAMBOR SS
TRITON SS
TASK FORCE 12
SONOMA AT
WRIGHT AV
PLUNGER SS
POLLACK SS
POMPANO SS
TASK FORCE 8
TASK FORCE 3
WM. WARD BURROWS AP
ROBIN AM
ANTARES AKS
VEGA AK
PACIFIC FLEET
AT
PEARL HARBOR
SEAGULL AM, ARCTIC AF
MINNEAPOLIS CA
CHANDLER DMS
HOVEY DMS
BOGGS DMS
LAMBERTON DMS
LITCHFIELD DD
THRESHER SS
HARRY LUCKENBACH
JANE CHRISTENSEN
MAUNA LOA
IRVING L. HUNT
KAULA AG
HAWAIIAN PLANTER
LUDINGTON
LOUISVILLE CA
(2-SHIP CONVOY)
PENSACOLA CA
(8-SHIP CONVOY)
KINGFISHER AM
GAR SS
FULTON AS
TRENTON CL
RICHMOND CL
SEATTLE - YOKOHAMA
YOKOHAMA - SEATTLE
SAN FRANCISCO - YOKOHAMA
HONOLULU - YOKOHAMA
HONOLULU - MANILA
ROUTE TO PHILIPPINES
INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE
PHILIPPINE IS
MARIANAS
CAROLINE ISLANDS
MARSHALL IS
GILBERT IS
FIJI IS
TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO
SOLOMON
NEW GUINEA
CORAL SEA
TASMAN SEA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
JAVA SEA
BANDA SEA
CELEBES SEA
SULU SEA
MEXICO
GULF OF MEXICO
CARIBBEAN SEA
PERU
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
Honolulu
Midway
Wake I
Guam
Manila
Singapore
Darwin
Brisbane
Sydney
Melbourne
Auckland
Suva
Pearl Harbor
San Diego
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Seattle
Portland
Panama Canal
Balboa
Cristobal
Valparaiso
Callao
Lima
Guayaquil
Galapagos Is
Easter I.
Tahiti
Samoa
Fiji
Tonga
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Hawaiian Is
Aleutian Islands
Kuril Islands
Sakhalin I
Kamchatka Pen.
Japan
Formosa
Hainan
Indochina
Thailand
Malaya
Borneo
Sumatra
Java
New Guinea
Solomon Is
Caroline Islands
Marshall Is
Gilbert Is
Marianas
Philippine Is
Mindanao
Luzon
Shanghai
Hankow
Chungking
Canton
Foochow
Amoy
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Yokohama
Tokyo
Nagoya
Osaka
Kobe
Hiroshima
Nagasaki
Sasebo
Kure
Yokosuka
Vladivostok
Petropavlovsk
Nikolaevsk
Aleksandrovsk
Sakhalin I
Kuril Islands
Shumushu
Paramushiro
Attu
Kiska
Adak
Dutch Harbor
Unalaska
Kodiak
Juneau
Sitka
Ketchikan
Prince Rupert
Vancouver
Victoria
Seattle
Portland
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Diego
Long Beach
Bremerton
Astoria
Eureka
Salt Lake City
Denver
Chicago
New York
Washington
Norfolk
Charleston
Savannah
Jacksonville
Miami
New Orleans
Galveston
Houston
Corpus Christi
Brownsville
Matamoros
Tampico
Veracruz
Acapulco
Manzanillo
Mazatlan
La Paz
Guaymas
Magdalena Bay
Cristobal
Balboa
Panama Canal
Curacao
Trinidad
Barbados
Jamaica
Cuba
Haiti
Puerto Rico
Bermuda
Azores
Gibraltar
Malta
Suez Canal
Port Said
Alexandria
Cairo
Aden
Bombay
Calcutta
Madras
Colombo
Karachi
Rangoon
Bangkok
Saigon
Singapore
Penang
Batavia
Surabaya
Makassar
Kupang
Timor
Darwin
Port Moresby
Rabaul
Noumea
Suva
Auckland
Wellington
Christchurch
Dunedin
Hobart
Melbourne
Sydney
Brisbane
Townsville
Cairns
Thursday I
Torres Strait
Great Barrier Reef
Coral Sea
Tasman Sea
Great Australian Bight
Spencer Gulf
Gulf of Carpentaria
Arafura Sea
Timor Sea
Java Sea
Banda Sea
Celebes Sea
Sulu Sea
South China Sea
Gulf of Thailand
Gulf of Tonkin
Yellow Sea
Sea of Japan
Okhotsk Sea
Bering Sea
Chukchi Sea
Beaufort Sea
Hudson Bay
Baffin Bay
Davis Strait
Labrador Sea
Gulf of St. Lawrence
Gulf of Alaska
Gulf of Mexico
Caribbean Sea
Panama Canal
Strait of Magellan
Cape Horn
Drake Passage
Antarctica
Ross Sea
Weddell Sea
Antarctic Peninsula
Graham Land
Palmer Land
Ellsworth Land
Marie Byrd Land
Victoria Land
Ross Ice Shelf
Ross Dependency
Amundsen Gulf
Prince of Wales Strait
Victoria Island
Banks Island
Melville Pen.
Foxe Land
Southampton Island
Baffin Island
Ellesmere Island
Greenland
Iceland
Faroe Is
Shetland Is
Orkney Is
Hebrides
Ireland
Scotland
England
Wales
France
Spain
Portugal
Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
Italy
Sicily
Sardinia
Corsica
Balearic Is
Canary Is
Madeira
Cape Verde Is
Azores
Bermuda
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Prince Edward I
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Alaska
Hawaii
Midway
Wake I
Guam
Saipan
Tinian
Rota
Palau Is
Yap
Truk
Ponape
Kusaie
Jaluit
Majuro
Eniwetok
Kwajalein
Wotje
Maloelap
Mili
Makin
Tarawa
Nauru
Ocean I
Canton I
Enderbury I
Christmas I
Fanning I
Palmyra I
Johnston I
Howland I
Baker I
Phoenix Is
Line Is
Tokelau Is
Ellice Is
Gilbert Is
Marshall Is
Caroline Islands
Marianas
Philippine Is
Mindanao
Luzon
Mindoro
Panay
Negros
Cebu
Leyte
Samar
Palawan
Sulu Archipelago
Celebes
Borneo
Sumatra
Java
Bali
Lombok
Sumbawa
Flores
Timor
Aru Is
Tanimbar Is
New Guinea
Bismarck Archipelago
New Britain
New Ireland
Admiralty Is
Solomon Is
Santa Cruz Is
New Hebrides
New Caledonia
Loyalty Is
Norfolk I
Lord Howe I
Kermadec Is
Tonga Is
Fiji Is
Samoa
Cook Is
Society Is
Tuamotu Archipelago
Marquesas Is
Pitcairn I
Easter I
Juan Fernandez Is
Galapagos Is
Cocos I
Clipperton I
Revillagigedo Is
Guadalupe I
Socorro I
Baja California
Gulf of California
Mexico
Guatemala
Honduras
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Bolivia
Paraguay
Argentina
Uruguay
Brazil
Falkland Is
South Georgia
South Sandwich Is
South Orkney Is
South Shetland Is
Bouvet I
Prince Edward Is
Crozet Is
Kerguelen Is
Heard I
McDonald Is
Australian Antarctic Territory
French Antarctic Territory
Queen Maud Land
Enderby Land
Kemp Land
Mac. Robertson Land
Princess Elizabeth Land
Wilkes Land
Adelie Land
George V Land
Oates Land
Victoria Land
Marie Byrd Land
Ellsworth Land
Palmer Land
Graham Land
Weddell Sea
Ross Sea
Ross Ice Shelf
Ross Dependency
Amundsen Sea
Bellingshausen Sea
Scotia Sea
Drake Passage
Strait of Magellan
Cape Horn
Tierra del Fuego
Patagonia
Argentine Basin
Brazil Basin
Cape Basin
Angola Basin
Guinea Basin
Sierra Leone Basin
Canary Basin
Iberian Basin
Biscay Basin
Rockall Basin
Norwegian Basin
Greenland Basin
Iceland Basin
Labrador Basin
Newfoundland Basin
Nova Scotia Basin
Gulf of Mexico
Caribbean Sea
Panama Canal
Strait of Magellan
Cape Horn
Drake Passage
Antarctica
Ross Sea
Weddell Sea
Antarctic Peninsula
Graham Land
Palmer Land
Ellsworth Land
Marie Byrd Land
Victoria Land
Ross Ice Shelf
Ross Dependency
Amundsen Gulf
Prince of Wales Strait
Victoria Island
Banks Island
Melville Pen.
Foxe Land
Southampton Island
Baffin Island
Ellesmere Island
Greenland
Iceland
Faroe Is
Shetland Is
Orkney Is
Hebrides
Ireland
Scotland
England
Wales
France
Spain
Portugal
Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
Italy
Sicily
Sardinia
Corsica
Balearic Is
Canary Is
Madeira
Cape Verde Is
Azores
Bermuda
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Prince Edward I
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Alaska
Hawaii

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

Published at Washington, D.C., June 1946
BY THE U.S. COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY
L. O. Colbert, Director

LIGHTS, BEACONS, BUOYS AND SOUNDINGS CORRECTED FOR INFORMATION RECEIVED TO DATE OF ISSUE

(Hawaiian Islands) U.S.C.& G.S. 4102
PRICE 75 CENTS
79716 O—46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 9



Published Washington, D.C. June 1942
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O. H. Gabert, Director

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(Hawaiian Islands) U.S.C.


HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
SOUTH COAST OF OAHU
AHUA POINT TO BARBERS POINT
SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS
AT MEAN LOWER LOW WATER
PEARL HARBOR
Middle Loch
East Loch
West Loch
Lake Honolua
Lake Ee
PEARL CITY
FORD I.
WAIPIO PENINSULA
HONOLULU
Honolulu Harbor
Keehi L.
Keehi Lagoon
Kewalo Basin
Kapalama Basin
Sand Island
Makalapa Crater
Kamanuu
Halawa Pt.
Iroquois Pt.
WATERTOWN
Bishop Pt.
Aiea Bay
Aiea Pt.
Pearlridge
Waimalu
Waiau
Waiawa
Waimano
Waiau Power Plant
Waiau Pt.
Waiawa Pt.
Waimano Pt.
Pearl Harbor Naval Base
Naval Magazine
Naval Ammunition Depot
Naval Hospital
Naval Base
Naval Air Station
Naval Supply Depot
Naval Radio Station
Naval Air Station Landing Field
Naval Air Station Seaplane Base
Naval Air Station Seaplane Ramp
Naval Air Station Seaplane Hangar
Naval Air Station Seaplane Runway
Naval Air Station Seaplane Taxiway
Naval Air Station Seaplane Apron
Naval Air Station Seaplane Parking
Naval Air Station Seaplane Tie-down
Naval Air Station Seaplane Mooring
Naval Air Station Seaplane Anchorage
Naval Air Station Seaplane Channel
Naval Air Station Seaplane Turning Basin
Naval Air Station Seaplane Approach
Naval Air Station Seaplane Departure
Naval Air Station Seaplane Traffic Pattern
Naval Air Station Seaplane Control Tower
Naval Air Station Seaplane Operations
Naval Air Station Seaplane Maintenance
Naval Air Station Seaplane Repair
Naval Air Station Seaplane Overhaul
Naval Air Station Seaplane Storage
Naval Air Station Seaplane Supply
Naval Air Station Seaplane Fuel
Naval Air Station Seaplane Oil
Naval Air Station Seaplane Water
Naval Air Station Seaplane Power
Naval Air Station Seaplane Light
Naval Air Station Seaplane Beacon
Naval Air Station Seaplane Buoy
Naval Air Station Seaplane Marker
Naval Air Station Seaplane Sign
Naval Air Station Seaplane Signal
Naval Air Station Seaplane Radio
Naval Air Station Seaplane Radar
Naval Air Station Seaplane Sonar
Naval Air Station Seaplane Loran
Naval Air Station Seaplane Decca
Naval Air Station Seaplane Omega
Naval Air Station Seaplane Transit
Naval Air Station Seaplane Satellite
Naval Air Station Seaplane Navigation
Naval Air Station Seaplane Chart
Naval Air Station Seaplane Publication
Naval Air Station Seaplane Notice
Naval Air Station Seaplane Warning
Naval Air Station Seaplane Danger
Naval Air Station Seaplane Caution
Naval Air Station Seaplane Restriction
Naval Air Station Seaplane Prohibition
Naval Air Station Seaplane Regulation
Naval Air Station Seaplane Rule
Naval Air Station Seaplane Law
Naval Air Station Seaplane Treaty
Naval Air Station Seaplane Convention
Naval Air Station Seaplane Agreement
Naval Air Station Seaplane Contract
Naval Air Station Seaplane Lease
Naval Air Station Seaplane Deed
Naval Air Station Seaplane Title
Naval Air Station Seaplane Property
Naval Air Station Seaplane Boundary
Naval Air Station Seaplane Survey
Naval Air Station Seaplane Map
Naval Air Station Seaplane Chart
Naval Air Station Seaplane Publication
Naval Air Station Seaplane Notice
Naval Air Station Seaplane Warning
Naval Air Station Seaplane Danger
Naval Air Station Seaplane Caution
Naval Air Station Seaplane Restriction
Naval Air Station Seaplane Prohibition
Naval Air Station Seaplane Regulation
Naval Air Station Seaplane Rule
Naval Air Station Seaplane Law
Naval Air Station Seaplane Treaty
Naval Air Station Seaplane Convention
Naval Air Station Seaplane Agreement
Naval Air Station Seaplane Contract
Naval Air Station Seaplane Lease
Naval Air Station Seaplane Deed
Naval Air Station Seaplane Title
Naval Air Station Seaplane Property
Naval Air Station Seaplane Boundary
Naval Air Station Seaplane Survey
Naval Air Station Seaplane Map
ANTI-TORPEDO NET
ANTI-TORPEDO & ANTI-BOAT NET
INSHORE PATROL AREA
BARBERS PT.
Kualaka'i
Ewa Beach
Ahua Pt.
ONE NAUTICAL MILE


PEARL HARBOR
ANCHORAGE PLAN
7 DEC. 1941
ONE NAUTICAL MILE
N
EAST LOCH
PEARL CITY PENINSULA
FORD ISLAND
MONOGHAN - DD
FARRAGUT - DD
DALE - DD
AYLWIN - DD
HENLEY - DD
PATTERSON - DD
RALPH TALBOT - DD
SELFRIDGE - DD
CASE - DD
TUCKER - DD
REID - DD
CONYNGHAM - DD
WHITNEY - AD
HELM - DD
BLUE - DD
PHOENIX - CL
PHELPS - DD
MACDONOUGH - DD
WORDEN - DD
DEWEY - DD
HULL - DD
DOBBIN - AD
DETROIT - CL
RALEIGH - CL
SOLACE - AH
ALLEN - DD
CHEW - DD
RAMSAY - DM
GAMBLE - DM
MONTGOMERY - DM
TREVER - DD
BRIESE - DM
ZANE - DD
PERRY - DD
WASMUTH - DD
MEDUSA - AR
UTAH - AG
CURTISS - AV
TANGIER - AV
NEVADA BB
ARIZONA BB
VESTAL AR
TENNESSEE BB
W. VIRGINIA BB
MARYLAND BB
OKLAHOMA BB
NEOSHO - AO
CALIFORNIA BB
AVOCET - AVP
OGLALA - CM
HELENA - CL
CACHALOT - SS
PENNSYLVANIA - BB
SHAW - DD
CASSIN - DD
DOWNES - DD
PELIAS - AS
SUMNER - AGS
CASTOR - AKS
U.S. NAVAL STATION
HALAWA
HICKAM FIELD
ANTI-TORPEDO NET
ANTI-TORPEDO AND ANTI-BOAT NET
U.S. ARMY RESERVATION
Fort Kamehameha
SIGNALS


180°
170°
160°
MIDWAY
RADIUS 400 MI.
RADIUS 400 MI.
RADIUS 400 MI.
RADIUS 300 MI.
RADIUS 200 MI.
PEARL HARBOR
ENTERPRISE
RADIUS 150 MI.
ENTERPRISE
AIR SEARCHES FLOWN IN HAWAIIAN AREA.
6 DECEMBER 1941
PRIOR TO ATTACK, 7 DEC.
AFTER ATTACK, 7 DEC.
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
200 NAUTICAL MILES


HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
O A H U
SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS AT MEAN LOWER LOW WATER
NAS MIDWAY
SQDRN PLANES CONDITION
VP 21 12 PBY-3 7 PLANES IN THE AIR 5 PLANES ON 10 MIN. NOTICE
EWA
SQDRN PLANES CONDITION
VMSB 231 7 SB2U-3 ALL OPERATIONAL
VMSB 232 3 SBD-2 1 SBD-1 PARTIALLY STRIPPED- NO ENGINE INSTALLED.
19 SBD-1
VMJ 252 2 R3D-2 1 IN A&R SHOP AT FORD ISLAND.
1 J0-2
2 J2F-4 UTILITY-NON COMBATANT
1 JRS-1 " "
1 SNJ-3 " "
1 SB2U-3 " "
1 SBD-1 " "
VMF-211 11 F4F-3 1 UNDER MINOR OVERHAUL
EWA, OAHU, T.H. NAVAL AIR STATION
OPERATIONAL EXPLAINED: COMBAT AIRCRAFT- GENERAL CONDITION FOR BASED PLANES DURING PEACE- TIME WHEN USED FOR TRAINING ONLY.
WAKE
SQDRN PLANES CONDITION
VMF 211 12 F4F-3 OPERATIONAL
JOHNSTON ISLAND
SQDRN PLANES CONDITION
VJ 2 2 PBY-1 OPERATIONAL
NAS PEARL HARBOR (FORD ISLAND)
SQDRN PLANES CONDITION
VP 21 1 PBY-3 1 UNDER REPAIR
VP 22 14 PBY-3 12 READY ON 4-HRS. NOTICE, 2 UNDER REPAIR.
VP 23 12 PBY-5 11 READY ON 4-HRS. NOTICE
1 UNDER REPAIR
VP 24 6 PBY-5 1 READY ON 30-MIN. NOTICE
4 IN THE AIR
1 UNDER REPAIR
VJ 1 9 J2F UTILITY-NON COMBATANT
9 JRS " " "
VJ 2 10 J2F " " "
2 PBY-1 " " "
VF 2 3 F3A-3 LEFT BY USS LEXINGTON
VF 3 1 F4F-3 LEFT BY USS SARATOGA
VB 6 1 SBD-2 LEFT BY USS ENTERPRISE
VB 2 1 SBD-2 LEFT BY USS LEXINGTON
VS 2 1 SBD-2 LEFT BY USS LEXINGTON
O A H U
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
NAS KANEOHE
SQDRN PLANES CONDITION
VP 11 12 PBY-5 12 READY ON 4 HRS. NOT
VP 12 12 PBY-5 5 READY ON 4 HRS. NOT
6 READY ON 10-MIN. NOT
1 UNDER REPAIR
VP 14 12 PBY-5 4 READY ON 4 HRS. NOT
3 READY ON 10-MIN. NOT
3 IN THE AIR
2 UNDER REPAIR
1 OS2U (COMMANDANTS PL
WARMING UP ON STR
FORD ISLAND NAVAL AIR STATION
NAS PUUNENE, MAUI
SQDRN PLANES CONDITION
VJ 3 4 JRB OPERATIVE
UTILITY 1 J2F OPERATIVE
1 JRF OPERATIVE
2 BT-1 OPERATIVE
(ALL UTILITY - NON COMBATANT)
DISPOSITION, NUMBER, TYPES, OPERATIONAL AND READINESS CONDITION OF AIR CRAFT. DEC. 7, 1941.
NAUTICAL MILES


DISPOSITION OF
U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
7 DEC. 1941
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CHINA
AUSTRALIA
N O R T H P A C I F I C O C E A N
BERING SEA
OKHOTSK SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
CHUKCHI SEA
ALASKA
UNITED STATES
DOMINION
VICTORIA ISLAND
HUDSON BAY
GULF OF ALASKA
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
KURIL ISLANDS
SAKHALIN I
PHILIPPINE IS
CAROLINE ISLANDS
MARSHALL IS
GILBERT IS
MARIANAS
SOLOMON IS
NEW GUINEA
CORAL SEA
FIJI IS
TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO
MEXICO
GULF OF MEXICO
HITOKAPPU BAY
DEPART 1330
25 NOV.
A 43-00N 159-30E
B, 3 DEC. 43-00N 178-00W
C 2130 - 6 DEC. 31-00N - 158-00W
D, 0730 - 7 DEC. 28-00N - 158-00W
E 37-00N 172-00W
F 37-00N 175-00E
G 36-00N 170-00E
H 28-00N 141-00E
I 32-00N 133-00E
INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE
HONOLULU - YOKOHAMA
HONOLULU - SHANGHAI
YOKOHAMA - SEATTLE
SEATTLE - YOKOHAMA
SAN FRANCISCO - YOKOHAMA
GILLIS AVD
BRAZOS AO
COLORADO BB
CASCO AVP
WILLIAMSON AVD
TEAL AVP
6 DESTROYERS
1 SEAPLANE TENDER
1 STORE SHIP
5 SUBMARINES
3 OILERS
PROCYON AK
BOREAS AF
ALDEBARAN AF
SEPULGA AO
PLATTE AO
PINOLA AT
TIPPECANOE AO
BALLARD AVD
SEMINOLE AT
NECHES AO
1 AIRCRAFT CARRIER
1 LIGHT CRUISER
3 DESTROYERS
4 SUBMARINES
1 TRANSPORT
1 SUB RESCUE
1 OILER
ARGONAUT SM
TROUT SS
REGULUS AK
WRIGHT AV
PLUNGER SS
POLLACK SS
POMPANO SS
TASK FORCE 12
SONOMA AT
TASK FORCE 8
TASK FORCE 3
ROBIN AM
PACIFIC FLEET
AT
PEARL HARBOR
ANTARES AKS
VEGA AK
SEAGULL AM, ARCTIC AF
MINNEAPOLIS CA
CHANDLER DMS
HOVEY DMS
BOGGS DMS
LAMBERTON DMS
LITCHFIELD DD
THRESHER SS
TAMBOR SS
TRITON SS
WM. WARD BURROWS AP
HARRY LUCKENBACH
JANE CHRISTENSEN
MAUNA LOA
IRVING L. HUNT
KAULA AG
HAWAIIAN PLANTER
LUDINGTON
LOUISVILLE CA
(2-SHIP CONVOY)
PENSACOLA CA
(8-SHIP CONVOY)
KINGFISHER AM
GAR SS
FULTON AS
TRENTON CL
RICHMOND CL


180°
170°
160°
MIDWAY
RADIUS 400 MI.
RADIUS 400 MI.
JAP STRIKING FORCE
31-00N
158-00W
2130, 6 DEC.
JAP STRIKING FORCE
26-00N
158-00W
0730, 7 DEC.
RADIUS 400 MI.
RADIUS 300 MI.
RADIUS 200 MI.
PEARL HARBOR
RADIUS 150 MI.
ENTERPRISE
ENTERPRISE
AIR SEARCHES FLOWN IN HAWAIIAN AREA.
6 DECEMBER 1941
PRIOR TO ATTACK, 7 DEC.
AFTER ATTACK, 7 DEC.
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
200 NAUTICAL MILES

(TN SKETCH OF MOVEMENTS OF AIR UNITS AFTER THEY CAME IN SIGHT OF OAHU.)



1. Second Attack Unit.
2. Ordered to deploy at 0410 hours.
3. Dive bombing unit
4. Attack run ordered at 0425 hours.
5. Horizontal Bombing Unit
6. KANEOHE
7. HICKHAM
8. FORD Island
9. First Attack Unit

10. Ordered to deploy at 0310 hours.
11. Attack run ordered at 0320 hours.
12. Dive Bombing Unit.
13. WHEELER.
14. Torpedo Bombing Unit.
15. Horizontal Bombing Unit.
16. BARBERS POINT
17. Note: The Fighter Striking Units in each attack operated at will after

Secret

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Joint Committee on the Investig
of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S. Con. Res. 27
Exhibit No. 7 Date 11/17
Reporter Shaw

CLARA

DINAH

34 35

SECRET

COPIED 10 OCTOBER 1945 FROM SKETCH OF LT. TAIT (CIC USA) MADE DURING INTERVIEW H LT. COM. YOSHIS, SHIGA, IJN, AT OMURA.

PREPARED BY AC of S, G-2, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS.

TOP SECRET

79716 O—46—pt. 21

A METHOD OF SEARCHING 5° SECTORS THROUGH 360° TO A RADIUS OF 833 MILES FROM OAHU EMPLOYING 72 B-17D AIRPLANES.

1 VISIBILITY ASSUMED TO BE 25 MILES.
2 ALL MILES NAUTICAL.
3 CROSS-HATCHED AREAS INDICATE COVERAGE ON SEARCH OUT.
4 SHADED AREAS INDICATE OVERLAP.

(C-442-3/7C-17)[2-3-41]

Confidential



CHART 1

CONFIDENTIAL

METHOD OF CONSTRUCTING CURVES

1. These curves apply to the search out only.

2. This explanation is based on the 5° search sector. The principal employed in constructing the 5° curve applies in the construction of the curves for the 3° and 4° search sectors.

3. At sixty (60) nautical miles, 1° equals one (1) mile. At 1200 nautical miles 5° equals 100 miles. Since the area that can be searched by one plane at any time with 25 miles visibility, is 25 miles to either side, the area that can be covered on the search out between two planes is 50 nautical miles. Therefore at 1200 miles, 50% coverage is obtained.

4. From the solution above the following working formula can be applied to plot the curves:

$$\frac{\text{60 nautical miles}}{\text{Search radius in nautical miles}} \times \frac{\text{50 nautical miles}}{\text{Degree of search sector}}$$

If the answer is greater than one, it indicates coverage in excess of 100% and, therefore, overlap.

For example at 300 miles:

$$\frac{10}{\cancel{60}} \times \frac{\cancel{50}}{5} = 2 \text{ or, } 100\% \text{ overlap.}$$

RELATION OF 25 MILE VISIBILITY TO DISTANCE



(C-242-917C-17)(8-9-41) - CHART


S OF ACTION OF B-17D AIRPLANE
F VARIOUS LOAD CONDITIONS IN
TION TO POSSIBLE PLANS OF
ARRIER GROUP ATTACKING OAHU
S SHOWN ARE NAUTICAL MILES.
TIONS 2&3 INDICATE ONLY TWO
MANY CONDITIONS THAT MIGHT
UR DURING A 360° SEARCH
4. PERFOMANCE OF B-17D AIRPLANE:
FOR EACH RADIUS OF ACTION ALLOWANCE
IS MADE FOR 1HR. FULL THROTTLE OPERATIONS
AND 2HR. FUEL RESERVE.
A. RADIUS OF SEARCH 1067 MILES
2500 GAL. FUEL NO BOMBS
45% POWER OUT AND BACK
5,000 FEET ALTITUDE, 143 KNOTS.
B. RADIUS OF ATTACK FORCE 775 MILES
2093 GAL. FUEL 4-600# BOMBS
65% POWER OUT 45% BACK
15000 FEET ALTITUDE. 193 KNOTS OUT
C. RADIUS WITH MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD 58
1700 GAL. FUEL 8-500# BOMBS
65% POWER OUT, 45% BACK 15000 FEET
ALTITUDE. 193 KNOTS OUT.
5. ASSUMPTIONS
A. CARRIER SPEED 30 KNOTS
B. CARRIER PLANES PERFORMANCE
600 MILE RANGE AT 180 KNOTS
C. DAYLIGHT-13 HOURS, DARKNESS 11 HO
D. VISIBILTY-25 MILES
E. NO WIND
(0-252-917-C-17)(8-9-41
Confidential
SECTION 2
SECTION 3
SECTION 1
CV DAWN D DAY-1 1246 MILES
1067 MILES
RADIUS B-17D AP WITH 2500 GAL FUEL NO BOMBS AT 45% POWER
SEARCH FORCE INTERCEPTS CV AT D DAY-1 DAWN +7.12
1050 MILES
CV DUSK D DAY-1 856 MILES
CV DAWN D DAY-1 1070 MILES
775 MILES
SEARCH FORCE INTERCEPTS CV AT D DAY-1 DAWN+6.12 884 MILES
CV POS DUSK D DAY-1 680 MILES
SPEED 143 KNOTS
DARKNESS
CV DAWN D DAY 528 MILES
SEARCH FORCE
SEARCH FORCE INTERCEPTS CV AT DAWN-3.03 D DAY 435 MILES
ATTACK FORCE HITS CV AT D DAY-1 DAWN+6.24 485 MILES
ATTACK FORCE HITS CV AT DAWN+3.34 D DAY 339 MILES
CV LAUNCH PLANES
CV RECOVER PLANES
ATTACK FORCE TO DAWN+6.54 193 KNOTS
ATTACK FORCE TO DAWN +3.43 193 KNOTS
250 MILES
DARKNESS
NOON
DUSK-MIDNITE
RADIUS B-17D AP WITH 4-600# BOMBS AT 65% POWER
RADIUS B-17D AP WITH 2500 GAL FUEL NO BOMBS AT 45% POWER
RADIUS B-17D AP WITH 8-500# BOMBS 581 MILES AT 65% POWER
FRENCH FRIGATE SHOALS
KAUAI
OAHU
MAUI
HAWAII
A
B
C
D
CHART 3



1. RADIUS OF ACTION OF B-17D AIRPLANE [illegible] IN RELATION TO POSSIBLE PLANS OF ACTION OF A CARRIER GROUP ATTACKING OAHU.
2. MILES SHOWN ARE NAUTICAL MILES.
3. SECTIONS 5&6 INDICATE ONLY TWO OF MANY CONDITIONS THAT MIGHT OCCUR DURING A 360° SEARCH.
4. PERFORMANCE OF B-17D AIRPLANE FOR EACH RADIUS OF ACTION ALLOWANCE IS MADE FOR 1 HR FULL THROTTLE OPERATION AND 2 HR RESERVE.
   - A. RADIUS OF SEARCH 1067 MILES
     2500 GAL FUEL NO BOMBS
     45% POWER OUT AND BACK
     3000 FEET ALTITUDE 143 KNOTS
   - B. RADIUS OF ATTACK FORCE 175 MILES
     2093 GAL FUEL 4-600# BOMBS
     65% POWER OUT 45% BACK
     15000 FEET ALTITUDE 193 KNOTS
   - C. RADIUS WITH MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD: 581
     1700 GAL FUEL 8-500# BOMBS
     65% POWER OUT 45% BACK
     15000 FEET ALTITUDE 193 KNOTS
5. ASSUMPTIONS
   - A. CARRIER SPEED 27 KNOTS
   - B. CARRIER PLANES PERFORMANCE
     [illegible] AT 145 KNOTS
   - C. DAWN GIVEN 1 HOUR DARKNESS [illegible] HOURS
   - D. VISIBILITY 25 MILES
   - E. WIND [illegible]

(C-242-917-C-17)X 8-9-41

Confidential

CHART 4

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATING SCHEDULE FOR 216 B-17D COMBAT CREWS

DAYS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
SEARCH	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF
REST&TRNG.	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB
ALERT	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD

1. The 216 combat crews are divided into units of 36 each for the purpose of assignment to missions and are designated by the letters A to F inclusive.

2. On the 1st day of operations, Groups A and B search, C and D conduct training and rest, F is on the alert for an attack mission and the underscored group E is also on the alert for an attack mission if airplanes of the maintenance and reserve force are in commission. Thus it is planned that 72 combat crews will search daily, 72 will conduct training and rest and 72 will be on the alert for an attack mission.

3. It will be noted that over a thirty day period each unit will:

   a. Fly a total of 10 search missions averaging 10 hours per mission, or 100 hours per period.
   b. Be on the alert for attack missions 10 days per period.
   c. Conduct training and rest 10 days per period.

OPERATING SCHEDULE FOR 288 B-17D COMBAT CREWS

DAYS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
SEARCH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD
REST	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB
TRAINING	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH
ALERT	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF

1. The 288 combat crews are divided into units of 36 each for the purpose of assignment to missions and are designated by the letters A to H inclusive.

2. On the 1st day of operations, groups A and B search, G and H rest, E and F conduct training, D is on the alert for an attack mission and the underscored group C is also on the alert for an attack mission if airplanes of the reserve and maintenance force are in commission. Thus it is planned that 72 combat crews will search daily, 72 will rest, 72 will conduct training, and 72 will be on the alert for an attack mission.

3. It will be noted that over a thirty day period units will average:

   a. 7½ search missions averaging 10 hours per mission, or 75 hours per period.
   b. 7½ days rest per period.
   c. 7½ days training per period.
   d. 7½ days on the alert for attack missions.

REMARKS

1. It should be noted that a minimum of 216 B-17 Combat Crews are considered necessary. Considerable doubt exists as to whether or not this number of combat crews are sufficient for sustained operations. As has been pointed out, each combat crew will fly approximately 100 hours search per 30 day period and be on the alert for attack missions 10 days during the period. Further it is possible that over an extended period of time combat crews may never fire a round of machine gun ammunition or drop a bomb. They must, therefore, conduct a certain amount of routine training to maintain their combat efficiency. This training would be accomplished on the ten days set aside for rest. It is not improbable that a pilot would fly some 130 hours per 30 day period. It is believed that combat crews, particularly pilots, could not perform continious flying duty efficiently if required to fly over 100 hours per month for any length of time.

2. The 288 combat crew set-up is, therefore, recommended as an alternate plan and it is requested that serious consideration be given to assigning this number of combat crews in furtherance of the Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu.

(C-242-917-17)(8-9-41)- CHART 5



ITE

Position of USS BOISE at times indi

1840 - 27 Nov 1941 - Lat 16°
Long 153°

1851 - 27 Nov 1941 - Lat 16°
Long 153°

1927 - 27 Nov 1941 - Lat 16°
Long 153°

1743 - 28 Nov 1941 - Lat 14°
Long 148°

1920 - 28 Nov 1941 - Lat 14°
Long 148°

The above positions were obtained
courses and speeds back from the
on those dates. All data was obta
BOISE log.

These positions may be in error t
miles due to normal inaccuracies
and plotting.

79716 O—46—pt. 21 (Fa

GUIDE TO SYMBOLS

• FLEET TYPE COMBATANT VESSELS •

BB BATTLESHIP
Add Letters on Pin for CB, CC, (Battle Cruiser) and BM, (Monitor).

CV AIRCRAFT CARRIER

CV AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN CONCENTRATION

CA HEAVY CRUISER

CL LARGE LIGHT CRUISER

CL LIGHT CRUISER

DD DESTROYER
Larger Shape for DL, (Over 1800 Tons.)

SS SUBMARINE
Add Letters on Pin for SM (Submarine Mine Layer)

LARGE Over 300 Units | MEDIUM 50 to 300 Units | SMALL 1 to 50 Units

• CONCENTRATIONS •

BB,CC,CB-23 Units; CV-17 Units; CA-10 Units; CL,BM-7 Units; DD,SS-1 Unit

CONCENTRATION WITH NO HEAVY GUNS

CONVOY

• MISCELLANEOUS NAVY VESSELS •

PC, PE, PG, PR, PT, PTC, PY, PYc, XCL — PATROL VESSEL

AD, AG, AH, AT, ARC — TENDER (Without Bead)

AM, AMc, CM, CMc, DM, DMS — MINE SHIP (With Bead)

AC, AE, AK — NAVY CARGO VESSEL

AO — TANKER

AP — NAVY TRANSPORT

• NON-NAVY VESSELS •

ARMY TRANSPORTATION

COMMERCIAL VESSEL

• AIRCRAFT •



AIR BASE (OR CARRIER)

BOMBER SQUADRON (18)

FIGHTER SQUADRON (18)

PATROL SQUADRON (12)

SCOUTING SQUADRON (18)

Flag Under Pin Shows Number of Planes When Less Than Squadron.

Long Shank Indicates WING (100) Rather than squadron.

• MISCELLANEOUS •

INFANTRY DIVISION
MECHANIZED DIVISION
CAVALRY DIVISION

MARINE FORCE

NAVAL BASE

SUBMARINE BASE

SURFACE RAIDER

SUBMARINE RAIDER

SUSPICIOUS VESSEL

"HOT SPOT"

SEE SPECIAL FILE

SUBMARINE NET

MINE FIELD

MOMP

PLANE GUARD STATION

SHIP PIN ON WALL MAP, AT SEA

SHIP PIN ON WALL MAP, IN PORT

SHIP PIN ON PORT BOARD

SHIP PIN ACCOUNTED FOR IN TASK FORCE OR UNDER INTERIM C.N.O.

SHIP UNDER OVERHAUL

SHIP UNDER CONSTRUCTION


SECRET
DEC. 41
SECRET
DEC. 41
SECRET
DEC. 41
PORTS
SECRET
DEC. 41


SECRET
2 DEC. 41
SECRET
2 DEC. 41
SECRET
2 DEC. 41
PORTS
SECRET
2 DEC. 41


SECRET
3 DEC. 41
SECRET
3 DEC. 41
SECRET
3 DEC. 41
PORTS
ATLANTIC
HALIFAX
BOSTON
NEW YORK
BERMUDA
KINGSTON
BAHAMAS
TRINIDAD
PORT OF SPAIN
CURACAO
SAN JUAN
ANTIGUA
ST. LUCIA
ST. THOMAS
PORT ANTONIO
GUANTANAMO
SECRET
3 DEC. 41
PACIFIC
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN PEDRO
SAN DIEGO
HAWAII
MANILA
FOREIGN PORTS
SCAPA FLOW
SICILY
NEW ZEALAND
CORAM SEA
TARAWA


ECRET
DEC. 41
ALASKA
SECRET
4 DEC. 41
SECRET
4 DEC. 41
PORTS
ATLANTIC
NEW YORK
SCAPA FLOW
SICILY
MALTA
GIBRALTAR
HALIFAX
BOSTON
NEW LONDON
NEWPORT
PHILADELPHIA
CHARLESTON
SAVANNAH
NEW ORLEANS
GUANTANAMO
SAN JUAN
TRINIDAD
RIO DE JANEIRO
DAKAR
CAPETOWN
ALEXANDRIA
SUEZ
BAHREIN
SINGAPORE
DARWIN
BRISBANE
NEW ZEALAND
BATAVIA
CORAL SEA
TARAWAN
SECRET
4 DEC. 41
PACIFIC
PUGET SOUND
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN PEDRO
SAN DIEGO
HONOLULU
MANILA


SECRET
5 DEC. 41
ALASKA
SECRET
5 DEC. 41
SECRET
5 DEC. 41
PORTS
SECRET
5 DEC. 41
PACIFIC
FOREIGN PORTS


SECRET
6 DEC. 41
SECRET
6 DEC. 41
PORTS
SECRET
6 DEC. 41



DISPOSITION OF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET 7 DEC. 1941


COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS
LEGEND
58 Numerals indicate Cable Huts (existing).
96 Numerals, circled, indicate Cable Huts planned but not yet constructed.
Heavy lines, between huts, indicate the general trace of cable lines (existing).
Broken lines, between huts, indicate the general trace of proposed cable lines.
97
105
98
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103
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102
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106
100
59
61
101
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70
71
93
62
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
INCLOSURE NO. 2
LEGEND
4 — POLICE DISTRICTS
45 — RAILROAD BRIDGES
(34) — HIGHWAY BRIDGES
ELECTRIC LINE POWER HOUSE TO SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. 22 MILES
ESSENTIAL TELEPHONE SWITCH-BOARDS (OUTSIDE HONOLULU)
DEPARTMENT ENGINEER OFFICE HHD FT SHAFTER REVISIONS
ISLAND OF OAHU
SCALE 1:80,000
MILES
YARDS
REPRODUCED BY 11TH DEPT. ENGINEER MAP REPRODUCTION PLANT
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
HONOLULU
Waikiki
Aiea
Pearl Harbor
Kaneohe Bay
Waianae
Nanakuli
Maili
Waialua
Kahuku
Laie
Kaneohe
Kailua
Waimanalo
Makapuu Head
Diamond Head
Maunalua Bay
Ewa Beach
Barbers Pt.
Kahe Pt.
Makaha
Mokuleia
Kawailoa
Punaluu
Hauula
Kaipapau
Waiahole
Waikane
Kualoa Pt.
Mokapu Pt.
Lanikai
Mokuauia I.
Moku Manu I.
Manana I.


INCLOSURE NO. 3
LEGEND
PLANTATION GENERATING PLANT—CONNECTED TO H. E. CO. SYSTEM
PLANTATION GENERATING PLANT—NOT CONNECTED TO H. E. CO. SYSTEM
TRANSFORMER—APEX TOWARD LOW SIDE
44000 VOLT LINE
11000 VOLT LINE
6600 VOLT LINE
4000 VOLT LINE
2300 VOLTS AND BELOW
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
DISCONNECT SWITCH
#0/0, #0, #4, ETC.—WIRE SIZE, B. & S. GAUGE
DESCRIPTION
NO. | NAME | VOLTS | SOURCE OF SUPPLY | LOCATION
1 FORT KAM. and HICKAM FIELD 6600 PUULOA SUB-STA. NEAR PUULOA R.R. STATION
2 FORT ARMSTRONG 2300 POWER PLANT ALAKEA and HALEKAUWILA ST.
3 FORT DE RUSSY 2300 MC CULLY SUB-STA. PUNCHBOWL and LIME ST.
4 FORT RUGER 2300 KAIMUKI SUB-STA. HARDING AVE. BET. 9th and 10th AVE.
5 FORT SHAFTER 2300 KALIHI SUB-STA. Uhi and KAMEHAMEHA ST.
6 FORT WEAVER NOT CONNECTED TO H.E. CO. SYSTEM
7 SCHOFIELD BARRACKS 44000 WAHIAWA SUB-STA. NEAL ST. OPP. MULIWAI ST.
8 FORT BARRETTE 11000 EWA SUB-STA. HONOULIULI, EWA PUMP 7.
9 BELLOWS FIELD 2300 WAIMANALO SUB-STA. WAIMANALO
10 ALIAMANU CRATER 2300 KALIHI SUB-STA. Uhi and KAMEHAMEHA ST.
11 FORD ISLAND 2300 WAIMALU SUB-STA. PEARL CITY, HON. PLAN. PUMP 7.
12 WHEELER FIELD PUMPING PLANT 4000 WAHIAWA SUB-STA. NEAL ST. OPP. MULIWAI ST.
13 TRIPLER GENERAL HOSPITAL 2300 KALIHI SUB-STA. Uhi and KAMEHAMEHA ST.
14 HAWAIIAN ORDNANCE DEPOT 2300 " " " " " " "
15 FORT RUGER PUMPING PLANT 4000 KAPAHULU SUB-STA. KUHIO AVE. NEAR MAKEE RD.
16 HAWAIIAN Q.M. DEPOT 2300 POWER PLANT ALAKEA and HALEKAUWILA ST.
NOTE- All power 60 Cycles A. C.
INDEPENDENT GENERATING PLANTS
CONNECTED TO H. E. CO. SYSTEM
PLANT | No. UNITS | K. W. | VOLTAGE | TYPE DRIVE | K. W.
1 HONOLULU PLANTATION CO. 1 1500 440 ENGINE TOTAL 1500
2 EWA PLANTATION 1 1250 440 ENGINE
1 1250 440 ENGINE
1 2500 11000 TURBINE TOTAL 3000
3 OAHU SUGAR COMPANY 1 800 2300 DIESEL TOTAL 800
4 WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO. 1 2000 6600 TURBINE
1 900 6600 HYDRO
2 700 440 ENGINE TOTAL 3500
5 KAHUKU PLANTATION 1 1500 11000 TURBINE
1 800 440 ENGINE TOTAL 2300
6 WAIMANALO PLANTATION 1 345 440 ENGINE TOTAL 345
7 U. S. NAVY 1 2000 2300 TURBINE
1 3000 2300 TURBINE TOTAL 5000
TOTAL CONNECTED 15645
NOT CONNECTED TO H. E. CO. SYSTEM
1 OAHU SUGAR COMPANY 1 1800 440 TURBINE
1 750 440 TURBINE
2 750 440 TURBINE TOTAL 3450
2 WAIPAHU COMPANY 1 250 2300 DIESEL
1 45 220 DIESEL TOTAL 634
TOTAL NOT CONNECTED 3784
TOTAL INDEPENDENT COMPANY 19429
KAHUKU SUB-STATION 2000 KVA 44000/11000V 300 KVA 11000/2300V
KAHUKU PLANTATION 1000 KW 11000 V 1000 KW 440 V 2000 KW TOTAL
WAHIAWA SUB-STATION 1500 KVA 44000/11000V 300 KVA 11000/2300V
300 KVA 2300/460V
WAIMEA SUB-STATION 150 KVA 44000/2300 V
AWA SUB-STATION 750 KVA 44000/2300V
WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO. 2300 KW 6600 V 1000 KW 440 V 3300 KW TOTAL
WAIALUA SUB-STATION 4600 KVA 44000/6600 V 450 KVA 6600/4000V
GASTHER SUB-STATION 2250 KVA 44000/6600 V
WAHIAWA SUB-STATION 3000 KVA 44000/4000 V
WHEELER FIELD PUMPING STATION 4000 V
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
WAIANAE CO. PLANTATION 434 KW 2300 V
WAIANAE SUB-STATION 225 KVA 11000/2300 V
LUALUALEI
SUB-STATION 2250 KVA 44000/11000 V
LUALUALEI SUB-STATION 300 KVA 11000/2300 V
SUB-STATION 225 KVA 11000/2300 V
MAILANI SUBSTATION 750 KVA 44000/11000 V
WAIPIO SUB-STATION 750 KVA 44000/11000 V
HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC CO. WAIAU PLANT 7500 KW 11000 V ADDITIONAL 15000 KW 11000 V (1941) PEARL CITY SUB-STA. 7500 KVA 11000/2300 V
WAIPAHU SUB-STATION 300 KVA 11000/2300 V
WAIPAHU SUB-STATION 1000 KVA 44000 2300 V
OAHU SUGAR CO. PLANT WAIPAHU 2300 KW 440 V
OAHU SUGAR CO. 800 KW
STANDARD DREDGING CO. 7500 KVA 44000/11000 V
HONOLULU PLANTATION CO. 1800 KW 440 V
AIEA SUB-STATION 3000 KVA 44000/11000 V
EWA SUB-STATION 4500 KVA 44000/11000 V
EWA MAHIAHUA SUB-STATION 30 KVA 11000/2300 V
EWA PLANTATION 2500 KW 11000 V 1250 KW 440 V 1250 KW 440 V 5000 KW TOTAL
CAMP MALAKOLE
FORT BARRETTE
WEST LOCH SUB-STA. 150 KVA 11000/2300 V
FORT WEAVER
HICKAM FIELD
FORT KAMEHAMEHA
PEARL HARBOR
U.S. NAVY 5000 KW
ALIAMANU CRATER
HAWN ORD DEPOT
TRIPLER GEN HOSP
FORT SHAFTER
PUUOA SUB-STATION 2000 KVA 44000/11000 V 7500 KVA 44000/11000 V 10500 KVA TOTAL
KALIHI SUB-STA.
SCHOOL ST. SUB-STATION
HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC CO. PLANT HONOLULU 60000 KW 11000 V
FORT SUB-STATION 2500 KVA 11000/4000 V
TRIPLER SUB-STATION 1500 KVA 11000/44000 V
MUUANU SUB-STATION 750 KVA 11000/4000 V
HAWN Q.M. DEPOT
FORT ARMSTRONG
KAIMUKI SUB-STATION
KEWALO SWITCH STATION
KAKAAKO SUB-STATION 450 KVA 11000/4000 V
KAILUA SUB-STATION 750 KVA 11000/4000 V
MOKAPU PENINSULA
MOKAPU SUB-STATION 600 KVA 11000/4000 V
U.S. NAVAL STATION HEEIA 15 KVA 2300/208/120 V
WAIKELE SUB-STATION 375 KVA 11000/2300 V
WAIKEE SUB-STATION 150 KVA 11000/2300 V
BELLOWS FIELD
WAIMANALO PLANTATION 345 KW 440 V
WAIMANALO SUB-STATION 450 KVA 11000/2300 V
MIU SUB-STATION 750 KVA 11000/4000 V
FORT RUGER PUMPING PLANT
FORT RUGER
KAPAHULU SUB-STA.
FORT DE RUSSY
GRAPHIC SCALE—MILES
REVISED JULY 15, 1941



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

ORIGINAL RADAR PLOT OF STATION OPANA
INCL 1 - TO Ltr:

HAFMIPAC, file A C 413.884, Subject: "Original Plots and Data of Radar Stations on Oahu compiled on 7 Dec, 1941," dtd 24 Nov 45

ISLAND OF
OAHU

0 5 10 15 30 45 60

SCALE IN STATUTE MILES

6QN
OPANA

SECRET